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Chapter 1
Introduction to the Problem
1.1 Introduction
The Islamic Republic of Iran is a country with many problems, especially with its
economy. However, for many people outside Iran, its name is associated with three
products: pistachio nuts, carpets, and oil. Although the first two products are well
known, they contribute only a small fraction to the Iranian economy. Oil comprises
the vast bulk of the Iranian economy. Therefore, it is important that Iran uses the latter
to the benefit of the economy. On this principle all Iranians agree, but the question is
how it can be achieved. Most people in Iran believe that the current policy; that is,
making energy available at extremely low prices, is the best way for the Iranian people
to benefit from its energy resources. In this study we analyze this popular belief and
will reveal alternative policies. Furthermore, since oil is an exhaustible resource, we
will show that Iran's current domestic energy policy willlead to an economic disaster
in the not so distant future, and that drastic change in Iran's domestic energy policy is
required.
This chapter contains a brief introduction to the problem analyzed in this
research. Section 1.2 discusses the subject and objective of this research. Section  1.3
discusses the research methods   used, and Section 1.4 contains an outline   of  the
contents.
1.2 Research Objectives
The subject of this research is to optimize, or better improve, the longer-term -up to
2020- use of different energy carriers in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Generally
speaking the optimal energy basket is the basket that captures the opportunities of
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international and domestic energy markets, and avoids and/or eliminates threats and
constraints faced by the domestic energy sector. At present the level of consumption
of different energy carriers as well as the division of consumption over energy carriers
in Iran is far from optimal. Due to Iran's extremely low prices of energy carriers,
energy is not allocated efficiently.
The Iranian economy depends heavily on crude oil export, which is some 80%
oftotal exports. However, the market share allocated by OPEC limits Iran's oil export.
Improving Iran's production capacity could result in a larger market share when
renegotiating the shares, but with many of Iran's reserves beyond their production
peak a significant increase in production is difficult if not impossible to realize.
Therefore, the domestic growth of consumption of all types of energies strongly
affects the Iranian economy.
During the years   1988   to   1998 1, Iran's average annual growth   rate of final
energy consumption has been 6.7%, and at the same time the average annual growth
rate of the consumption of refined petroleum products has been 4.2%. If this trend
continues, the domestic demand of crude oil will be about three millions barrels per
day by the year 2010 (IIES, 1994). On the other hand, crude oil production will, by
2010, be less than 4 million barrels per day. Iran's main reserves have passed their
peak production, and reservoir pressures are dropping. Even if the National Iranian Oil
Company (NIOC) manages to develop all new fields currently known, production will
only be about 3.5-3.8 million barrels per day by 2010 (IIES, 1994).
Figure   1-1   illustrates the various trends. If Iran's domestic energy policy  is not
changed, there is a fair chance that Iran's domestic consumption requirements will
change it from an oil exporting country to an oil importing country somewhere
between 2010 and 2020. As a result, the income from oil will be reduced drastically.
Even policies to reduce domestic oil consumption, such as the investment in gas
production facilities for domestic gas use and for the use of gas in oil and power
production will no longer be possible. This will hamper the improvement of oil
production in existing fields, as well as the development of new oil fields. Needless to
say, that before this happens Iran will face severe economic and social problems.
' The Iranian calendar year starts on March 21 and ends March 20 the following year.
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Figure 1-1. Possible trends of Iranian domestic oil production and consumption
Apart from oil Iran has large associated and non-associated natural gas
reserves. These gas reserves are difficult to export. However, gas is produced for
usage in oil production. With good domestic energy policy it is possible to (partly)
replace the domestic use of oil products by natural gas; this can be achieved in several
direct and indirect ways. This policy would postpone the switching point from oil
export to oil import,  and oil export is possible for a longer period of time, earning
money that can be used to improve the non-oil economy (Ministry ofEnergy, 1999).
In the past, three main factors have contributed to the inefficient and
uneconomical energy consumption in Iran. These factors are:
-   The energy sector is under the complete control of the government and is
managed inefficiently and ineffectively.
- Iran's domestic energy prices are among the lowest in the world and often even
below production costs. Domestic energy use is implicitly heavily subsidized.
-   The absence of effective non-price energy policies that would mitigate the
effect of the low energy prices.
All three factors are important, but the extremely low (subsidized) prices ofthe energy
carriers have caused the high rates of energy growth in households as well as
industries. Furthermore, the lack of energy conservation regulations, such as building
and construction codes, amplifies the non-optimal use ofenergy.
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Also in the primary energy sector (power and refinery) the current organization
of the domestic energy sector leads to severe problems. Because energy prices are low,
the sector cannot invest from its own financial resources, but requires government
funding and is subject to constant ministerial control. This results in slow and often
ineffective decision-making, which culminates into large inefficiencies in the primary
energy sector.
Thus, Iran's present energy basket is not optimal, neither from an available
energy resource, nor from an effective and efficient use point of view. Therefore, this
research aims at
"identifying  the strengths  and weaknesses  of Iran's  domestic energy  sector,  as
well as its  opportunities and threats,  in order to formulate a domestic energy policy
that, better than the current policy (or better the lack thereoD, benefits the Iranian
economy in the long-term.
.
The research will in particular answer the question of how Iran's energy
pricing policy should be adjusted, possibly in combination with energy conservation
policies, to improve domestic energy use and Iran's economic performance. It is our
intention to base our policy proposals on sound empirical analysis. The reader should,
however, be aware of the many political and economic problems Iran faces (and has
faced in the past), which complicate such an empirical analysis.
Apart from the complex problem of Iran's domestic energy prices, Iran has
two other main policy issues. First, Iran has large quantities of associated and non-
associated natural gas that can be produced cheaply, and is easier to use domestically
than to export. This policy is already in place and progress has been made. Second,
Iran's government sector is large and operates slow. The government exerts tight
control over all energy related activities. First steps have been taken towards
liberalization and privatization, but these steps are far from adequate to having an
overall efficient energy sector.
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1.3 Research Methodology
To improve Iran's domestic energy policy we apply a combination of methods. First
we apply strategic planning to identify Iran's threats and opportunities as well as its
strengths and weaknesses. These are then used to identify the main strategic issues and
to formulate the main policies. Second, an econometric model of Iran's domestic
energy sector is formulated. This model is then used to analyze the formulated policy
scenarios.
For an organization or firm, the formulation of a strategy is based on surveying
the external environment for threats and opportunities, and an internal survey of
strengths and weaknesses, taking into account the expectations of stakeholders and the
institutional culture   of the organization   (Hill,   2001).    As is shown in Figure    1 -2,
strategy is created at the intersection of an external appraisal of the threats and
opportunities an organization faces in its environment, expressed in terms of key
factors for success, and an internal appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of the
organization itself, distilled into a set of distinctive competences. Outside
opportunities are to be exploited by inside strengths, while threats are to be avoided
and weaknesses circumvented. The values of the leadership as well as the ethics of the
society and other aspects of so-called social responsibility are to be taken into
consideration, both in the creation of the strategies and in their subsequent evaluation
when choosing the "best" strategies. Once a strategy has been chosen, it is translated
into policies that can be implemented. In the literature this is know as Strengths and
Weaknesses, and Opportunities and Threats or SWOT analysis (Koch, 2000 and 2001;
and MindToots, 2003).
According to the above, the strengths and weaknesses, and the opportunities
and threats the organization faces must be specified. A strategy will be chosen in such
a way that it captures the opportunities and strengths, and reduces the weaknesses as
well as the possible effects of threats. The strong and weak points are the result of an
internal analysis. These are within the authority of the policy makers and they can
influence them. The opportunities and threats are part of the problems environment
and cannot be influenced by the policy makers, but merely worked around.
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This methodology will be applied to Iran's domestic energy sector. Although
SWOT analysis has originally been developed for corporations and their strategic
planning, the methodology can also be applied for a region or a country. In each
situation, one can identify the internal and external factors needed for a SWOT
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Figure  1 -2. Selecting a strategy based on strategic analysis
Once the policies to implement the strategy have been formulated, their
viability needs to be tested. For this a quantitative instrument in the form of an
econometric model of Iran's s domestic energy market shall be formulated. This
instrument should allow us to quantify the effects of the policy and check whether the
proposed policies are beneficial to the Iranian economy and the Iranian people.
There are a few restrictions for this research. First, Iran is a member of OPEC
and intends to stay within OPEC. We will not analyze what could happen if Iran
would leave OPEC. Although an interesting exercise, this research focuses on Iran's
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domestic energy market. Furthermore, Iran has many political problems, both
domestically and internationally.  On top of that Iran is located in a part of the world
that is known for its many political problems that cannot be resolved easily. When
finalizing this study the United States invaded Iraq, and it is unclear what the near
future will bring to the Persian Gulf region. We are aware of the many political
problems and undoubtedly a war in Iraq will have an effect on Iran -which was linked
to Iraq in president's Bush's axis of evil-, but it is beyond our research capabilities to
analyze the possible effects  of the war.
1.4 Research Structure
The starting point for this research is a description of Iran's current economic situation
as well as a brief review of its past since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.  This  is the
subject of Chapter 2.  We will show that the current domestic energy policy harms the
economy and if the current trends in domestic energy consumption and production
continue, Iran will face far more serious economic problems than it already does. This
domestic analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Iran's domestic energy sector, as
well as its opportunities and threats, is essential for the formulation of a better
domestic energy policy.
Moreover, the Iranian economy is affected by several international factors,
such as the policies of oil producing countries, and more in particular OPEC,
international oil markets and more general international energy markets, trends in
future consumption of energies in the world, energy intensity in developed and
developing countries, environmental policies, etc. In the strategic planning
methodology, these are called environmental factors that are not under the authority of
domestic decision-makers. They may hold threats or opportunities for Iran's domestic
energy sector and it is necessary to analyze these threats and opportunities. This is
discussed in Chapter 3.
The analyses of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are used in Chapter 4 to conduct a
complete SWOT analysis and formulate strategies as outlined in Figure   1-2.  It
explains how the SWOT analysis can be used to analyze Iran's domestic energy
sector.
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To analyze the potential policies that result from the new domestic energy
strategy a suitable model is required. Chapter 5 reviews energy demand models and
their usefulness for our research goal. It discusses three main types of models General
Equilibrium, Variance Autoregressive models, and traditional Structural or
Simultaneous Equation models.  We will argue which type is most suitable for our
analysis.
In Chapter 6 the actual model is built and tested, and used to simulate a
reference scenario up to the year 2020. This reference scenario indicates how the
domestic energy sector will develop without a change in policy.
Chapter 7 evaluates the effects of the new domestic energy policies as
formulated in Chapter 4 and analysis how these affect economic growth. It will be
shown that, contrary to popular belief in Iran, domestic energy price increases have a
positive effect on the domestic economy. The effect of increased energy prices is
domestic energy conservation, which increases the oil export potential. As we shall
show, the income from extra oil exports in combination with the domestic revenues
from increased energy prices, allows the Iranian economy to lower inflation and to
invest more in economic development.
Chapter 8 contains conclusions and recommendations for further research.
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Iran's Economy and Domestic Energy Markets
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter the main strengths and weaknesses, as well as opportunities and threats
governing Iran's economy are reviewed. Given the subject of this research, in
particular the role oil and gas play in Iran's economy will be discussed. Iran's main
export commodity is crude oil and Iran is a prominent member of OPEC. Although
the OPEC member countries review the production quota at least every six months, a
country's production quota does not fluctuate that much. As a member of OPEC,
Iran's total crude oil production quota  is,  for  the time being,  set  at 3.84 million barrel
per day (bbl/d), which is, as we will show, close to its production capacity. Changes
in quota are used in efforts to stabilize the price of crude oil; OPEC currently aims at
a price of oil between 22 and 28 US$ per barrel. Despite these efforts, the price of
crude oil shows large fluctuations. In January 1999 the price was less than 10 USS per
barrel, which passed in silence, whereas it was more than 32 US$ in February 2001,
leading to strong pleas from the industrialized world to increase production. Because
of these swings in international oil prices, Iran's income from oil export is very
volatile, and this of course has strong implications for its economy and the planning
thereof.
There is one extra complication. The production quota set by OPEC cover
domestic demand and export. So a growing domestic demand for oil products reduces
the amount of oil available for export. As we shall show, this causes major challenges
for Iran's domestic energy policy, since this problem was -and to a large extend still
is- insufficiently recognized by the Iranian government. This has led to an
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unsustainable domestic energy policy that can, as we will show, only be solved
through tough policy measures, such as a drastic domestic energy price increase. The
question is how to formulate these measures in such a way that the short-lerm
negative economic and social consequences for the Iranian people are minimal.
Already for many years Iran has implicitly subsidized domestic energy use (as
it does with many other commodities) through extremely low prices, which are among
the  lowest in the world.  For example, the price of one liter regular unleaded gasoline
in Iran in the year 2000 was 4.7 US$-cents, based on the free market exchange rate.
This price is extremely low compared to 32.8 US$-cents in the USA, 94.4 US$-cents
in  Germany, 108 US$-cents  in the Netherlands,  and 136 US$-cents in Norway  in  the
first quarter of 2000 (IEA, 2000). The prices of other oil products reflect similar
differences, as do natural gas and to a lesser extent electricity. The current pricing
policy is such that energy use in Iran is implicitly heavily subsidized, since energy is
sold below its opportunity value (and on several occasions even below its production
Cost).
The energy intensities of Iran's economic sub-sectors that resulted from this
domestic energy policy are much higher than those in other countries, and have
increased rapidly for a long time. Domestic primary energy consumption has grown
by a factor 5.6, from 142.4 million barrel of oil equivalent (BOE) in 1974 to 795.1
million BOE  in  1998, most of which is met by oil products, whereas the real GDP
grew   by a factor   of   1.6  only, from 10,869 billion   Rial   to   17,051   billion  Rial
respectively. This large difference in growth factors, which was not the result of a
drastic change in the structure of the economy, illustrates the severity of the domestic
energy problem.
Remark: For this research a databank, containing energy and economic data
was established in cooperation with the Institute for International Energy Studies
(IIES) in Tehran. All data were made consistent and therefore can differ from those
published by, for example, the Ministry of Energy in the Energy Balance and the
Statistical Yearbook. A brief description of the data available will be given in Section
5.4.
This has resulted in a domestic demand for oil of 1.21 million barrels per day,
limiting  the oil export potential  to 2.51 million  barrels  per day  in  1998. So, implicit
energy subsidies are increasing rapidly and at the same time exports earnings are
decreasing. As we will show, total implicit energy subsidies have increased, and
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amounted to more than US$ 14.3 billion in 1997 (which is about 95 percent of the
dollar value of oil revenue). This mechanism puts a lot of pressure on Iran's economy
and seriously limits its potential for growth.
In this chapter Iran's economic development is reviewed and special attention
will be paid to the role of energy in the growth of the economy. Section 2.2 reviews
Iran's main economic variables, its economic growth rate, employment, productivity,
and population growth, as well as some relevant past policies. Section 2.3 briefly
reviews Iran's primary energy reserves, and discusses domestic energy production
and consumption. The energy intensities of various economic sectors are discussed in
this section also. Section 2.4 discusses the nominal and real domestic prices ofenergy,
border prices, and what this means in terms of implicit energy subsidies. Section 2.5
reviews Iran' s domestic energy policy intentions for the future as agreed upon by the
Iranian parliament, the Majlis. Since Iran is a member of OPEC, the role of OPEC and
its impacts on Iran's economy as well as the quota restrictions are discussed in this
section also. Section 2.6 contains conclusions.
2.2      Iran's Main Development Indicators
This section discusses the main indicators that are of importance when describing a
country's economy. These comprise demographic indicators, macroeconomic
indicators, and for Iran the role of oil and oil income. To understand Iran's strengths
and weaknesses, as well as opportunities and threats, it is necessary to discuss all of
these issues. In Subsection 2.2.1 population and employment are discussed.
Subsection 2.2.2 reviews the role of oil revenue as a share of the total economy
government expenditure. Subsection 2.2.3 is concerned with macroeconomic
indicators as real gross domestic product, labor productivity, and investment and
consumption.
2.2.1    Population and Employment
According to the international population classification, Iran is among the top fifteen
of countries in terms of population growth (IMF, 2000).  In 2000, the population was
63.9 million people (CBI, 2001), compared to 31.95 million people in 1974. A high
population growth rate and a low average age are the two main characteristics of the
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Iranian population. Table 2-1 shows the share of young people in Iran's total
population between 1974 and 2000.
Between 1974 and 2000 major changes occurred in terms of rural and urban
population also. The share of the urban population grew from 45.1% in 1974 (14.4
million) to 64.7% in 2000 (41.4 million). The total annual population growth rate over
the period 1974-2000 was 2.7%, but the population growth rate of cities over the same
period has been 4.1% annually, whereas in rural areas it was only 1%. This shows that
the Iranian economy is changing from a rural economy, based on agricultural
products, to an urban economy requiring a larger manufacturing and services sector.
Table 2-1. Iran's population structure
Year Total population     Annual growth Age group 0-19     Population 15-65
(Million) rate (Percentage) (Percentage) (Percentage)
1974 31.9 2.7 54.7 51.4
1980 39.3 3.9 55.3 51.6
1985 47.6 3.9 55.8 51.3
1990 54.5 2.5 54.9 51.9
1995 59.2 1.5 51.9 55.0
2000 63.9 1.6 49.4 57.7
Source: Iran Statistical yearbook, Statistical Center of Iran, 1998; and CBI, 2001.
The share of the population at working age (15-65 years) has grown also, from
16.4 million in 1974 to 36.9 million in 2000, an annual growth rate of 3.1%. To
provide work for the young urban population, strong economic growth is required.
However, as we will show next, the growth of employment opportunities has been
much lower, leading to much (hidden) unemployment.
Employment
In 1974, about 8.43 million people were employed, whereas in 2000 this number
almost doubled to 15.87 million, an average growth of only 2.40% annually. The major
part of employment in the private sector is in small commercial enterprises. Total
private sector employment in 2000 was about 68.8% The government sector, with
31.2%  in 2000,  was by far the largest employer. This indicates a seriously inflated
government. The ratio of people employed over economically active people' was
1 Economically active people are the people between the ages of 10 to 65, excluding
students, housekeepers without pay, and income recipients without work.
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83.7% in 2000, which in turn results in an unemployment rate of 16.3% (Central Bank
of Iran, 2001). Especially in recent years Iran has experienced a strong increase  in the
rate of unemployment, in 1996 it was much less 9.1% (CBI, 1997).
Every person with work, on average, has to earn enough to support 4.2
persons. This situation is worse when the hidden unemployment in the inflated
governmental sector is taken into account.    For an extended discussion of these
population issues, see Salehi-Isfahani (2000).
2.2.2 Oil Revenues in Iran's Economy
Iran, as an oil exporting country, is in the group of basic commodity supplying
countries. Its national economy strongly depends on the export of crude oil.
Therefore, the performance of Iran's total economy is strongly affected by
fluctuations in oil income, and given OPEC's quota system these fluctuations are
mainly caused by fluctuations in international oil prices. This dependency of oil can
be further characterized as follows; also see Table 2-2.
Table 2-2. Importance ofoil income in Iran's economy (in percent)
Year GVAo,isec,04  GDP
Share of oil in export   Share of oil income in
income government budget
1974 89.0 86.4 44.4
1980 94.8 61.1 9.4
1985 96.8 39.7 14.1
1990 93.2 53.9 21.2
1995 82.4 64.2 18.1
1996 86.1 57.2 17.5
1998 75.7 30.8 15.6
2000 85.5 59,0') 13.6
Sources: National Account o f Iran, Central Bank Yearly Balance, and Economic Trends, all
published by the Central  Bank of Iran.
Note: Gross value added (GVA) and GDP in constant 1982 market prices.
 This includes oil revenue and income form free market oil dollar sales.
The ownership of Iran's oil and gas reserves as well as all related industries is
with the government. Since oil is Iran's main export commodity, a large part of the
public budget stems directly from oil export. Any unexpected decrease in oil income
affects the government budget directly and can result in dramatic problems, as was the
case in 1998 when oil prices fell to almost 10 US$/bbl.
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Table 2-2 shows that the share of crude oil export in total export income has
always been more than 75%, even when oil prices were low, and normally is over
80%.  During the period of 1974-2000 dollar oil revenues were on average responsible
for more than 86% of Iran's dollar revenues
In addition, the share of oil income in the government budget is high too.
Table 2-2 shows this share strongly fluctuates, which is due to fluctuations in
international oil prices. Figure 2-1 shows the trend ofthe OPEC basket oil price and
Iran's revenue from oil export. The figure shows that, with the exception of the years
1980-1982 when Iran faced a lower level  of oil production,  and as a result oil export,
due to the Iraq-Iran war, Iran's oil revenues closely follow the oil prices. The share of
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Figure 2-1 OPEC's oil price and Iran's oil revenue
The importance of oil is also reflected by the share of the real gross value
added  of the oil sector  in  Iran' s total real gross domestic product (GDP), which  is  on
average about 19%; see Table 2-2.
Over 95% of the domestic energy demand is met by the fossil fuels oil and
gas, which are transformed by Iran's energy sector into the energy carriers demanded.
students, housekeepers without pay, and income recipients without work.
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Iran's government sector has grown rapidly in the past and all major energy
industries are either owned by the state or completely depend on the state. Examples
are the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), the National Iranian Gas Company
(NIGC), the National Iranian Oil Refining, Distributing Company (NIORDC), and
National Petrochemical Company (NPC), which are all subsidiaries of the Ministry of
Petroleum; also see Section 2.5.
Note that the energy sector is not the only sector dominated by the government;
also the insurance industry, iron and steel, and the banking sectors are either owned or
completely controlled by the government.
2.2.3 Economic Trends
When discussing the changes in Iran's GDP since 1974, three main periods have to be
distinguished. The first period is the period before the Islamic revolution (1974-1979),
which was politically unstable time due to social unrest. The second period, 1979-
1988, was a very chaotic period, which started with the Islamic revolution in February
1979 and shortly thereafter, in September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, starting a war that
lasted till August  1988  when a ceasefire was agreed  upon. The third period started  in
1989, when rebuilding Iran was high on the political agenda. To achieve this the
Iranian government introduced social-economic five-year plans, which were
introduced for the first time in  1989.
The first two periods, for obvious reasons, show large fluctuations in
production.  The real gross domestic product at constant 1982 market prices (denoted
by GDP) first increased from 10,869 billion Rial in 1974 to 13,255 billion in 1977,
but then came down sharply to 9,177 billion in 1981; see Figure 2-2.
During the war period Iran's export capacity decreased, whereas its
requirements increased. This is illustrated in Figure 2-2 by the fact that GDP is below
or only slightly above the sum of consumption, investment, and government
expenditure.
However, as a result of the war effort, the reduction in GDP was partly
compensated by a considerable growth in  1982 and  1983, and in  1985  it was  11,607
billion Rial again. Thereafter, the real GDP decreased again for two years and was
rather constant until 1989. Iran's efforts to increase its GDP during this period were
17
rather constant until 1989. Iran's efforts to increase its GDP during this period were
counterbalanced by the destruction of many of its vital industries and the resulting
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Figure 2-2.  GDP and  its main components in 1982 market prices
In  1989,  one year after the 1988 cease-fire  and the start of the reconstruction,
real  GDP was 11,067 billion Rial Since  then,  real  GDP has shown a moderate  but
continued growth; also see Figure 2-2. To coordinate reconstruction, the first five-year
plan was developed for the period 1989-1994.
Table 2-3. Labor productivity,  and GDP, consumption, and investment per capita  in
103 Rial
Year Productivity GDP Consumption Investment
1974 1288.9 340.2 118.7 51.1
1980 983.3 240.8 136.4 47.0
1985 1132.9 256.1 153.2 45.3
1990 973.3 225.9 138.8 25.3
1995 1073.7 258.8 158.1 38.5
2000 1189.9 290.5 171.3 37.9
Growth: 1988-2000 2.3% 2.9% 10% 4.5%
Growth: 1974-2000 -0.3% -0.6% 1.4% -1.2%
Source: National Account of Iran, Central Bank Yearly Balance, and Economic
trends, published by Iranian Central Bank, various volumes
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The war period also (partly) explains the growth of the government sector, but
the main cause of Iran's inflated government is the revolution, in which the "great
requisition" and "nationalization" occurred.  This was partly because  of the economic
view of politicians who thought (and many still do) that the government  can  run the
economy, and partly because the war needed extraordinary coordination of all efforts
Due to the fast population growth and chaotic economic development, the per
capita GDP decreased by 0.6% per year, and came down from 340 thousands Rial
(5,196 US$) in 1974 to 295 thousands Rial (168 US$) in 2000; see Table 2-3. A
reduction of almost 24% in per capita income, based on real Rial values, which is
even worse in US$ terms. In the same period, the number of employed people went up
from 8.4 million to 15.6 million.  As a result, labor productivity fell from  1.29 million
Rial per employee (17,488 US$) in  1974 to 1.19 million Rial (680 US$) in 2000;  see
Table 2-3.
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Figure 2-3. Shares of GDP components in constant 1982 market prices
Although labor productivity decreased during the period before 1989, and as a
result during the total period 1974-2000, the country succeeded in improving its labor
productivity during the third period, with a growth rate of 2.3% per year; see Table 2-
3.  The annual growth rates  for the whole period  and the period after the ceasefire
show that some improvement has been achieved for the latter period.
Bottom line is that the average growth rate of population in 1974-2000 was
about 2.7%, while the economy has not responded to this growth. The real GDP
19
growth has been 2.1% per annum on the average in the same period, resulting in an
annual decrease ofper capita GDP by 0.6%.
Consumption and capital formation
As shown in figure 2-3, the share of private expenditure in real GDP has grown from
34% in 1974 to more than 67% in 1990 and then decreased again slightly to 57% in
2000. Adding government expenditure of about  11%, the national expenditure is 69%
of GDP.
The share ofcapital formation in 1974 was 14.9%, increased to 24.8% ofGDP
in   1977, the highest value   in the whole period, and showing,   with some swings,   a
downward trend. The share was 12.6% in 2000. Compared to other developing
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Figure 2-4. Contribution ofeconomic sectors in generating GDP
Compared to more successful developing economies, an investment share of
14.1%  is  a  low. For example, the shares of capital formation  in  real  GDP of China,
Malaysia, South Korea, and Indonesia are 43%, 39%, 38%, and 29%, respectively
(IMF, 2000). The share of capital formation in GDP of OECD countries is also
considerably larger, denoting a bottleneck in Iran's GDP growth. Capital formation in
some selected OECD countries is, United Kingdom (19.6%), USA (16.7%), the
Netherlands (20.0%), Australia (23.8%), and Germany (21.1%). These shares are
rather steady already for some time and show no drastic swings (IMF, 2000).
Figure 2-4 shows the contribution ofeach major economic sector in total GDP
during recent years. Notice that the service sector in Iran is large.
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Government policy
One of the most difficult points to discuss here is the development of government
policy in Iran. After the revolution of 1979 and during the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988)
the economy of Iran has actually become a centrally planned one. This had lead to a
very complex situation in which almost all aspects of the economy were/are run by
the state, and this is certainly the case for the energy sector. With the revolution, most
privately owned banks and energy companies were nationalized, as were many other
activities. Almost ten years after the revolution, by the end of the Iraq-Iran war, the
Iranian economy was, by international standards, in a very bad condition. Imports,
exports, and most other activities depended on a complex system of government
approval, and the prices of most basic goods were heavily subsidized. The state
control of the economy did, however, have several positive effects also. Social
indicators, such as poverty reduction and the closing of the gender gap, have
improved considerably and Iran serves as an example to comparable countries (World
Bank, 200 la).
Immediately after the end of the war, Iran developed its first five-year
development plan (FYDP) to improve its economy, and has been working on this ever
since. In March 2000 the parliament accepted the third FYDP. We will not discuss all
problems, but only list those relevant for our research:
•   In the past the Iranian government has used up to twelve different exchange rates
for various categories of goods. The exchange rate for an imported good was (and
in many cases still is) set by the government, based on its view on the strategic
importance of the good. In recent years only three exchange rates (see below)
were used, and in 2002 Iran switched -in principle- to one market based exchange
rate.
•    There are many tariff and non-tariff barriers for imported goods. The government
has made alist of items that can be imported relatively easy.
•    Exports are bound by foreign exchange rules, minimum prices for exported goods,
quality regulations, and licensing.
•    Many domestic goods are either explicitly or implicitly subsidized. The amount of
(implicit) subsidies, although difficult to estimate exactly, amount to more than 15
and possibly even more than 20% of total GDP.
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• State control over the prices of many goods has lead to continuously decreasing
real prices.
•     Las but not least, to finance many of the policies, the increase in liquidity in Iran
has been as high as 30% per year, leading to double-digit inflation rates as well.
All this has resulted in an economy that depends more than any other on government
policy decisions and on state control. It is certainly not a textbook economy and
cannot be treated  as such. Given  the goal  of this research, which  is to provide insight
into the possibilities of domestic energy policy and domestic energy saving, we will
not aim at providing complete description of the total economy.  For this research we
will not try to model the total economic structure, but we will only build a descriptive
model of Iran's domestic energy sector, augmented with a limited number of
macroeconomic relations; see Chapter 6.
2.3        The role of energy in Iran's economy
In this section the role of energy in Iran's economy is discussed in general terms. The
basket of primary energy reserves, the transformation of energy for domestic use and
the losses of the transformation-sector, energy intensity, as well as energy
consumption in various sectors are analyzed.
Primary energy reserves in Iran
Based on the latest available information, the oil in place reserve in Iran is about 425
billion barrels, of which 89.4 billion barrels is recoverable in primary and secondary
production; that is, with 90% certainty this amount of oil can be recovered using
current technology (this is also called proven reserves). The average oil recovery
factor is about 21% of the total reserve. With the current level of technology,
production-reserve ratio is about 65 years (Ministry of Energy, 1999). This amount of
oil reserve is equal to 8% ofthe world reserves and 10% ofOPEC's reserves.
Iran's recoverable natural gas reserves are about 24.5 trillion cubic meter
(TCM) or 882 trillion cubic  feet (TCF).  This is equivalent to about 148 billion barrel
of crude oil. With the current level of production and technology, Iran's production-
reserve ratio is about 160 years. Iran owns about 16 percent of the world gas reserves.
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Apart from oil and gas, Iran also has a large potential of other energy
resources:
• Total reserve of coal is estimated  at 12.7 billion tones.
• Iran's hydroelectric potential  is more than 42,000 megawatt. of which only 4.7%
is currently used.
• Iran's solar energy potential is estimated to equal 130 billion barrel of oil
equivalent.
•   The potential for wind energy is about 6,500 megawatts.
Energy production and consumption
From 1974 to 1998 the consumption of primary energy has increased more than
458%, from 142.4 to 795.1 million BOE, final energy demand increased by the same
percentage, and the demand by the primary energy sector by including the losses
462%. The main primary energies supplied to the domestic market are crude oil and
natural gas, but also some hydroelectricity, solid fuels, non-commercial energies, and
renewable energies such as wind and solar are used. Next we discuss all energy
carriers used in more detail.
Crude oil
Iran's crude oil production capacity was about 6 million barrel per day before the
Islamic Revolution   of 1979. After the revolution, crude oil production decreased
reaching its lowest   level   of   1.28 million barrel   per   day   in    1981. The production
capacity in 1998 was 3.84 million bbl/d, and the daily average production was 3.73
million barrel. Figure 2-4 depicts the trend of oil production from  1974 till  1998 and
shows that a sharp drop in production occurred after the revolution, which was
amplified by the Iraq-Iran war.
Iranian experts believe that maintaining a production capacity of almost 4
million barrels per day in the years to come will be difficult. To keep this production
level, Iran has to invest much, particularly in gas injection projects to raise the
pressure of dying reservoirs. Achieving a higher level of production capacity is only
possible when a considerable amount of hard currency is invested in those fields that
are currently producing, and in the development of new fields. However, such a
policy would be at odds with Iran's OPEC quota, which does not even permit the use
of all capacity currently available. Although the excess capacity cannot be used
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currently because of quota limitations,  it can play a critical role in a time of OPEC
supply shortage. The latter provides an opportunity to recover the costs of excess
capacity and make a profit. For example, the cut in Iraqi production because of
political problems and the reduction in Venezuela's production offered members with
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Figure 2-4. Oil production, domestic demand for oil, and oil export
Figure 2-4 shows that the amount of crude oil supplied to meet domestic
demand has grown from 0.32 million barrel per day in 1974 to 1.21 million in 1998.
The average annual growth rate of the domestic demand for oil from  1974 to  1998
was 5.56%. However, its share in the domestic energy basket has come down from
81.95% in 1974 to 55.72% in 1998 due to the gas for oil substitution policy,
especially since the early nineties; see Figure 2-5.
As shown in Figure 2-4 the domestic consumption of crude is currently about
33% of production, and this share is increasing, threatening the export of crude oil and
thus   Iran' s main opportunity  to   earn hard currency. So without a change in Iran's
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Figure 2-5. Share ofthe main energy carriers in Iran's primary energy basket
Natural gas
Since  Iran has abundant natural gas reserves  (24.3 TCF which  is  15.8% of world
reserves  and   1.65  time  more  than its proven oil reserves), a major change  in  the
domestic energy market  over the last decade  has  been the replacement  of oil products
by natural gas. This policy will be continued in the future, because it has many
advantages. First, it increases the amount ofoil available for export. Ifwe assume that
the share of crude oil in Iran's domestic energy supply would have stayed at 82.7%,
this would require about  50% of the OPEC quota for Iran. Second,  the use of natural
gas is more energy efficient in refineries when transforming crude oil into petroleum
products, and power plants based on natural gas are on average more efficient also.
Third, natural gas is less emitting in terms of greenhouse gasses than oil products.
Finally, one should keep in mind that natural gas is more difficult to export. Investing
in international gas infrastructure faces many political problems, because the gas
pipelines have to cross several borders. This is especially true for Iran, which is a
difficult part of the world from a political point of view. LNG on the other hand
requires larger investments than the international oil trade does.
Iran has tried (and will try) to export its natural gas. Iranian gas is currently
exported to Turkey, which is an interesting market. However, Turkey has contracts
with other neighboring and gas producing countries also. From a Turkish point of
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view this increases the certainty of supply. This also shows that there is tight
competition in this region by Iran's neighboring countries.
Iran had a contract with the USSR also, but this contract has been canceled
after the collapse of the  USSR. As a result, the best way for Iran to utilize its natural
gas reserves is by domestic consumption while trying to extend its share in regional
foreign markets. Finally, many countries in the region try to export their natural gas,
which means there is more competition on the market for gas than on the market for
oil. Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Qatar are among the countries in the region
that would like to export their gas to the same markets as Iran, i.e. Turkey and then to
Europe, Pakistan, and India.
The primary consumption of natural  gas  in  1998  (336.9  MBOE)  is 21.6 times
that of 1974 (15.6), this is an average annual growth of 12.8%. For the period 1988-
1998 this growth rate is even bigger, 15.5%. As a policy it was decided in 1998 to
expand the domestic usage of natural gas.  As a result the share of natural gas in total
primary energy demand has grown from 19.3% in 1988 to 42.4% in 1998.
Despite the high share of natural gas in Iran's primary energy basket, the share
of oil in total energy consumption is still high. This is one of weak points in Iran's
energy supply, improvement ofwhich this research is trying to analyze.
Other energy resources
Currently the shares of hydroelectricity, solid fuels (mainly coal), and other fuels
(non-commercial fuels as wood and charcoal), in Iran's total primary energy
consumption  are  1.3%,  and 1.90% respectively. The share  of renewables is negligible.
In general Iran's hydroelectric power is directly connected to the overall electricity
grid; only in some isolated areas it is consumed locally. Major consumers of coal are
iron and steel manufacturers. Wood, charcoal, animal and plants wastes are used only
in remote rural areas, mainly as household fuels.
Losses and fueI use in the primary energy sector
Primary energy supplied into the domestic energy sector has to be transformed into
energy that can be used by end users. Refineries produce petroleum products and
power stations produce electricity. These final energies have to be transmitted or
transported to the final consumers. Transformation and transport themselves use
energy also. However, the energy efficiencies of these processes in Iran are low,
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certainly compared to state of the art processes, but also to other countries. The
difference between total primary energy demand (TPED) and total final energy
demand (TFED) gives the amount of own energy consumption and energy losses of
the energy sector; see Figure 2-6. This amount has increased from 30.7 million BOE
in   1974  to 172.6 million  BOE  in 1998, indicating an annual 7.2% growth  rate.  The
ratio of total own consumption  in the energy sector  in   1998  as a percentage of total
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Figure 2-6. Total final and primary energy demand;  loss  and  fuel of energy sector
The power sector is responsible for the major part of its own energy
consumption in the primary energy sector. With the development of the domestic
electricity market in combination with the low electricity prices the sector's energy
losses have increased.  As a percentage of the total own energy consumption by the
power sector has grown from 38.8% in 1974 to 55.0% in 1998.
Final energy consumption
Total final energy demand in 1974 was about 111.7 MBOE or 0.31 MBOE/day; see
Figure 2-7. With an annual growth rate of 7.2% it has reached to 622.5 MBOE or 1.7
MBOE/day in 1998. Petroleum products, with a share of 81%, covered the main part
ofthis demand in 1974. The share of natural gas in final consumption was only 17%
in that year. The share of petroleum products has decreased to 55%, whereas the share
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of natural gas has increased from to 35% in 1998, indicating once more the
considerable changes  in  Iran' s final energy basket
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Figure 2-7. Final energy demand and its main components
The average annual growth rate of petroleum products was about  5.58% over
the time period 1974-1998.   At   the   same time, natural   gas has grown   at   a   rate   of
13.26% per annum. Electricity demand has increased by 8 91% per year, coming from
9,152 million kWh (5.8 million BOE) in 1974 to 77,646 million kWh (48.9 million
BOE) in 1998. The smallest share (2%) is that of solid fuels. Figure 2-7 shows that the
petroleum products and natural gas meet the major part of Iran's final energy demand
(about 90.1 %)  So hydrocarbon energies cover more than 90% of Iran's total final
energy demand.
Energy demand in various economic sectors
Figure 2-8 shows final energy demand by the main economic sectors in 1998. With a
share of 36% the Residential & Commercial sector is the largest consumer of energy.
Transport and Industry are two other major consumers, responsible for 25% and 24%
respectively. The agricultural sector is the smallest consumer of energy. In the
following the details ofeach sector are discussed.
Remark: Unfortunately, the energy usage data per economic sector are
not available for the total period and these data are not reliable; also see Section 5.4.











Figure 2-8. Shares of final energy consumption by economic sector in 1998
Residential & Commercial sector
Annual final energy consumption by the Residential & Commercial sector has grown
on average by 7.8%, from 34.1 MBOE in 1974 to 222.3 MBOE in 1998. The share of
petroleum products was 85.1% in 1974 and that of natural gas 0.25%. In 1974 the
share of electricity and solid fuels were 8.5% and 6.1% respectively. As Figure 2-9
shows the fuel basket for this sector has changed drastically. Natural gas has replaced
petroleum products especially since 1990. The annual growth rate of natural gas
demand during the period is 28.9% while for petroleum products this is 54%. The
main portion ofthe gas is used for heating and cooking.
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Figure 2-9. Fuel mix in Residential & Commercial sector
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Transport sector
This sector is the second largest consumer of final energy. The consumption of the
transport sector has grown from 26 MBOE in  1974 to  155  MBOE in  1998, an average
annual growth rate of 7.3%.   As one would expect, almost all consumption of this
sector is in the form ofpetroleum products, although in recent years some vehicles use
compressed natural gas (CNG), and LPG. In some urban areas, such as Tehran, some
electricity is used for electrified trains, but the data on this usage are not available.
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Figure 2-10. Fuel mix in Industrial sector
Industrial sector
The industrial sector  is the third largest of energy user in  Iran,  with a share of 24%  in
1998; see Figure 2-8. The average growth rate of final energy use in this sector was
6.5% within 1974-1998. Total energy consumption  was  31.8   MBOE   in   1974   and
reached a level of 150.9 MBOE in  1998,
As shown by Figure 2-10, in contrast to the Residential & Commercial sector,
the main energy carrier of this sector is natural gas, with a share of 50.7% in 1998.
The shares of petroleum products, electricity, and solid fuels are 33.3%,  10.7%, and
5.3%, respectively. Compared to the other sectors the share of electricity in energy
consumption of the Industrial sector is large
Agriculture sector
Final energy consumption in the agriculture sector was 6 MBOE in 1974, which with
an annual growth rate of 7%, reached to 32 MBOE  in  1998. The share of this sector
has always been less than 6% of total final energy consumption. Petroleum products
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has always been less than 6% of total final energy consumption. Petroleum products
cover about 87.7% of total final energy used in this sector, while the remaining
demand (12.3%) is met by electricity.
Other final energy use
In Figure 2-8 about  10% of total final energy is consumed in miscellaneous activities
titled as "other", which include petrochemical consumption, and some other energy
and non-energy use.
In conclusion, the largest consumer of final energy is the Residential & Commercial
sector, with a considerable capacity to replace petroleum products by natural gas.
With a good pricing policy CNG can be economical in the transport sector, which
offers a tremendous opportunity to conserve petroleum products. Although the share
of natural gas in industry is high, there still is room for natural gas replacement at
affordable prices.
Energy intensity
The amount of primary (or final) energy used per unit GDP is an important and often
used indicator for the energy intensity of an economy. Although this indicator should
be used with care, it can be used to compare economies (Sun, 1998) and for energy
professionals has a distinctive informational value. We calculated the energy intensity
based on total primary as well as total final energy; see Figure 2-11.
As the figure shows, Iran's primary energy intensity has grown  from   13.1
BOE per one million Rial of GDP (at constant 1982 prices) in 1974, to 39.2 in  1990,
and reached 46.6 BOE in 1998. The annual average growth rate of primary energy
intensity over the total period was 5.3%. Despite some fluctuations in recent years, the
trend in energy intensity has been upwards. The energy intensity of based on final
energy was 10.3 BOE per million Rial of GDP in 1974 and 36.5 in 1998, so the
growth rate was the same as that of primary energy demand.
In the transport sector the energy intensity was 45.1 BOE per million Rial real
gross value added (GVA) in 1974 and grew to 146.3 BOE per million GVA in 1988,
but improved after the ending of the war to reach  118.6  BOE in  1998; see Figure 2-
12. This sector is by far the most energy intensive one. The average annual growth
rate ofenergy intensity was 4% over 1974-1998.
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Figure 2-12. Final energy intensity
The energy intensity of the industrial sector shows a different trend. The
overall annual average growth  rate  was   1.4%  over the evaluation period 1974-1998.
In recent years the intensity even shows a downward trend, mainly because of Iran's
improved economic situation due to high oil prices. Figure 2-12 clearly shows that the
Iraq-Iran war resulted in an upward trend. During the war Iran's industry worked
around  50% of its nominal capacity due to lack of funding, especially hard currencies
(which were historically injected by the government into the industrial sector at
favorite exchange rates), and the lack of (raw) materials. After the war idle capacities
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favorite exchange rates), and the lack of (raw) materials. After the war idle capacities
were used again and capacities were used more efficiently, causing the industrial
energy intensity to come down slightly.
Energy intensity in the agriculture sector is low, 4.3 BOE per one million Rial
real GVA in 1974 and 7.5 BOE in 1998, an annual growth rate of2.3%.
Since the growth rates  of the three sectors discussed  here are below the overall
growth rate, this can only mean that the Residential & Commercial sector shows a
much higher growth rate in energy demand.
2.4 Energy Prices and Implicit Energy Subsidies
In every country energy pricing is one of the most important energy and
environmental policy instruments. In most countries energy products are a revenue
raiser for the government. In most developed countries the border price of an energy
carrier is less than half of the consumer price. However, for Iran this does not hold.
Although the Iranian government sets the price of energy carriers, these prices have
not been set in an economically efficient way. For one, the real domestic prices of all
energy carriers have gone down almost every year over the last decade; also see
Figure 2-14. Furthermore, no attention has been paid to the relative prices. As a result,
the prices of, for example, gasoline and electricity are closer to their economic prices
than the prices of kerosene or gas oil.
Although aware of these problems, this has not lead to drastic changes in
Iran's energy pricing policy. Only in the second five-year plan (1995-1999) were
nominal energy prices adjusted, but as we shall show, in real terms these adjustments
were insufficient. However, further significant price adjustments planned for the third
five-year plan (2000-2004) have been abandoned. Recently the Iranian parliament has
decided to increase all nominal energy prices for end-users  by  10% and future price
increases will not exceed this. With an expected inflation rate of over 20%, the real
prices of energy carriers will go down once again. Given the fact that oil is the main
source of foreign revenue, in combination with the fact that Iran is hardly able to
produce enough oil to meet its OPEC quota, the potential for export will be reduced
once nlore.
This policy of decreasing real energy prices has resulted in large implicit
subsidies. The size of these subsidies are and have been the subject of much
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discussions, both within Iran (Mazraati and Fathollahzadeh, 2000; Saboohi, 2001) and
between Iran and aiding institutions as the IMF and the World Bank (World Bank,
1999 and 200lb). Here we will estimate the size of the implicit subsidies on final
energy demand using the border prices of petroleum products, natural gas, and
electricity.
One could, and many people in Iran do, argue that border prices are not the
appropriate prices to estimate implicit subsidies. Iran is rich in oil and therefore the
production cost should be used. However, Iran's current oil production capacity is
only just above (and some say on average even below) its OPEC quota. All oil
produced, or petroleum products obtained from it, available for export can be sold.
Furthermore, Iran's refinery capacity is insufficient to meet all domestic demand for
gasoline. Given this situation there is no excess supply, so the border prices for
petroleum products are the appropriate prices to calculate the implicit subsidies.
The main argument for low energy prices is that the Iranian people should
benefit from Iran's main resource. Since Iran is thought to have abundant energy
resources, energy should be available for the Iranian people at low prices, and some
used to argue even for free. However, this implicit income policy has lead to great
distortions in relative prices, which  in turn has resulted  in misallocation of the energy
resources. The question is not if the Iranian people should benefit from Iran's
resources, the question how can they benefit the most. Income policy through low
energy prices (and many other products) deprives the people from making their own
choices.  If they would  have the money equivalent of all implicit subsidies to spend at
their own discretion, they might make other choices than they are obliged to make
now.
In the following production cost of petroleum products and the nominal and
real prices of energy carriers are discussed, as well as border prices. The latter are
then used to estimate the implicit subsidies on energy.
2.4.1 Petroleum Product Production Cost
The Ministry of Energy of Iran (1998, p 86) calculated that the average cost of one
liter of a composite barrel of oil products is less the one US$-cent for all Iranian
refineries. Most likely these calculations are not based on the economic costs. If they
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are true, the profit margin of Iran's refineries would be the largest the world.  This is in
sharp contrast with the fact that some of them face continuous losses also.
Table 2-4. The characteristics of Iran's refineries in  1998
Refinery Remaining Replacement Depreciation
Current Active
Name lifetime* Cost cost (annual)
value of refining
capacity capacity
Unit Year US$/bbl US$/bbl Million US$ 1000 bbl/d
Tehran II 2 13000 1040 66.1 115.01
Isfahan 6 12500 3000 205.1 329.48
 Tehran I 0 10000                  0 0 115.01
Shiraz 0 10000          0           0          49.79
Tabriz           4 10000 1600 48.2 102.6
Arak 20 10000 8000 112.2 161.6
Bandar 24 10000 9600 170.8 227.67
Kermanshah           0                8000               0                 0               22.41
Abadan                 6 2250 540 44.1 393.69
Lavan            4 2030 320 2.6 27.87
*  Lifetime of a refinery assumed to be 25 years. Source: Pakravan, 1999
Pakravan (1999) provides us with a more serious estimate of the cost price of
domestically produced petroleum products, by analyzing all Iranian refineries and
their refining patterns. The following cost items were considered:
-      Transportation cost of crude oil from Persian Gulf to the refineries;
- Overhead costs;
- Refinery costs (including depreciation); and
-        Distribution cost of petroleum products  to the major distribution locations.
To calculate the depreciation cost, the refineries were valued at the replacement cost
of a new similar refinery. The investment cost of installing one barrel of refining
capacity ranges between US$ 2,030 and US$ 13,000 for simple and complicated
refineries respectively. Table 2-4 contains a brief specification of Iran's refineries. As
it can be seen all refineries are old and already beyond their economic lifetime, except
for Arak and Bandar.
In all calculations a free market exchange rate of 8,000 Rial per US$ was used.
The  price  of oil  was  set  at  the FOB Persian Gulf price  of 10.59 US$/bbl. Table  2-5
contains the estimated cost price of refined products in Iran as well as Persian Gulf
FOB prices. The table shows that the cost price of refined products in Iran, when
based on economic cost, is close to the international prices.
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Next we look at domestic and international energy prices.
Table 2-5. Iranian supply cost and international prices of petroleum products in 1998
Cost Price Persian Gul f FOB priceProducts





Gas oil 8.5 8.3
Fuel oil 6.4 5.9
Source: Pakravan, 1999.
2.4.2 Energy Prices
Prices of goods and services determine the allocation of resources in every market
economy. For this reason, changes in relative prices will cause changes in resources
allocation. Energy prices affect consumer welfare and the cost of production, because
energy costs are part of every household's budget and every manufacturer's cost
structure. However, in Iran the government and not the market determine energy
prices; energy prices are administered prices. Before the revolution  of 1979,  as  well  as
during the Iraq-Iran war, the nominal prices of energy products were kept almost
constant; see Figure 2-13. After 1988 energy prices were adjusted somewhat; the
price of gasoline has changed more than the prices of other products, because it is
regarded a luxury product rather than an essential good.
In the first five-year plan (1989-1993), special attention was paid to energy
demand. In order to control the growth rate of energy demand, as well as to decrease
implicit energy subsidies, prices of energy carriers in nominal terms were increased.
At the end of the first five-year plan the price of gasoline was 50 Rial per liter (3 US$-
cent), that of kerosene  15 Rial (0.9 US$-cent), of gas oil  10 Rial (0.61 US$-cent), and
that of fuel oil 5 Rial (0.3 US$-cent) respectivelyz. The weighted average of all
nominal prices of petroleum products  was  16  Rial,  which is equal  to 0.97 US$-cent.
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Figure 2-13. Nominal price index ofpetroleum products in Iran (1977=100)
Due to the devaluation of the Rial-US$ value, domestic energy prices in terms
of US$  have not increased considerably. Table 2-6 contains the three most important
exchange rates for Iran. The table shows that large differences in dollar value will
occur depending on the exchange rate used. However, the dollar prices are low for all
three ofthe exchange rates.
Table 2-6. Exchange rate ofthe Rial per US$
Year Free market Non-oil export rate Official oil export rate
1992 1,498 NA 65.7
1993 1,810 NA 1,646.3
1994 2,808 NA 1,749.0
1995 4,064 2,897 1,747.5
1996 4,446 3,008 1,751.7
1997 4,782 3,008 1,752.5
1998 6,468 5,395 1,752.5
1999 8,682 7,645 1,752.5
2000 8,188 8,078 1,752.5
2001 7,994 7,920 1,752.5
Source: Central Bank of Iran, "Economic Indicators", various issues.
Table 2-7 shows that the price of gasoline in Rial has increased by 34% per
year over 1994-2000, whereas it has increased by only 14.9% per year in US$-terms
when using the free market exchange rate. The same holds for other energy carriers.
The weighted average ofthe petroleum products was 44 Rial in 1996 and 75 in 1999,
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when using the free market exchange rate. The same holds for other energy carriers.
The weighted average of the petroleum products was 44 Rial in  1996 and 75 in  1999,
which is equal to only 2.5 and 4.3 US$-cent per liter respectively at the most
favorable exchange rate, the official oil export exchange rate; see Table 2-6.
Table 2-7. Iran's nominal prices for petroleum products in Rial and US$-cents
Year Gasoline | Kerosene I   Gas oil   |   Fuel oil   I     LPG     |   Jet fuel
Rial per Liter
1994         50        15        10        5         27        24
1995 100       20       20        10        27       30
1996 130       30       30        15        55        37
1997 160       40        40        20        68        47
1998 200       50        50        25        91        58
1999 350 100 100       50        123       73
2000 385 110 110       55       135       80
1994-2000 34.0% 33.2% 40.0% 40.0% 26.8% 20.1%
US$-Cent per liter using the free market exchange rate
1994 1.8 0.5 0.4 0.2 1.0 0.9
1995 2.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.7
1996 2.9 0.7 0.7 0.3 1.2 0.8
1997 3.3 0.8 0.8 0.4 1.4 1.0
1998               3.1 0.8 0.8 0.4 1.4 0.9
1999 4.2          1.2          1.2 0.6 1.5 0.9
2000 4.7          1.3          1.3 0.7 1.6 1.0
1994-2000 16.2% 15.1% 22.1% 22.1% 9.0% 2.2%
Source: Energy Balance of Iran, 1998, Economic trends, Central  bank of Iran,  1999
In comparison, the price o f premium leaded gasoline in OECD Europe in  1999
was 89.7 US$-cent per liter. In the many European countries prices were even higher.
In, for example, Norway and France the  1998 pump prices  were  1.065  US$  and 0.901
US$ respectively (IEA, 2000). (These prices include about 70% taxes and levies.)
One  can also compare the prices in Table  2-7  with the average 1999 international
prices. For gasoline, gas oil, and fuel oil the Rotterdam spot market prices were 13.6
US$-cent, 13.8 US$-cent, and 6.1 US$-cent respectively (OPEC, 1999). So even
compared to these bulk market prices without taxes the Iranian consumer prices in
US$, which cover supply costs and taxes also, are very low. Finally, another study,
comparing fuel prices all over the world (Metschier, 1999), states that the untaxed
benchmark retail pump price for gasoline is US$-cents 21 and that for gas oil 18 US$-
cents. These large differences between prices all over the world and the Iranian prices
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As energy prices play an important role in the production costs of goods and
services, it is difficult for the government to change these real energy prices rapidly
without causing social unrest. That is one of the reasons the Majlis, the Iranian
parliament, refuses to approve energy price increases in line with inflation
The prices of electricity and natural gas in 1998 were 62 Rial (3.5 US$-cent)
per kWh and 39.4 Rial (2.2 US$-cent) per cubic meter respectively, which are
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Figure 2-14. Real domestic energy prices
As    Figure 2-14 shows, despite    Iran' s larger nominal price increases    of
petroleum products, electricity, and natural gas during the period 1994-2000, this has
not lead to increases in real prices, because of Iran's high inflation rate (20.8%
annually between 1994 and 2000). So in real terms, prices of energy have been going
down for a long time. Only gasoline experienced a somewhat higher real growth rate
in recent years. As a result ofthe very low real prices ofenergy products, energy users
in Iran have no urge to use energy efficiently. This holds for all economic sectors.
Although some policy makers and representatives of congress, as well as
independent researchers are convinced a substantial up-ward adjustment   of  Iran' s
domestic energy prices based on sound economic reasoning is required, no decisions
to achieve this have been taken so far. Iran lacks a sound energy pricing mechanism
based on the opportunity cost of each energy carrier, equal to the pricing of natural
gas based in the Netherlands, where, for example, the price of natural gas for
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based on the opportunity cost of each energy carrier, equal to the pricing of natural
gas based in the Netherlands, where, for example, the price of natural gas for
households and small business is based on the trend in the international price of
heating oil.  Also a long run strategy for the process of energy price determination in
Iran is still absent.
In the next paragraph we will estimate the implicit subsidies on energy, which
can be interpreted as negative taxes also. In the light of long term planning, these
negative taxes should gradually vanish (World  Bank,   1999  and  2001 b),  and  in  the
end, as a policy instrument and government revenue raiser, positive taxes could
emerge.
2.4.3 Implicit Energy Subsidies in Iran
In economics, subsidy is defined  as "...a payment  made  by the government  (or
possibly by private individual) which forms a wedge between the price consumer pays
and the costs incurred by producers, such that price is less than marginal costs.-
(Pearce,  1986).  In case of an implicit subsidy the government does not make an actual
payment, but its policy results in a wedge between the economic value of a good or
service and the price the consumers pay. In many countries endowed with an
exhaustible resource this occurs when the government supplies the good extracted
from the resource (or goods produced from the extracted good) to the domestic
consumers at a price below the opportunity cost of the good. As was shown above,
this is the case for energy products in Iran.
The Iranian consumers value a marginal barrel of (say) fuel oil at the current
price the same as they value other goods they could buy for the same amount.
Exporting the fuel oil would result in a larger amount of money and if given to the
consumers they would be able to buy more other goods and thus increase their
welfare. Since the prices of petroleum products are below their domestic production
costs, even pricing them at that level would lead to an increase in welfare.
What should be used as the opportunity costs of energy products in Iran,
marginal production costs or border prices, needs some thought. As was argued
above, Iran has no excess supply capacity. Furthermore, due to the life cycle of oil
reserve depletion, new investments are required to keep production at its existing
level. This research was induced by the fact that the amount of oil available for export
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is falling due to strong increases in domestic demand. This means that Iran is not in a
situation of excess supply.  In such a situation the border prices of petroleum products
should be used as the basis for the opportunity cost.
Note that this is similar to the pricing of natural gas adopted by the Dutch
government when the huge gas reserve in the province of Groningen was discovered.
Despite the  fact that The Netherlands had an abundance of natural gas, certainly when
it was only just discovered, the Dutch government based its domestic gas pricing
policy on the international market prices of the main competitors (fuel oil for the
industry and heating oil for domestic consumers) right from the start.
The model we use to calculate the subsidies per fuel is simple. Let PB;' be the
border price of fuel j in US$, PD; the domestic price in US$, and D,1 the amount of
fuel j used domestically.  The implicit subsidy in US$ of fuel j. denoted by  S/, is
defined as Sl = (PBJ  _ PDJ )DJ  .
Of course an important problem to solve is estimating PBi. For this we used
several sources. In the following the estimation of implicit subsidies is calculated
based on the following assumptions:
•  The Singapore FOB prices for petroleum products are used as the opportunity
cost. The freight rates from Singapore to the Persian Gulf are not included, since
the products would be available from neighboring countries. Also the domestic
distribution costs are neglected. This error is, however, small since these costs in
Iran are rather low.
•  For electricity the end-use pre-tax price of electricity in Turkey is used as an
estimate for the opportunity cost of this energy carrier, which was 6.7 US$-cent
per kWh in 1997. In Turkey private companies produce electricity and most of
the fuels used in power generation have to be imported. Note that the Turkish
price of electricity is close to the average price of electricity in OECD countries.
In  1996 the Iranian Ministry of Energy stated that the average opportunity costs
based on border fuel prices were 4.5 US$-cents per kWh: Unlike FOB petroleum
prices, it is difficult to get a good estimate of electricity border prices. We know
that for 1997 it must be between 4.5 and 6.7 US$-cents. We do not want to
overestimate the border price of electricity and given the fact that cost of the fuel
3 Payam-e-energy, No. 13, Vol. 2, February 1997.
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mix in electricity production in Iran will be lower than that of Turkey, 6.7 US$-
cents per kWh is an upper bound. We (rather arbitrarily) set the border price for
electricity in  1997 at the average value of the two prices.
•   For the opportunity cost of natural gas we looked at two possibilities. Turkey
imports natural gas from Iran at a price of about 0.08 US$ per cubic meter. On the
other hand Iran pays on average only 4.2 US$-cents to Turkmenistan for usage of
their gas in the North of Iran . Since Turkmenistan is land locked and has no other
opportunity to export gas, this price is most likely the minimum price. We set this
border price of natural gas equal to the average price paid to Turkmenistan.
One last important factor that determines the size of the implicit subsidies is
the exchange rate used to express domestic energy prices in US$ terms. For this we
use the free market exchange rate.
The energy subsidies calculated below are based on total final energy demand
(TFED in terms of the model of Chapter 6); the energy transformation sectors have
not been taken into account.
Table 2-8. International border prices of energy carriers  in  Iran
Year Jet fuel LPG Gasoline Kerosene  Gas oil    Fuel oil   Nat. gas Electr.
$/liter $/liter $/liter $/liter $/liter $/liter $/mj $/kWh
1994 0.128 0.128 0.126 0.128 0.124 0.086 0.042 0.054
1995 0.141 0.141 0.139 0.141 0.137 0.095 0.042 0.055
1996 0.163 0.163 0.161 0.163 0.159 0.110 0.042 0.057
1997 0.157 0.157 0.155 0.157 0.153 0.106 0.042 0.056
1998 0.102 0.102 0.100 0.102 0.099 0.069 0.042 0.051
1999 0.139 0.139 0.137 0.139 0.136 0.094 0.042 0.054
2000 0.191 0.191 0.188 0.191 0.186 0.129 0.042 0.058
Source: Own calculations.
The results of our estimations  are in Tables 2-8 and 2-9. Table 2-8 shows the
border prices for the period 1994-2000 and Table 2-9 the total implicit subsidies. The
latter amount to a staggering 14.4 billion US$ in the year 2000, based on a price of
Iranian oil of 22 US$/bbl. The amount of implicit subsidies is, however, strongly
affected by the price of oil. For example in  1998, when the implicit price of Iranian oil
4 The reason why Iran imports gas in the North is that it would be more expensive to
build a pipeline from its own gas resources to this region.
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was  only  10.8  US$/bbl, the amount of implicit subsidies  was  "only" 9.3 billion  US$.
On average the implicit subsidies are between ten and fifteen percent of the gross
domestic product in dollar value.
The approach outlined here will also be used in chapters 6 and 7 to calculate
future energy subsidies and the effect ofopportunity cost pricing.
Table 2-9. Energy subsidies in billion US$
Year Jet fuel LPG Gasoline Kerosene  Gas oil   Fuel oil  Nat. gas Electr. Total
1994 0.10 0.40 1.31 1.43 2.74 0.97 1.64 3.55 12.15
1995 0.11 0.42 1.22 1.45 2.71 0.91 2.01 3.79 12.61
1996 0.15 0.54 1.46 1.91 3.54 1.07 2.72 4.44 15.83
1997 0.15 0.48 1.54 1.58 3.22 1.08 2.51 4.15 14.70
1998 0.09 0.31 0.91 0.95 2.04 0.64 1.88 2.60 9.29
1999 0.13 0.46 1.28 1.23 2.68 0.66 1.31 3.42 11.17
2000 0.19 0.68 2.03 1.78 3.79 0.88 1.39 3.64 14.38
Different assumptions lead to different estimates. The estimates per fuel by
Pakvaran and reported in Subsection 2.4.1, are slightly lower than our estimates. This
is most likely due to a different base year and differences in the oil price. In 1997 the
Ministry of Energy estimated the amount of subsidies on petroleum products,
electricity, and natural  gas at 7.3,2.5,  and 1.35 billion dollars respectively (Ministry
of Energy, 1997). Note that our estimates are at the high end of these previous
estimates.
2.5 Energy Policy Formulation
In the previous sections the structure of Iran's energy sector was discussed. In the
current section Iran's current energy policy intentions are outlined, although it should
be kept in mind that these are intentions and still need to be translated into actual
policies. As we shall show this is a cumbersome process in Iran (as is the case in
many other countries).
After the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq in  1988, the first five-year plan for
the period 1988-1993 was formulated and approved. Surprisingly, the energy sector
was not approached as a separate issue in this plan. Electricity and the oil sector were
discussed separately. The plan didn't contain any policy for restructuring the energy
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sector. The plan only discussed the functioning of the Ministry of Petroleum and the
Ministry of Energy (which is actually only responsible for power), not a long-term
plan.
In the second (1995-1999) and the third five-year plan (2000-2004), energy
issues received the attention they deserve, and were discussed comprehensively. The
new policies are in a separate section of the latest plan approved by Majlis. The
adjustment of energy prices as well as liberalizing parts of the energy sector was
approved in the second FYP.
In Subsection 2.5.1 the most important government bodies and the procedures
followed are briefly discussed. In Sub-section 2.5.2 the main strategic policy
intentions of the energy sector as formulated the third FYP are briefly discussed.
2.5.1 Decision Taking and Decision Making
The governmental decision making process is a complex one, and this certainly holds
for Iran. There are two main lines, with many connections. There is an elected
president and an elected parliament, the Majlis. The president is head of the executive
branch of power.  He and his cabinet develop the energy policy, which has to be
approved by the Majlis first.
After approval by the Majlis, a proposal is sent to the Council of Guardians,
which consists of six theologians appointed by the Supreme Leader and six jurists
nominated by the judiciary and approved by the Majlis. This council must check all
bills that pass parliament, to make sure they do not contradict Islamic law. The
Council of Guardian is the most influential body in Iran.
If the Majlis and the Council of Guardians disagree, the Expedience Council
will mediate. This council is active in policy-making and its members are prominent
religious, social, and political figures. It advises the Supreme Leader, who also
appoints the members.
The Supreme Leader is at the top of Iran's political power structure. The
Supreme Leader - currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei - appoints, among others, the
clergy members on the powerful Council of Guardians, and he has to confirm the
election of the president.
All these institutes have to agree when a new energy policy is introduced. It
will be obvious that this is not simple, especially since the political views of the
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members of the different bodies differ considerably and an understanding of the
relationships between all issues involved is often lacking.
Energy Policy formulation
At the highest level, the cabinet formulates energy policy. Four ministries and the
Organization of Atomic Energy each have a task:
•  The Ministry of Petroleum is responsible for oil and gas and all downstream
activities;
•      The Ministry of Energy is responsible for electricity;
•      The Ministry of Mining and Manufacturing is responsible for coal;
•      The Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for rural renewable energy; and
•  The Organization of Atomic Energy is responsible for renewable and atomic
energy. (This organization  is the direct responsibility of President Khatami.)
Because energy plays such an important role in the Iranian economy, the
planning of long term energy matters, such as the formulation of the five-year plan,
and the yearly budget allocation prepared by the individual ministries, are coordinated
by Management and Planning, an office under the direct responsibility of the
president. Only then the coordinated plans are send to the parliament.
All financial consequences have to be approved by, what is called the
Economic Council, which consists of high-level representatives of the president, the
Central Bank of Iran, the Ministry of Finance and Economics, and the Ministry of
Petroleum.
Because the Ministry of Petroleum is the most important ministry in the matter
of upstream and downstream oil and gas, an organization chart of this ministry is
added; see Figure 2-15. This figure will help to better understand the discussions in
the remaining chapters.
The boxes at the top directly support the minister and are headed by a director
general. The term deputy indicates a department within the ministry that is headed by
a deputy-minister. The four companies are independent entities with a board of
directors headed by a managing director that is appointed by the minister.
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Figure 2-15. The Ministry of Petroleum and its subsidiaries
OPEC
OPEC is an organization that affects Iran's opportunities in the international oil
market is OPEC, of which Iran is one of the founding members. OPEC's main goal is
to  stabilize the price  of oil. To achieve this the ministers of petroleum of the member
countries meet at least twice a year to discuss the production quota of each member
state. Through this restriction of production OPEC tries to influence the international
price of oil. The success of this policy has varied  in the past. Table 2- 10 shows some
of the production quota for several periods. Since OPEC covers only part of all
producers, OPEC also tries to convince other oil producing countries, such as Russia
and Norway, to act in line with the OPEC decisions to stabilize prices. However, this
policy is only occasionally successful.
Currently OPEC tries to stabilize the price of oil between US$ 22 and US$ 28
per barrel. A recurring problem is the fact that members with access production
capacity cheat and produce more oil than is agreed upon. With the reduction in
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reserves outside OPEC and the expected increase in demand from developing
countries, it is expected that the future role of OPEC in oil price stabilization will
increase.
Table 2-10. OPEC's oil production quota in 1000 barrels per day
Apr82- Mar93-  2nd half April SeptemberCountry Mar83 Jun93 1998 2000 2000
Algeria 650 732 788 811 836.6
Indonesia 1,300 1,317 1,280 1,317 1,358.6
I.R. Iran 1,200 3,340 3,318 3,727 3,843.8
Iraq 1,200 400       -        -
Kuwait 800 1,600 1,980 2,037 2,101
Libya 750 1,350 1,323 1,361 1,404.2
Nigeria 1,300 1,780 2,033 2,091 2,156.6
Qatar 300 364 640 658 678.8
Saudi Arabia 7,150 8,000 8,023 825.3 8,512.2
U.A.E. 1,000 2,161 2,157 2,219 2,289.4
Venezuela 1,500 2,257 2,845 2,926 3,018.8
Total OPEC 17,150 23,301 24,387 25,400 26,200
Source: ASB, 1999, EIA 2000.
Speed of the decision process
It will be clear that the complex and centralized structure of decision preparation and
decision taking in Iran does not favor quick responses to changes in domestic or
international energy markets. It also hampers negotiations with foreign oil companies
and others, whose expertise is needed to improve Iran's energy sector capabilities.
This problem is further complicated by the fact that the Iranian law currently prohibits
direct investment in upstream energy activities by foreign companies. This means that
production sharing contracts and concessions in which a foreign company owns (part
of) the oil are not allowed. Only in downstream activities foreign investments are
allowed nowadays.
2.5.2 Policy Improvement Plans
In the third five-year plan a number of domestic and international energy issues were
addressed and policy intentions were formulated. Here we briefly state those issues
that affect our analysis ofthe domestic energy market.
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• Because Iran's oil production capacity is decreasing, priority will be given to
investments to increase oil production and/or to improve the quality of production
and supply. This should increase Iran's oil and gas production capacity (or at least
keep it at its current level).
•   Given the technical infrastructure currently available in Iran, the security, quality
level, and reliability of the supply of electricity, natural gas, and petroleum
products has high priority.
•   The substitution of crude oil by downstream products that have a higher added
value, such as petroleum and petrochemical products, and possibly electricity.
•    Optimization of domestic energy consumption and conservation. To achieve this
energy prices must be increased to the regional level. This should result in
conservation and protection of Iran's natural resources.
•  The government companies need to achieve financial self-reliance and create
incentives for participation and involvement of the non-government sector of the
economy in the energy market. Gradually this should result in the elimination of
monopolies in electricity generation, oil and gas refineries, and the distribution of
petroleum products and associated services. These companies should be managed
and operated in a commercially viable way.
• Energy conservation programs shall be designed with incentives, such as financial
support, for all economic sectors.
•   When the companies are economically viable. the government will sell (part of)
its shares in the holdings of state-owned companies to cooperatives and/or the
private sector.
•   The government will create an open and fair system to assign contracts for work
related to the manufacturing of equipment and projects in the energy sector to
private, cooperative, and governmental companies.
•    The government will promote research in the energy sector with the aim to reduce
the cost of finished products and the foreign currency component. Financial
support for these research activities will be provided to the non-government
sector, universities, and research institutes. The research aims at demand side
management and the development of energy conservation plans.
•  The different energy resources of the country (oil, gas, hydro, nuclear energy,
coal, and renewables) shall be utilized according to their relative local advantages,
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based on economic factors and environmental considerations. To this end the
share of natural gas, electrical power, and renewable energies should increase.
The five-year plan's articles related to energy, were passed by the Majlis in March
2000, and are in chapter 15, titled Energy.
Although these intentions are far reaching and seem to cover all aspects of
improving domestic energy consumption, it has to be said that the translation into
actual policy is still far away and in some cases meets fierce political resistance. Most
important, higher increases in energy prices, which were close to the inflation level
during the second five-year plan, were actually abolished again for the third five-year
plan period. Until now the increases were about 10% each year and this is expected to
continue at least till 2004, but most likely also thereafter; also see Chapter 6.
2.5.3 Regional Opportunities
In addition to the policies discussed above, Iran has the opportunity to become a
major energy trader in the region. The collapse of the Soviet Union has led to the
establishment of independent states in the Caspian Sea region, which have significant
oil and gas resources. Kazakestan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan offer the
opportunity to swap energy with Iran.
When the rush of the investing companies to the region first started the only
matter of concern for these companies was to sign a production sharing agreement.
The problem of transportation of the oil and gas from these landlocked countries to
the world market was not of immediate concern. Now that oil and gas have been
found, the problem of transportation to the market has become important. If the
decision on the optimal route could be limited to the evaluation of the parameters that
have a direct impact on the technical and economic feasibility, the problem could be
solved easily. Transportation via Iran given its large energy infrastructure, would be
the optimal solution.
However, this problem is more of a political nature and under the
circumstances, the techno-economical aspects of the problem  seem to have no bearing
on the decision regarding the route selection. Under the USA's Iran-Libya Sanction
Act (ILSA) it is difficult to implement the most economical solution. For example, the
USA backs the construction of the Ceyhan pipeline with a capacity of one million
barrels   per day, which is approximately    1,038   miles   long   (281 miles through
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Azerbaijan, 135 miles through Georgia, and 622 miles through Turkey). Construction
costs are estimated to be between US$ 2.8 billion and US$ 4.0 billion. Construction
on the Turkish section of the pipeline started mid 2002, and the pipeline is expected to
be finished late 2004. Without the backing of the USA, this pipeline would be
uneconomical and was therefore criticized by many.
In case the sanctions against Iran would be lifted, or other countries would
ignore them, Iran has the necessary capability to offer a number of solutions for the
transportation of oil and gas from the landlocked regions (Nematollahi, 2000):
•    Iran can act as a safe transit corridor for oil and gas pipelines to the world markets
with a competitive transit fee.
•    Iran can directly purchase oil from these countries (up to 800,000 barrels per day)
for its oil refineries in the north of Iran.
•  Having the necessary infrastructure, Iran can enter into swap agreements with
these countries, receiving oil  in the north, at Neka, south east of the Caspian Sea
and delivering equal volumes of Iranian oil for export at the Persian Gulf.
•  Having an increasingly integrated gas pipeline network, Iran can purchase gas
from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan for consumption in its northern provinces
and/or for export to Turkey, rather than transporting gas from its own gas fields in
the south, thereby saving energy and investment costs.
The region is known for its many national and international political problems.
Therefore, once production is on stream, the landlocked countries in the Caspian
region will want to diversify their export routes to guarantee security of supply to
their customers. In that case Iran can benefit when offering economical routes, with
good infrastructure, and a sound knowledge of the oil business.
For this study it is important to remember that Iran already delivers gas to
Turkey and utilizes gas from Turkmenistan in the north. Furthermore, Turkmenistan
uses the Iranian gas infrastructure to deliver gas to Turkey also.
2.6 Conclusions
Demographically a large percentage of young people, high population growth, fast
urbanization, and a high rate of unemployment characterize Iran. Economically, a
low rate of GDP growth (with an even lower growth rate of productivity), a
decreasing share of investment, and an increasing share of consumption expenditure
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characterize Iran. The government sector in Iran is large by any standard, and the
government controls all major economic activities, resulting in slow decision making.
The export of oil is by far the most important revenue raiser and plays a vital
role in Iran's economy.  In  1998 the share of oil revenue in dollar export, government
budget, and gross value added was 75.7,30.8, and 15.6 percent receptively.
Iran is endowed with rich energy resources. Iran's proven oil reserves were
about 86.4 billion barrels in early 1999, resulting   in a production-reserve ratio  of
about 60 years. Iran's natural gas reserves are about 24.3 trillion cubic meter or 857
trillion cubic feet. This is equivalent to 148 billion barrel of crude oil, and the
production-reserve ratio is about 160 years. Iran has a large potential of other energy
resources also.
The domestic demand for crude  oil has grown  to 1.21 million barrels  per day
in 1998. The average annual growth rate of domestic supply of oil for 1977-1998 has
been about 4.2%, much higher than the average rate of growth of the real gross
domestic product, which was only 1.20%. However, the share of oil  in the domestic
energy basket has come down  from  82% in  1977  to  57.6%  in  1998. This reduction  in
share was mainly due to the gas for oil substitution policy, which is already in place
for some time now. The average annual growth rate of natural gas consumption
during the period 1977-1988 was 11.3% and the share of natural gas in total energy
consumption has grown from 10.1 % in 1977 to 40.1% in 1998. Despite the increasing
share of natural gas in Iran's primary energy basket, the share of oil consumption in
total energy consumption is still high.
Iran's energy transformation and transmission sectors are characterized by
increasing losses  and  own use, which increased  7.1% annually. Considering  the
sectoral structure of energy consumption, the greatest consumer of final energy is,
with 35.5%, the Residential & Commercial sector, while agriculture has lowest share
(5%). Furthermore, the Residential & Commercial sector also experienced the highest
growth rate ofall sectors.
The growth rate of final energy intensity was on average 5.3% over 1974-
1998, which is much higher than the growth in real gross domestic product. Given the
fact that Iran's energy intensity is high, this indicates a misallocation of energy
resources. This trend is also in strong contrast to other countries, which show a
decrease in energy intensity.
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One of the main reasons for this is another characteristic of Iran's energy
sector: extremely low domestic energy prices. The average nominal price of
petroleum products  in  1998 was  16 Rial or 1.3 US$-cent. For comparison, the price of
premium leaded gasoline in OECD Europe was 89.7 US$-cent in 1999, but only 4.2
US$-cent in Iran.
Due to low energy prices, and as a result a high level of energy consumption,
the implicit subsidies on final energy consumption amounted   to a staggering   14.4
billion US$ in 2000. And even in 1998, when oil prices were extremely low, total
subsidies were 9.3 billion US$. The implicit subsidies are between ten and fifteen
percent of the total gross domestic product.
The policy intentions of the Iranian government are upward adjustment of
energy prices, profit based decision-making in the state-owned energy companies and
in the long-term liberalization (and possibly privatization) of parts of the energy
sector, especially downstream and non-core activities. Conserving petroleum products
and increasing the efficiency of energy consumption, as well as the continuation of
the gas for oil substitution policy, are also part of Iran's policy intentions. However,
until now most of the good intentions remained intentions and were not translated into
actual policy.
Meanwhile, Iran is a member of OPEC and its production capacity is
decreasing, so the quota and the production capacity need serious consideration in
mid and long-term economic planning.
In general, Iran has to improve its economic performance, which is lagging
behind in comparison to other countries. Executing cost effective conservation
programs in the light of OPEC quota and production limitations, and continuation of
the  natural gas substitution policy are required  to  keep  Iran' s share  in the international
oil markets. This in turn will provide enough hard currency revenues to fund the
improvement of the economy. Domestically a number of measures are required to
support such a policy, among which (i) reduction of the losses in the energy
transformation and transmission sectors as well as in the final demand sectors, (ii)
correcting domestic energy prices to prevent misallocation of resources, and (iii)
improving decision-making by the domestic energy sector. Unfortunately, the actual
policy decisions taken so far, which have led to a continued reduction in real energy
prices, are once again at odds with the policy intentions.
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The previous chapter analyzed Iran's domestic economy and especially the role
energy plays in it. For Iran, as oil exporting country, the expected long-term trend
(2000-2020) in international energy demand in general, and oil in particular, is very
important. In this chapter, we analyze the long-term expectations for the international
oil market, this to guarantee that the international demand for oil will be large enough
to absorb Iran's oil export. The most important long term threat for Iran's oil export
seems to be the international efforts to limit greenhouse gas emissions.
The international efforts to limit greenhouse gas emissions have resulted.
among others, in the Kyoto protocol. These efforts could have a negative impact on
oil exports, and thus on (OPEC and non-OPEC) export revenues. Under the Kyoto
protocol, developed countries have to reduce their energy intensities to keep
emissions restricted, and many countries have plans and programs to achieve this
goal. This downward trend in oil demand is most likely counterbalanced by strong
economic growth in developing countries, whose demand for oil and other fossil fuels
is increasing.
We will not develop our own predictions or scenarios for the world energy
outlook, but use those of a few well-known institutes. Our main sources to gain
insight into the quantitative and qualitative aspects of future international energy
issues are the Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2001), the International
Energy Agency (IEA, 2000), the forecasts of the European Union (EC, 1999), and
OPEC (1998). Each of these institutions publishes long-term energy scenarios. We
will discuss and compare some of these scenarios and the assumptions used. We
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mainly want to know if the expected future international oil demand will be sufficient
to guarantee oil producers, and especially Iran, sufficient export opportunities.
For Iran's oil export revenue it is also important to know how energy prices
will develop over next twenty years. As we will show real oil prices are expected to
show some moderate growth. This will, of course, be affected by demand, and total
available reserves and production capacity, which are all highly uncertain. All these
aspects need to be reviewed to delineate the current and future energy situation.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we briefly review long-
term economic growth. Section 3.3 discusses energy demand, supply, and the role of
reserves. Section 3.4 briefly discusses the resulting trends in energy intensities.
Section 3.5 looks at oil price expectations. Section 3.6 draws conclusions.
3.2 Long-term Economic Growth
It is widely known that economic growth and the rate of growth of energy
consumption are closely related. For future energy demand in general, and the
demand for petroleum products in particular, it is also important to know how this
growth is distributed. Although we will not model the world's energy demand it is
important for Iran's future oil export to know if the market will be large enough.
As Table 3-1 shows, developed countries are expected to experience lower
economic growth rates than the world average, with the exception of the United States
and Asia's newly industrialized economies (NIEs). Given the United States' energy
policy, especially its low petroleum product prices and its refusal to implement the
Kyoto protocol, it is reasonable to assume that its demand will remain relatively high.
At the same time, low-income developing countries will experience higher
rates of economic growth. Among them, East Asia -especially China- and South Asia
-including India- showed high rates of growth over the recent past and are expected to
grow by more than 5% annually over the next decade. This economic growth in major
developing countries is a major potential for energy demand growth. Note that these
countries have a GDP per capita in purchasing power parity that is estimated to be in
the range of US$ 3,000 to US$ 10,000, the range in which energy demand explodes
due to the rapid growth of the industrial sector and personal mobility (Shell, 2001).
This is the range where the income elasticity for energy demand is much larger than
one and the demand for transport is rapidly increasing. China's estimated GDP per
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capita in purchasing power parity was US$ 3,600 in 2000, therefore clearly in the
strong energy growth domain, and for India it was US$ 2,200, which, in combination
with an annual growth rate of more than 5%, means that its energy demand will start
to grow quickly in six years time.
Table 3-1. Economic growth rate in % of real GDP in 1995 prices in various parts of
the world
Area 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010
World 3.2 2.6 2.9
High income countries                           3.1 2.4 2.5
United States 3.2 3.2 2.7
Japan 4.0 1.4 2.0
Euro area 2.5 2.1 2.4
Asian NIEs 7.4 6.1 4.2
Low income countries 3.5 3.2 4.5
East Asia and Pacific 7.8 7.2 6.0
South Asia 5.8 5.2 5.3
Latin America and the Caribbean              1.1 3.3 3.5
Europe and Central Asia 3.5 2.3 3.4
Middle East and North Africa 2.4 3.2 3.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.7 2.2 3.6
Source: World Bank (2002)
OPEC has developed its own economic growth scenario; see Table 3-2. Their
growth rates are lower than those predicted by the World Bank, but nonetheless
indicate high growth rates for Asia's developing economies (more than 5% for
China). The expected annual economic growth rate of the OPEC countries for the
period 2000-2020 is about 4%, which is higher that the predicted world average. But
the former centrally planned economies of Europe as well as other developing
countries show high growth rates also. Only the former Soviet Union shows a
relatively slow growth  rate,  but this country is self-sufficient in terms of energy.
Although OPEC's forecast is less optimistic than that of the World Bank
(Table 3.1), both studies show considerable growth in those areas of the world where
the demand for commercial fuels is currently low and still has to develop.
Furthermore, many developing countries are not hampered by the Kyoto protocol,
because their demand for fossil  fuels is only just taking off.
As stated before, we will not estimate future energy demand based on
expected economic growth. As shall be shown in the next section, many better
equipped institutions publish energy demand forecasts that can be used. Here the
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goals is to show that the demand for petroleum products is not likely to decrease
during the next twenty years, which is the time horizon of this research. But as we
will show, it is reasonable to assume that also a considerable world market for
petroleum products will exist. Next, several long-term energy demand and supply
scenarios will be reviewed.
Table 3-2. Average real GDP rates, % in the reference case
Regions 2000-05 2005-10 2010-15 2015-20 2000-20
OECD 1.9 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.0
North America 2.0 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.1
Western Europe 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.1
OECD Pacific 1.2 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.7
OPEC 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
South Asia 2.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
South East Asia 5.4 5.3 5.0 5.0 5.2
China 6.6         6.1 5.6 5.0 5.8
Africa and Middle East 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
Latin America 3.3 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.7
Oil Exporting Countries 3.3 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.8
Total Developing Countries 3.9 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.3
Former USSR 4.0 3.2 2.8 2.5 3.1
Other Europe 4.1 3.7 3.3 3.3 3.6
Source:  OPEC (2002)
3.3 World Energy Demand and Supply
Due to technological improvement and environmental concerns, the growth rate of
global commercial energy demand has been decreasing over the last few years. Figure
3-1  shows that in recent years the average annual growth rate of commercial energy
has fallen to under 2% per annum.
The combination of energy carriers in the world's primary energy basket has
changed also; see Figure 3-2. Although the share of crude oil in the world's primary
energy consumption is still high (40% in  1998), the shares of natural gas and nuclear
energy have increased sharply since the eighties to 23.8% and 7.4% respectively.
Because the large unused natural gas reserves, and the fact that the use of natural gas
is less damaging to the environment, it is expected that the substitution of crude oil
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Figure 3-2. World primary energy consumption
In particular the IIASA (Huntington, 1999), the EIA (2001), and other studies expect
the replacement of petroleum products (and coal) by natural gas to continue,
especially when the emission targets of the Kyoto protocol' are taken into account.
' The Kyoto Protocol is an agreement that legally binds industrialized countries to reduce their
collective emissions of six greenhouse gasses to 5.2% below their 1990 levels by 2008-2012.
This 5.2% reduction in total developed country emissions has resulted in differentiated targets
for the various countries. Tile protocol states that the OECD Countries, except Mexico,
Korea, and Turkey plus Russia, Belarus, and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will
cut their greenhouse gas emissions by at least 5 percent relative to the 1990 emission level.
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The emission restrictions affect the energy sector that has to use less polluting
energy carriers. This can be achieved trough several policies. In most industrialized
countries taxes on fossil fuel consumption typically take the form of excise duties and
taxes that add up to 70 percent of the consumer price (Noord et al.,  1999). The tax
level on less emitting fuels, such as natural gas, is generally lower. This results in an
increase in the demand for natural gas at the expense of oil products. Although less
than in Europe, a shift towards natural gas also characterizes the energy mix in the
United States (EIA, 1999).
According to OPEC (1998), the Kyoto targets have important implications for
the oil market. With oil prices remaining firm, world oil demand will be 9 million
barrel per day (bbl/day) lower by 2010 compared to the scenario without Kyoto. This
implies an average annual growth in oil demand of less than half the growth expected
in scenario without Kyoto. This reduction in demand growth translates, according to
OPEC, into an expected loss in OPEC export revenues of almost US$ 16 billion each
year up to 2010 compared to the scenario without Kyoto. The impact upon OPEC's
export revenue after 2010 will be even larger.
Oil and gas reserves
Studies on global crude oil and natural gas reserves show that in 2000 about 146.4
trillion cubic meters of natural gas was extractable, based on current technology; see
Table 3-3. This is estimated to be sufficient for 61.9 years of world demand. Proven
crude oil reserves were 1,033.8 billion bbl, which is sufficient for about 40 years of
current world demand, again using current technology and production level.
As shown in Table 3-3 the largest known oil and gas reserves are located in
the Middle East. About 63.8% of world's oil reserves belong to the five countries of
Persian Gulf area i.e. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and
Iran. The Russian Federation has 32.9% of the world's extractable natural gas
reserves and Iran 15.7%, sO together they own almost half the world natural gas
reserves.
emission level. For the European Union and Switzerland a target of 8% was agreed upon, and
6% for Canada, Hungary, Japan and Poland. Russia, New Zealand and the Ukraine are to
stabilize their emissions, while Norway may increase emissions  by up to  1 %, Australia by up
to 8% and Iceland  10%. The United States had a target of 7%, but the Bush administration
does not want to comply with the Kyoto targets and has introduced a different policy that may
in the end jeopardize the entire agreement.
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Table 3-3. Proven Oil & Gas Reserves in the world and Middle East, early 2000
Oil reserves Billion barrel R/P ratio % of world
Total world 1033.8 41.0 100%
Ofwhich: OPEC 802.5 77.4 77.6%
Non-OPEC 1, 165.9 13.6 16.0%
OECD 85.6 11.8 8.3%
Total Middle East 675.7 87.0 65.4%





Kuwait 89.7 69.9 8.7%
Iran 96.5 >100 9.3%
Oman 5.3 15.9 0.5%
Qatar 3.7 14.7 0.4%
Yemen 2.5 12.3 0.3%
Syria 4.0 27.9 0.4%
North America 63.7 13.8 6.2%
South & Central America 89.5 37.7 8.6%
Europe 20.6 8.3 2.0%
Former Soviet Union 65.4 24.2 6.3%
Africa 74.9 28.2 7.2%
Asia Pacific 44.0 16.3 4.3%
Natural gas reserves Trillion m R/P ratio Percent of total
World 146.43 61.9 100.0%
Former Soviet Union 56.70 81.8 38.7%
Middle East 56.70 81.8 38.7%
Africa 11.16 98.2 7.7%
Asia Pacific 10.28 40.4 7.0%
North America 7.31 10.0 5.0%
South & Central America 6.31 66.2 4.3%
Russian Federation 48.14 82.7 32.9%
Iran                        · 23.00 >100 15.7%
Source: BP (2000)
" Excludes the former Soviet Union
On the supply-side it is expected that the role of OPEC in the world's oil
supply will increase, due to a relative decline in oil production outside OPEC. Table
3-4 contains IIASA's forecasts of OPEC and non-OPEC oil production up to 2020.
OPEC's market share will increase from 39.6% to 51.2%, with total oil production
estimated at 100.7 million barrel per day in 2020 in OPEC's reference scenario.
The Energy Information Administration's energy forecast also shows that
OPEC, and especially the Persian Gulf region, will play a fundamental role in the
future of world oil supply (EIA, 2000). As Table 3-5 shows, oil production capacity in
the Persian Gulf countries is expected to be in the range of 41 million bbl/day (high
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price scenario) to 61 million bbl/day (low price scenario) in 2020. The share of
Persian Gulf countries in total oil production capacity is expected to be between 36%
and 47% in 2020, indicating its importance for the world oil market. Furthermore,
OPEC's market share is expected to increase from 44.5% in 1996 to between 49%
and 59% in 2020, depending on the oil price scenario used.
Table 3-4. OPEC's world oil production outlook in million bbl/day (Reference Case)
Region 1995 2000 2010 2020
OECD 21.0 22.8 20.8 19.0
North America 14.1 14.8 13.5 12.5
Western Europe 6.3 7.3 6.7 6.1
OECD Pacific 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.4
DCs excl. OPEC 9.5 11.4 12.5 13.4
Total former CPEs 10.2 11.4 13.3 14.8
FSU 7.0 7.7 9A 10.4
China 3.0 3.4 3.6 4.2
Other Europe 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2
Processing Gains 1.4          1.5 1.8 1.9
OPEC 27.7 30.7 41.9 51.6
Non- OPEC 42.2 47.1 48.4 49.1
Total World 69.9 77.8 90.2 100.7
OPEC Market Share in % 39.6 39.4 46.4 51.2
Source: OPEC (1998).
Table 3-5. World oil capacity by region and country
History ProjectionRegion/Country 2000 2010 2020
(MBbl/day) 1996 LOP') HOP LOP HOP LOP HOP
Persian Gulf 20.9 23.2 20.9 35.2 23.2 61.0 41.4
Iran 3.9 4.2 3.9 5.2 4.1 7.0 6.3
Iraq 0.6 0.6 0.6 4.2 2.5 8.1 6.9
Kuwait 2.6 3.0 2.6 3.7 2.7 5.5 4.4
Qatar 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6
Saudi Arabia 10.6 11.8 10.6 17.2 10.6 33.7 18.2
U.A.E. 2.6 3.0 2.6 4.2 2.7 6.0 5.0
OPEC 30.9 34.7 31.5 50.9 36.5 76.3 54.8
Non-OPEC 42.3 46.4 47.9 52.5 56.7 52.4 57.7
Total World 69.5 81.1 79.4 103.4 93.2 128.7 112.5
Shares
Persian Gulf 30.1 28.6 26.3 34.0 24.9 47.4 36.8
OPEC 44.5 42.8 39.7 49.2 39.2 59.3 48.7
Source: EIA(2000)
1, LOP and HOP stand for low oil price and high oil price scenario respectively.
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Note that the various energy outlooks show considerable differences in
expected non-OPEC supply (Mitchell, 2002).
Regardless of possible changes in the world's gas and oil reserves or changes
in the trend of energy consumption, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Iran will
play an important role  in the future supply of world energy. Because the Persian Gul f
gas reserves are far away from the European and Far East gas markets, gas
transportation costs prohibit the export of Iran's natural gas in the near future. This
issue is further complicated by the political problems related to transportation via
pipelines through surrounding countries and the US embargo policy. Oil is much
easier to trade than natural gas. Because the Iranian economy uses oil extensively,
substituting domestic oil consumption by natural gas is a better option than exporting
natural gas. The oil will then be available for export, using the already installed
facilities. To achieve this Iran should continue its gas for oil substitution policy that
has clear domestic advantages, as well as environmental ones.
Energy demand outlook
Table 3-6 shows OPEC's reference demand scenario. The global growth rate of
energy demand is expected to reach 1.8% during 2000-2010  and 1.5% during  2010-
2020, which is lower that the expected economic growth rate. The growth rates of
energy in developing and OECD countries will be in the range of 2.5%-2.9% and
0.8%-1.1% respectively.
Table 3-6. OPEC's expected energy demand growth (Reference scenario)
Period Total world OECD Developing Former CPESN
Countries
1990-2000 2.1 1.9 4.8 0.5
2000-2010 1.8                1.1 2.9 2.3
2010-2020              1.5 0.8 2.5 1.6
Source: OPEC (1998).
1) CPES stands for Central Planning Economies and consist of China, the Former
Soviet Union (FSU), and Eastern Europe.
Overall world oil demand is expected to be 78.8, 90.2, and 100.7 million bbl/day
in 2000, 2010, and 2020 respectively. As shown in Table 3-7 average annual growth
rate of crude oil demand is  1.5% and  1.1% in 2000-2010 and 2010-2020 respectively.
In our opinion OPEC's oil growth scenario, however, is rather low given the expected
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high growth rates of countries such as China and India (together more than 2 billon
people).
The fact that the expected growth rates of energy demand are higher than the
expected growth rates of oil demand shows that the world will substitute other energy
carriers for oil products. According to OPEC, even developing countries will
experience a relative reduction of the share of crude oil in their energy basket; see
Table 3-7. These countries will try to reduce their energy intensity by means of
improving their technology base and by energy conservation policies (see Chapter 7
also). These policies are supported by emission reduction policies, such as joint
implementation and the clean development mechanism. As a result, it is difficult to
estimate the future (up to 2020) rate of growth in oil demand in general and in
developing countries in particular.
Table 3-7. Average annual growth rates of world oil demand in OPEC's reference
Scenario
Former
Pedod Total world OECD OPEC Other DCsCPES
1995-2000 2.2           1.1 3.0 2.7 4.6
2000-2010              1.5 0.6 1.8 2.7 2.8
2010-2020            1.1               0.3               1.5 2.1 1.9
Source: OPEC (1998).
OPEC expects that total world energy demand will be about 231.1 million
barrels of oil equivalent (BOE)   per day in 2010 and about 267.9 in 2020. The demand
of oil will increase from 66.2 million BOE per day in  1995 to 85.6 million BOE in
2010 and is expected to reach to 95.7 million in 2020.
Table 3-8. World energy demand by fuel type (OPEC's reference scenario)
Fuels (MBOE/Day) 1995 2000 2010 2020
Oil 69.6 77.4 90.1 100.7
Coal 50.4 56.3 68.5 77.0
Gas 38.3 43.2 55.5 70.7
Hydro /Nuclear 18.1 19.5 21.6 24.5
Total 173.0 192.7 231.1 267.9
Source: OPEC(1998).
Table 3-8 contains OPEC's forecast of the consumption of all main energy
carriers for its reference scenario. As Figure 3-3 shows, the share of oil in total energy
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demand is expected to decrease from 40.3% in 1995 to 37.6% in 2020, whereas the
share of natural gas is expected to increase from 22.1% in 1995 to 26 4% in 2020.
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Figure 3-3. Shares ofenergy carriers in world energy demand
Apart from OPEC, there are several other energy demand scenarios. They all
show the same tendencies as the OPEC scenario does, albeit in different proportions.
Because of the higher relative carbon content of coal and petroleum products, those
two energy sources would be used relatively less, placing more reliance on natural gas
and renewable energy, and slowing down the decline in nuclear power. The largest
use of petroleum products is in the transportation sector, where there are limited
affordable options for fuel substitution.
In his summary of international energy outlooks Huntington (1999) reviews
the common elements ofthese views on energy demand and supply until 2020, which,
from a qualitative point of view, are all very similar. The main assumptions are:
1.          The   fossil-fuel    era will remain    with us through   2020 and several decades
beyond. Oil, natural gas, and coal will continue to grow. Oil use will grow in
absolute terms,  but lose market share to other fuels. The share of Persian  Gulf
supplies in total oil will grow over time. The share of natural gas is expected to
increase by at least 5% points. Natural gas use will expand, partly to generate
additional power in more competitive electricity markets using very efficient
technology (combined cycle, etc.), and partly as a substitute for more polluting
fuels used in industry.
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2.        The share of coal will decline further in industrialized countries,  but will grow
in developing countries such as China and India. The latter are expected to
account for almost half ofthe growth in coal use umil 2020.
3.          Improvements in smaller, safer nuclear power plants could expand  the  use  of
this resource, whereas continued stagnation in this industry could lead to a very
large decline. The future of this form of energy, despite the fact  that  it  is CO2
emission free, is very uncertain, especially since it requires large up-front
investments.
4.   Contrary to the past, the long-term path for energy prices will increase only
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Figure 3-4. IIASA/WEC's world primary energy mix (Scenario B)
Figure 3-4 shows the world's primary energy mix up to 2020 under the
IIASA/WEC scenario B, the middle course scenario. OPEC (1998) expects the share
of oil in the world's energy basket to decrease to 37.6% in 2020, whereas
IIASA/WEC (1998) expects it to decrease to 27.8%. However, it will remain the most
important source of energy and gross oil demand is expected to grow in absolute
terms by some 10%. The large difference between the various energy outtooks shows
the uncertainty of these forecasts. However, all forecasts differ only is size and
composition, but use the qualitative arguments given above to support them.
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Excess demand
One should keep in mind the possibility of a gap between demand and supply of oil
due to the natural decline of oil production based on the reserve life cycle. There are
several experts that consider the production potential of OPEC and the EIA (tables 3.7
and 3.8) much too optimistic. Their estimations show that the world peak production
of oil will occur in 2006 (Duncan et. al,  1998). They expect the production level in
2006 to be  3 1  billion bbi or 87.67 million bbl/day.  It will then  decline to a level of 23
billion barrel in 2020, which is about 63.01 million bbl per day. If these pessimistic
estimates become reality, there will be a large gap between the various oil demand
forecasts and oil supply. However, these forecasts of oil supply are based on the
Hubbert curve model, which assumes that oil production is a symmetrical curve while
in fact it is an asymmetric one (Laherrere, 2000).
These authors assume future technology and new additions to reserves are
known. There are many other restrictions to these models too. As a result, these
projections should be viewed with care. They believe that we are approaching the
"end of cheap  oil" and that global production of conventional oil will begin to decline
sooner  than most other people think, probably within 10 years (Campbell,   1998).
However,  in the past many of these predictions have been made, but reserves steadily
increased. Nonetheless, it is not obvious whether the supply of oil can keep up with
demand the next two decades.  If so, this will increase the value of Iran's oil reserves.
Here we assume that for the next twenty years oil supply will be able to keep up with
demand.
Excess supply
There is also an opposite type ofreasoning, which argues that oil supply will be larger
than oil demand. There are three reasons given for this. First, the average elasticity of
energy and real GDP will go down due to a growing service sector and improved end
use technology. Second, improvement in technologies will reduce demand and
improve supply. Demand is reduced through very efficient natural gas based
technologies in electricity production, the further improvement of combustion
technology, as well as the development of increasingly cost effective fuel cells.
Supply is increased due to the improvements in exploration and exploitation
technologies. Third, global warming and ozone layer depletion will cause so much
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damage that the use of alternative fuels has to be speeded up to prevent an
environmental catastrophe. For these reasons Grosse and Yanes (2001) assume that
oil demand will reduce much faster than is reported in the various energy outlooks
discussed above, and will be no more than 70 million bbl/day in 2020. This causes a
large gap between oil supply and demand, resulting in low oil prices. However, as we
have argued above, the various energy outlooks take these considerations into account
also (Huntington, 1999).
Apparently there is a large difference among experts on the speed with which new
technologies are introduced and diffused. Given the current policy in the United
States and some other countries on environmental issues it seems reasonable to
assume that a faster reduction in the demand for oil products than assumed by the
major energy research institutes (EIA, IEA, OPEC) is unrealistic.
3.4 Energy Intensity
A popular way to express the development of energy use is energy intensity, the
amount of energy used per unit real GDP. Due to environmental considerations and
new energy efficient technologies developed for many different applications, most
industrialized economies will continue to shift resources away from the energy-
intensive manufacturing sectors that produce basic materials (steel, glass, etc.) to
other manufacturing and services. Moreover, within energy intensive sectors there is a
continuous search for less energy intensive processes, as well as a shift in materials
used. (For discussion of the economic effects of this dematerialization trend see
Mannaerts (2000).) As we have seen above this will result in lower growth rates of
energy demand than those of real GDP, causing energy intensities to decline further in
industrialized economies and result in lower energy growth in industrializing
countries.
As was argued before, developing economies will industrialize and will start
using commercial rather than subsistent energy resources, raising energy intensities in
these emerging countries or, taking into account the fact that they can use more
energy efficient technologies from the start, at least show a lower decline than
industrialized economies do.
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These trends can be observed in the IIASA scenario B (Huntington, 1999)
Intensities decline slightly between 1990 and 2020 in the emerging economies, while
they decline more sharply in the industrialized countries. However, IIASA expects the
energy intensity to grow in the reforming economies (former Soviet Union and
Europe), thereby lessening the decline in energy intensity on the world level.
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Figure 3-5. Energy intensity outlook
Other studies estimate a downward trend of all energy intensities; Figure 3-5
shows OPEC's view on the world's energy intensities. They expect the former CPEs
to show a decrease in energy intensity. In the past developing countries have shown
an increase in energy intensity, but it is expected that their energy intensity will
decrease in the future also, due to the use of efficient technologies. The figure also
shows that the OECD determines the world's energy intensity.
Table 3-9. Energy intensity growth rates in percent per year
Regions/Group 1995-2000 2000-2010 2010-2020
OECD -1.0 -1.2 -1.4
N. America -1.2 -1.0 -1.1
W. Europe -1.0 -1.5 -1.5
OECD pacific -0.8 -1.4 -1.6
OPEC -0.8 -1.1 -0.9
Other DCs. -0.7 -1.1 -1.6
Former CPEs -3.9 -3.0 -2.3
Total World -1.6 -1.6 -1.6
Source: OPEC (1998).
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As Table 3-9 shows that in OPEC's reference scenario the OECD energy
intensity is expected to decrease  at an average  rate of between  1.2%  and  1.40%  per
year for 2000-2010 and 2010-2020 respectively. Energy intensity in the former CPEs
is expected to improve substantially over the years to come, since the potential for
energy efficiency improvements in the FSU and Eastern Europe is large due to high
levels of energy inefficiency in the past. Generally speaking, environmental needs,
new technologies, and better management will lead to a negative trend in energy
intensity around the world.
3.5 The Price of Oil
Normally the price of a commodity is determined by demand and supply, which are
each affected by many factors. This is also true for the price of crude oil; see Adelman
(2002). However, a structural model for the long term of the price of crude oil is
virtually impossible. The appraoch used in the energy outlooks discussed above is the
introduction of a growth scenario for the average price, neglecting short term
variations. Other approaches to forecasting the price of crude oil for a long time
horizon have been investigated (Pindyck, 1999), but are not commonly used. In this
study we will make assumptions on the long term development of the international
crude oil price which are in line with those made in the energy outlooks discussed
above; see Chapter 6. In this section we only review various forecasts published to
show the spread in assumptions.
From the early 1950's until the early 1970s the real price of crude oil  from the
Middle East has been declining steadily. This is due to growing competition from
higher output. But also outside the Middle East, production cost were still below the
price of oil and already under development in  1972 (Adelman, 2002). After that there
was a period of oil price turmoil.  This was not due to actual resource scarcity as many
assumed, but to the desire by several large oil producing countries to increase their oil
income revenue by reducing production. The price increases have, however, lead to a
significant decrease in the demand for oil per real dollar GDP and this effect was not
reversed when oil prices came down again.
OPEC (1988) has a different view on this subject and concludes that the
substantial erosion in the value of the US$, coupled with global inflation and
depressed levels of nominal oil prices have resulted in continued lower real values of
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oil   exports.   (Also see Shaaf  (1985,   p   128)   On this subject.) The average value   of
OPEC's reference basket price of $18/bbl agreed upon in December 1986 was worth
$15.4/bbl in real terms in October 1988. The composite index, which is the deflator of
oil price, decreased to 85.53 in October 1988 from its base value of 100 in December
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Figure 3-6. Nominal and real price ofoil
Cooper (1996) points out that the price of oil  in  the  long run  has been  largely
independent of any particular currency (or group of currencies). But with regard to
purchasing power gains and losses of OPEC imports due to changes  in the US dollar
exchange rate, there have been some losses for OPEC countries, although it is difficult
to measure them accurately.
Note that a decrease in the actual value of Iran's oil export income, in
combination with an increase in its domestic oil demand, cause the country's real
purchasing power to decrease. This is a major threat ofthe Iran's economy.
The price of natural gas is closely related to the price of crude oil SO
fluctuations in crude oil prices affect the price of natural gas. However, due to the
high capital cost of the gas infrastructure, natural gas is often traded through long term
supply and demand contracts in which the daily spot market price fluctuations play
only a minor role, whereas the development of the longer term average price does.
This is confirmed  by the high correlation between the price of crude oil  and the price
of natural gas. In the United States, Europe, and the Far-East markets, the linear
correlation between the annual crude oil and natural gas prices is 90%, 90%, and 70%
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respectively. Figure 3-7 shows the price of crude oil and the price of natural gas for
the period 1985-1999.
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Figure 3-6. Oil (OECD) and natural gas (European Union) prices
We can conclude that the prices of oil and natural gas change in same direction, but
that the oscillation ofthe price of natural gas is less than that ofthe price of crude oil
due to long-term natural gas contracts. The average absolute annual change ofprice of
natural gas within 1985-1999 was 13.6%, where it was 19.2% for the price of oil.
Table 3-10. Various alternative oil price projections
Source 2005 2010 2020
OWEM Reference scenario (1997 US$/bbl) 18.8 20.2 23.5
HASAILEW Poll Response (medians), January 1997 - 25.3 28.0
International Energy Outlook 2002 (2000 US$/bbl), 22.7 23.4 24.7
Reference scenario
World Energy Outlook (November 2000) 20.4 20.4 27.8
DRI-WFA (October, 2001) 19.4 20.3 23.1
Petroleum Industry Research Associates Inc, October 2001 24.3 24.2         -
The WEFA Group 19.4 20.3 23.1
European Commission, Spring 1996 (1993 US$) - 29.0 31.0
Median of forecasts other than OWEM - 20.3 28.0
Source: OPEC (1998) and EIA (2002).
All major energy outlooks expect a moderate increase in real price ofcrude oil
up to 2020. Many studies assume a narrow range ofoil prices up to 2020. As Table 3-
10 shows, the price of crude oil is expected to be in the range of 23 and 31 US Dollars
per bbl in 2020. Note that these are expected average prices, so the short4erm
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volatility that characterizes the price of oil since the early seventies is neglected. In
Chapter 6 we will develop our own price forecast.
3.7 Conclusions
For Iran's future oil export, it is important to know if the international market for oil
will be sufficiently large. The general view is that the demand for oil will increase in
absolute terms, but the share of oil in the world's energy basket will decrease.
However, given the demand expectations we can conclude that there will be no
limitations for Iran's oil export form a demand side point of view.
Although the ideas about the size of future oil supply and how these will be
divided between OPEC and non-OPEC vary, all analyses agree that OPEC's role in
supplying oil will increase. So, from the supply side point of view there is no reason
to assume that Iran cannot export all oil available. The main conclusion of the demand
and supply analysis is that the fossil fuel era will remain with us for the next twenty
years and most likely far beyond.
There are several reasons why the demand for oil products will grow less than
overall energy demand. For environmental reasons there will be a continued
substitution of oil (and coal) by natural gas. Furthermore, technological improvement
will reduce the need for oil products. However, a quick replacement of fossil fuel
technology and infrastructure by other technologies, hydrogen for example, seems
unlikely due to the exceptionally high capital requirements for a new infrastructure,
and the fact that the existing infrastructures are sunk cost. On top of that improved oil
exploration and exploitation technologies will add to oil reserves and thus the time
horizon for a need to change from an oil availability point of view. All researchers
seem to agree on the fact that the role of renewable energy will remain small, despite
the massive efforts to promote them particularly in Europe.
The highest growth in the demand for oil products, especially for transport,
will be from Asian (China India), Eastern European and the Russian economies as
these economies move into the per capita income range (US$ 3,000 to US$ 10,000) in
which energy demand grows very fast, even if fuel prices are high. Equally important
will be the development of energy institutions and markets in developing countries.
The successes of future environmental policy may well depend upon the speed with
which efficient technologies are transferred from richer to poorer countries. Currently,
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Chapter 4
Determination of Strategic issues
4.1 Introduction
Iran's economic and domestic energy situation was analyzed in Chapter 2. The
international prospects of energy were discussed in Chapter  3. This chapter develops
strategies for the Iranian energy sector using a SWOT analysis, where SWOT stands
for Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats. SWOT analysis was developed
for, and is mostly used by, companies. However, as will be shown, it is a useful tool
to analyze the domestic energy policy of Iran also. Based on the approaches proposed
for corporate planning and the planning of non-profit organizations, a general
approach is formulated to tackle the strategic planning of Iran's domestic energy
sector. In this process, strategic planning is initiated by first clarifying the mission for
Iran's energy policy. The analyses of domestic and international developments in
chapters 2 and 3 provide the necessary materials for extracting the most important
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. This is then used to identify the
strategic issues, from which appropriate strategies can be extracted. These strategies
will be the starting point for the policy improvement analysis is Chapter 7.
This Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 strategic planning and
SWOT-analysis are discussed. In Section 4.3 the strategic mission for Iran's domestic
energy sector is formulated. Section 4.4 states the opportunities and threats using the
analyses of Chapter 2 and 3. Section 4.5 discusses the domestic energy market
strengths and weaknesses. Based on the mission and using the results of the SWOT
analysis, the strategic issues and main problems of Iran's domestic energy sector are
derived. These strategic issues will guide the formulation of strategies in Section 4.6.
Section 4.7 draws conclusions.
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4.2 Strategic Planning and SWOT Technique
The methodology for this part of the research is based upon the theory of strategic
planning. An often used definition of strategic planning is " . . .a disciplined effort to
produce fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide what an organization
(or other entity) is, what it does, and why it does it" (Bryson, 1989, p 5) Another
definition is: "Strategic planning is the process of selecting an organization's goals;
determining the programs necessary to achieve specific objectives en route to the
goals; and establishing the methods necessary to ensure that the policies and programs
are implemented" (Bryson, 1989).
In the literature the concepts strategic management strategic decision-making
and strategic planning, are concepts that are not always properly distinguished from
one another. What is described as the core of the strategic planning methodology
seems analogous to the descriptions of the core of strategic management and strategic
decision-making, or even strategic marketing (Bowman and Asch, 1987; Rue and
Holland, 1989; Kerin and Peterson, 1993). This is of course incorrect. Mintzberg
(1994a) defines planning as a formalized procedure to produce articulated results, in
the form of an integrated system of decisions. Furthermore, the mission to be
achieved should be clear, since strategic planning aims at achieving this mission, not
formulating it.
In the case of Iran, this means that the goals of its domestic energy policy
should be clear and in support of the broader goal of optimizing the use of Iran's
natural energy resources to the benefit of the country.  Here we analyze to what extent
past decisions on domestic energy meet the criterion of being integrated with and
supportive to the broader policy to optimize the country's benefits from its natural
resources.
There have been and still are fierce discussions on what strategic planning is
and how it should be executed; see Mintzberg (19944b), Ansoff (1994), and Bonn
and Christodoulou (1996). Others have worked on how to apply it for government
bodies; see Berry (1994), and Barkdoll and Bosin (1997). For the purpose of this
research the aspect of determining the correct issues to plan and the consistency
between different objectives are important. Therefore, the literature on strategic
planning will not be reviewed in detail, since most of the discussions are on how to
conduct the planning process in a company and on implementation issues.
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Strategic planning should, however, be distinguished from two other kinds of
planning i.e. long-range planning and comprehensive planning for cities and regions,
which sometimes is labeled long-range community or master planning. For
organizations and other entities,  like the energy sector of an economy or the economy
as a whole, the terms strategic planning and long-range planning are often used as
synonyms.
Although most of the theory on strategic planning has focused on firms, there
is also literature on how to apply it to the public sector. Strategic planning in the
public sector has been applied primarily for military purposes, NASA's space
program, and the practice of statecraft on a grand scale (Bracker, 1980; Barkdoll and
Bosin, 1997). However, strategic planning can be applied to many other entities too,
such as,
- Public agencies, departments, or major organizational divisions;
- General-purpose governments, such as cities, counties, or state governments;
- Non-profit organizations providing basic public services;
- Specific functions, such as transportation, health, or education, that bridge
organizational and governmental boundaries.
Herewith the strategic planning methodology will be used for a combination of
entities, which are all part of the Ministry of Petroleum, but actually cover one sector
of the Iranian economy, domestic energy, since virtually all activities in this sector are
under state control; see Section 2.5.
The many schools of thought and models of strategic planning all include the
following steps: general policy and direction setting, situation assessment, strategic
issue identification, strategy development, decision-making, action, and evaluation
(Bryson,  1989). The Harvard policy model of strategic planning in combination with
the stakeholder approach may be the best-known approach to strategic planning and
this approach is briefly addressed here. This model is based on the general concept of
strategic planning which implemented the advantages of all schools of thought in the
line of economy and sectors interaction rather than an organization. The Harvard
policy model is the principal inspiration behind the most widely cited recent models
of public and non-profit sector strategic planning (Bryson, 1989, p. 30). The main
purpose of the model is to develop the best strategy, where strategy is defined as "a
pattern of purposes and policies". Analyzing internal strengths and weaknesses, and
identifying external threats and opportunities, better known as SWOT analysis, can
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obtain the best strategy. This element appears to be applicable in any organization,
private as well as public, and profit as well as non-profit, but it can also be applied to
economic sectors or any other entity. Carrying out SWOT-analysis is illuminating; it
points out what needs to be done, and it puts problems in perspective. However,
SWOT will be a useful tool only if used properly and with sufficient follow-up (Hill
and Westbrook, 1997). The main weakness of the Harvard model is that it does not
offer specific advice on how to develop strategy, which in turn is needed as input for
the strategic planning process.
The stakeholder management approach sees the formulation of a strategy for
any entity as building bridges to its stakeholders. Stakeholders are all groups in the
entity and  in its environment that are affected by or can affect the future of the entity.
The stakeholder approach is thought to be especially useful for public entities,
because it integrates economic, political, and social concerns (Bryson, 1989, p. 33).
For example, if we regard Iran's energy sector as an entity, the domestic energy
consumers, policy makers, employees in the energy industries, private owners, local
governments, financial institutions, foreign oil and gas consumers, foreign investors,
etc. are all stakeholders, and a good domestic energy policy has to take into account
the needs of all groups mentioned.
There is, however, a missing step between the SWOT analysis and the
development  of the strategies, the identification of strategic issues.  We add this  step  in
our approach.
The concepts, procedures, and tools from strategic planning be used
effectively; see Frentzel, Bryson, and Crosby (2000). In fact strategic planning
embraces a range of approaches that vary in their applicability to the public and non-
profit sectors, and can easily be misinterpreted (Mintzberg, 1994a). According to the
above, any strategic planning process includes at least the following steps:
-    Develop or restate the mission;
-    Assess the external environment: opportunities and threats;
-    Assess the internal environment: strengths and weaknesses;
-    Identify the strategic issues facing the entity under study; and
- Formulate strategies.
Figure 4-1 summarizes this process with respect to Iran's domestic energy sector and
relates it to the chapters of this research. The entity for which this analysis is made, is
the Iranian domestic energy sector as outlined in Section 2.5. In these steps, the
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opportunities and threats are the external factors, which are beyond the control of the
entity, were reviewed in chapters 2 and 3. The internal factors are those controlled by
the entity, which we reviewed in Chapter 2 also. For each of the factors one must ask
"... is  this an internal strength or weakness,  or  is  it an external opportunity or threat,
that makes this of strategic importance?" Listing these factors will become useful in
the next step i.e. the development of strategies.
  Mission:  
<                             7>
 energy resources   
Internal analysis












Figure 4-1. Strategic planning process for Iran's energy sector
A strategy is defined as a pattern of purposes, policies, programs, actions, decisions,
or resource allocations that together define what an entity is, what it does, and why it
does it. An effective strategy must meet several criteria. It must be technically
workable, politically acceptable to key stakeholders, and must accord with the entity's
philosophy and core values. For example, if a one-time increase of domestic energy
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prices to European levels would be defined as a strategy, this could be a good policy
from an economic point of view, but it would be impossible politically and socially.
This would than be labeled as an ideal, but non-effective, strategy.
In what follows the mission of the Iran's energy sector is stated first. Next,
Iran's place in the global economic environment is analyzed to reveal the external
opportunities and threats the Iranian energy sector faces. An analysis of the current
domestic energy policy and the structures of energy supply and demand will identify
the strengths and weaknesses of Iran's energy sector in general and the organization
of the domestic energy markets in particular. These analyses can then be used to draw
up strategies for Iran's domestic energy sector.
4.3 The Mission of Iran's Domestic Energy Sector
The mission of Iran's domestic energy sector as an entity is to promote the efficient
usage    o f   Iran' s energy resources, where efficient usage means beneficial   to    the
economy. This mission for the domestic energy sector is, of course, part of the
mission of the total energy sector. This should be the guiding principle for all parties
involved.
Energy resources should be extracted in the light of sustainable development,
that is, usage now should result in wealth that also benefits future generations. This
mission is based on Iran's 1980 constitution. The Ministry of Petroleum has translated
the  mission  into  " . . . the optimal and scientific extraction  of oil  and gas resources,  as
well as the efficient usage of these resources domestically (NIOC,  1987)."
On the basis of this formulation of the mission, this research will analyze the
current domestic energy policy using SWOT analysis, and identify strategic issues.
The latter will be the starting point for the formulation of ways and means to improve
domestic energy use.
Note that many in Iran believe that the wealth of Iran's energy resources is
best distributed by making energy available at low prices. What we will show is that
this belief is a fallacy and that low domestic energy prices actually lead to a lower
GDP per capita.
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4.4 International Energy Market: Opportunities and Threats
International energy markets, especially  the oil market, were discussed in Chapter  3.
Trends in key international issues, such as, energy intensity, energy prices, economic
growth, substitution of energy products, the global warming problem, and emerging
technologies were discussed. The developments in these areas are beyond Iran's
policy reach. One could argue that a complete stop of its oil production would affect
international oil prices, but this cannot happen under normal circumstances. Iran has
to protect its role as a supplier to the international oil market and a substantial
reduction in its oil export would be devastating to its economy. (As is the case for
most other oil-producing countries, which no longer have sufficient financial reserves
for serious production cuts (Mitchell, 2002).) However, as will be shown, domestic oil
consumption may strongly reduce its role as a supplier, since production is limited.
Based on chapters 2 and 3 we can identify the following list of opportunities.
Opportunities
1.      The average annual growth rate of the world economy is expected to be between
2% and 3% until 2020; see Chapter 3. This will result in continuous growth of
global energy demand in general and oil in particular. Therefore, there will be a
suitable market for Iran's oil.
2.       The annual growth  rate of world energy demand is expected  to  be  1.8%  and
1.5% over 2000-2010 and 2010-2020 respectively, indicating a relatively active
market.
3. Petroleum products will continue to play a major role in global energy
consumption. OPEC expects the demand of oil to be  100.7 million bbl/day in
2020, while coal and natural gas are expected to be 77.0 and 70.7 million BOE
per day respectively, indicating oil remains the dominant fuel in the world's
energy basket. This is despite the many policies to substitute oil by natural gas
and other fuels.
4.      The proven reserves of oil and gas in different areas of the world show that the
Middle East, and especially the Persian Gulf, will play a major role in the oil
and gas market in the future. Although some researchers have high expectations
about the potential reserves of the Caspian Sea region, as another North Sea that
can compete with OPEC,  it is generally expected that the share of OPEC in total
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supply will increase.  In 2000 the share of the Caspian Sea region and the Persian
Gulf  region in total proven oil reserves were about   1.8   and 64.3 percent
respectively.
5.    The OPEC market share in the world oil production is expected to increase to
51.2 percent in the year 2020, and the share of the OPEC Gulf members in
meeting global oil demand will, with a forecasted 46%, be dominant.
6.      Iran, as a member of OPEC and being located in the Persian Gulf, can keep its
role in the international oil market. Iran's contribution to the world's oil
production is expected to be approximately 4 million bbl/day, so Iran's
contribution to the international markets could be considerable. Note that some
researchers claim that Iran's oil production could be as high as 7 million
bbl/day, if the latest technologies are used and new reserves are added. In our
opinion this is, however, too optimistic; also see Chapter 6.
7.  The demand for oil is expected to increase in the future, but natural gas
consumption is expected to increase at an even higher rate due to concerns about
the environment and new efficient gas based technologies. Iran, as the holder of
the second largest gas reserves in world, can play an important role in the future
gas market and could become a major supplier for Europe and other regions
once Russia is at its peak production. This will, however, materialize at the end
o f our time horizon at the earliest.
8. Iran's position in the global energy market provides good opportunities to
extend its political, economical, and technological relations with other countries.
9.    The strategic geopolitics of Iran can make it a corridor for energy trade in the
region, assuming political issues can be resolved. The energy swap in the region,
especially in the north, can be beneficial for the Iranian economy. Iran can act as
safe transit corridor for oil and gas pipelines to the world markets with
competitive transit  fees and relatively  low capital expenditure, since  much of the
required infrastructure is already available.
Threats
1.   In all industrialized countries, especially those under the Kyoto protocol, the
decrease in energy intensity will continue. Furthermore, environmental
problems will result in high energy and carbon taxes all over the world. Various
studies have shown that, in order to achieve the emission abatement as agreed
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upon in the Kyoto protocol, the average cost of energy would have to increase.
For  the  U.S.A. this would imply that energy prices  in 2010 should  be  17  to  83
percent higher than in the non-Kyoto scenario (EIA,  1998). Of course, the Bush
administration did not ratify the Kyoto protocol, but the U.S.A. will also have to
take measures mitigating energy  use.  This  in turn will lead to an increase  in the
cost of production and generally some cost-push inflation in developed
countries. The inflation imported by oil exporting countries will decrease the
purchasing power of each barrel ofoil exported (OPEC, 2000).
2.    The political problems in the Middle East, especially the Israel-Palestinian and
the Iraq problem, are expected to be persistent and possibly destabilize the
region even further. Despite the qualification of Iran as a rogue state by the Bush
administration, the Iran-US political problem is expected to relax during the
next two decades. More importantly, most European governments have openly
denounced the US qualification, and Europe is and will remain one of Iran's
largest export markets.
3.      The  lack of financial assistance  for  Iran,  as  well  as  the  lack  of technology
transfer, will delay oil and gas development projects as it has done since March
1995 when the U.S.A., via an executive order, banned foreign investments in the
Iranian energy sector. This was one month later replaced by a ban on all U.S.
exports  to  Iran.  In  1996  the U.S. replaced  the  ban by the Iran-Libya Sanctions
Act, which was passed to prevent European and Japanese countries benefiting
from the US export ban (Fairbanks, 2001).
4.   Iran's oil export is expected to decrease in the future, due to an increase in
domestic energy consumption, assuming the current domestic energy structure
remains in place.
5.   The depreciation of the US Dollar against other currencies, along with the
increases in the level of inflation of Iran's trading partners, will decrease the real
purchasing power of Iran's oil export. Iran has lost much of the real purchasing
power of its oil revenue in the past (CIES, 2001a). This will be the case in the
future also, and policy makers should be aware of such losses. Note that the
Euro can be used to hedge against the US$, and can (partly) offset the possible
purchasing power losses.
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4.5 Domestic Energy Market: Strengths and weaknesses
In Chapter 2 Iran's domestic energy markets and energy policies were analyzed. This
internal analysis contains sufficient information to accommodate the requirements of
the SWOT analysis of this chapter. First, the weaknesses of Iran's energy sector are
discussed, with special emphasis on the domestic side. Next, the strengths are
discussed.
Weaknesses
1.   Iran's fast population growth has resulted in a strong increase in direct and
indirect domestic energy demand. Although population growth has slowed down
in recent years, it is still 1.5 percent per year. The size of the population was 61
million people in 2000, of which 51.2 percent was younger than 19. More
people means more energy. Even with a considerable reduction in population
growth, the current population pyramid with its broad base will result in many
new families and a steady increase in the use of energy appliances and new
dwellings, leading to strong increases in energy demand. In addition, every new
household consumes energy based on the current consumption structure, which
is highly inefficient. Direct energy demand increases through the use of
inefficient appliances and the construction of highly energy inefficient
buildings.
2. Iran suffers from a shortage of efficient technology. Most of Iran's economic
sectors use obsolete and depreciated machinery and facilities; these are far
below the standards used in other parts of the world and are certainly not based
upon best practices. For example, only four of Iran's ten refineries have a
remaining lifetime of more than six years, and the others are obsolete. The same
goes for power stations and industrial factories, such as textile mills.
3.     The Iranian government is overly involved in the economy in general and on the
energy sector in particular. Decision-making is complex, centralized and
requires too much government approval, resulting in inefficiency and
inflexibility. This causes too much red tape and prohibits efficient decision-
making within the energy sector, in particular for the domestic market.
4.      The share of the government sector in economic and service activities in Iran is
very high. For this reason energy consumption in the public sector is high also.
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The government is consuming about 49.2% of total domestic energy supply in
Iran (IIES, 1995). (Energy conservation programs could be initiated in the
governmental sector.) In addition, the government owns about 99% of Iran's
energy producing companies (production, transmission, and transformation),
and most of the supply companies. For the time being and due to the low level
of energy prices in Iran, conservation projects cannot be justified on the basis of
a financial cost-benefit analysis. However, based on the opportunity cost of
energy carriers, a social-economic cost-benefit analysis justifies the same
projects. Some ofthe possibilities are:
For refineries
-      Reduction of losses and fuel use;
Producing petroleum products on the basis of international standards with an
acceptable quality:
-       Development of refining processes that produce more high value products;
-   Extraction of wet hydrocarbons (such as C4+) from natural gas and as a
result the supply of more dry gas;  and
-      Reduction of losses in the transportation systems (including pipelines).
For power generation
-       Improving the efficiency of existing power generation plants;
-    Investing in new technologies, such as, Combined Heat and Power (CHP);
-   Reduction of losses in transmission and distribution of electricity through
improvement and installment ofan efficient grid;
-       Substitution of petroleum products as a fuel by natural gas;
-       Increasing the share of hydro electricity; and
-  Diversifying the electricity supply via completing the first phase of the
Booshehr nuclear power plant or stopping the project, to prevent the
continued waste of capital.
For governmental industries
- Applying compulsory energy auditing;
- Replacing non-efficient technologies by efficient ones; and
-     Peak load shaving management during the day and during the year.
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For construction
-    Developing and applying compulsory building codes;
-    Restructuring current buildings to conserve energy; and
-  Restricting the utility budget of large governmental buildings (especially
energy costs) in order to encourage energy conservation.
5. Continued urbanization due to better infrastructure and higher income levels in
urban areas. The share of the urban population grew from 38% in 1966 (9.8
million) to 62% in 1997 (37.7 million). Urban households tend to use more
energy than rural ones. Furthermore, this type of population growth requires
more energy for public buildings, passenger transport, and transportation of
goods, which in turn increase the demand of energy.
6.  There is a lack of reliable information on energy issues. The lack of a
centralized and powerful data bank containing reliable information about supply
and demand is an important problem when formulating energy policy. A good
databank would allow better planning by government bodies and entities at all
levels, as well as energy users and suppliers. Experiments in other countries
show that correct and adequate information can increase energy efficiencies by
10  to  1 5  % in comparison  to the situation where reliable information is lacking
(IIES, 1995).
7.   The lack of an effective energy pricing mechanism. For a long time Iran's
nominal energy prices have been fixed whilst, due to high inflation, real energy
prices have been diminishing. This governmental pricing policy has resulted in
serious misallocation of resources and increasing energy intensity. Low energy
prices also made energy conservation projects financially unattractive. This is a
major weak point in Iran's energy policy. Energy prices should be based on a
suitable and comprehensive energy-pricing rule, e. g. be based on the opportunity
cost of energy.
8.    Due to Iran's (lack of) energy pricing policy, a high level of implicit energy
subsidies exists. Based on border prices they amount to between US$ 10 and
US$ 15 billion per year, depending on international energy price development.
For some years, they even amounted  to the level of oil export revenues.
9.   The high level of implicit subsidies not only gives the wrong incentives to
energy consumers, it reduces government income also. Because of this lack of
government income, the government uses money supply to make ends meet. The
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high growth in money supply again induces inflation, which reduces the real
income of the Iranian people. This mechanism also makes it more and more
difficult to induce non-oil economic activities.
10.   There is no incentive for good energy management. Energy management in Iran
is virtually absent and there is insufficient regulation and regulation enforcement
in this respect. This has lead to a repetition of mistakes in decision-making, and
the continuation of inefficient practices. In many situations, it is unclear who is
responsible. These are important causes of the domestic waste of resources, in
particular energy resources. Many government bodies take decisions on energy
issues, among which, the Ministry of Energy (responsible for power,
hydroelectricity as well as fossil fuel electricity), the Ministry of Petroleum
(responsible for oil and gas), the Ministry of Industry and Mining (responsible
for coal), Iran's Atomic Organization (responsible for nuclear and renewable
energy), Jihad-agriculture ministry (responsible for rural electricity), and finally
the Energy Commission of the Majlis, the Iranian parliament. Co-ordination of
energy policies between these entities is virtually absent. This weak point could
be removed via restructuring the organization o f the energy sector. Currently the
establishment of the Energy Supreme Council is supported by different studies
(IIES,  1995,  2001 b)  to cure this weak point. This council's task would be to co-
ordinate the policy efforts.
11.    The oil and gas industry under the responsibility of the Ministry of Petroleum
and the many oil and gas related companies that are its responsibility is not
organized effectively. The ministry is well aware o f the many problems and tries
to resolve them through restructuring and redistributing responsibilities towards
the companies (NIOC, 1999). However, until now these efforts have been
insufficient.
12. The Iranian economy is dominated by the oil and gas sector. The development
o f this sector has been at the expense of other sectors, which failed to develop or
even shrank. This development based on one commodity makes the Iranian
economy vulnerable. This one commodity relation between the national and the
international economy has imposed losses on the economy through the
oscillation in the level of oil revenues and the effect thereof on the government
budget (Amirmoeni and Mazraati, 1999). This weak point is currently addressed
somewhat by the establishment of a Stabilization Fund, which will be fed by oil
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revenue in excess of what was expected, to meet the needs in times when
revenue is below what was expected. However, a more comprehensive
diversification policy is required to improve  Iran' s economic structure.
13. The technology used in Iran's energy sector is old fashioned and obsolete. This
needs to be improved to boost the lifetime of [ran's reserves, and to improve the
efficiency of Iran's domestic energy sector.
14. Incentives to replace inefficient appliances by efficient ones are lacking,
especially for household appliances. Reducing energy use and as a result energy
costs, will certainly not be an incentive under the current low energy price
regime. But even when replacement is due, the financial benefit from energy
cost reduction by using energy efficient appliances, which works in, for
example, European countries, does not work in Iran due to very long pay back
periods.
15.  The low energy prices also lengthen the use of facilities and equipment that
would otherwise be economically obsolete. Because of the low energy running
costs, machinery, equipment, cars, and housing facilities are used beyond their
normal lifetime and use more energy than is efficient from a social-economic
point of view. As a result managers in private and public entities are not
receptive to energy conservation issues.
16. The absence of standards and regulations. Because standards and regulations are
virtually absent in, for example, the construction of houses and commercial
buildings, a major part of the energy used is lost. (Note that in Iran large
changes of temperature between summer and winter occur.) Another example;
in Iran the average consumption of gasoline in cars is  12 to 14 liters per 100 km.
In other countries, this consumption is much less. The same can be found in
other economic sectors; such as steel and aluminum industry (IIES, 1995).
17. The incoherent and inconsistent economic strategy at the macro level results in
counterproductive developments between sectors, especially between the energy
sector and other parts of the economy. Energy authorities are trying to decrease
the energy intensity of industries, while new developments of these industries
set up by other ministries are not energy efficient. Iran is in the early stage of
industrial development, so heavy industries are on the top of the development
agenda, which are incidentally the industries that are disappearing from the
industrialized countries (EIA, 2000). In Iran the combination of economic
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activities is not changing towards energy extensive activities, as is the case in
most other countries, where energy extensive activities are a considerable part of
the GDP.
Almost all of the above mentioned weaknesses are under the control of Iran's
policy makers, so they can be removed or changed when there is sufficient political
support.
Strong points
Iran has the following strong point as well.
1.   Due to its large natural gas reserves Iran can easily substitute oil with other
energy sources, especially natural gas. The oil replaced by natural gas can be
exported. (Because of its liquid form, oil is easier to export than gas.) This
policy also results in a reduction of Iran's contribution to global warming. Since
Iran's  natural gas reserves are about   15.8% of world reserves,  and 1.7 times
more than its proven extractable oil reserves, there is ample opportunity.
Existing facilities can be retrofitted to natural gas also.
2.     Iran is strategically located. It has access to the Caspian Sea in the north and the
Persian Gulf in the south, and the historical Silk Road passes through it. It also
borders several land locked countries that have energy resources that can be
exported. Iran can act as a transit station for these countries. Furthermore, there
is the possibility of energy swaps. For example, due to the variation in weather
conditions and the time difference of different parts of Iran and the neighboring
countries, electricity swaps for peak load management can be arranged.
3.  Iran can buy oil and gas from its northern neighbors and swap it with its
southern products. saving the transport cost of the oil and gas. Iran has the
capability to be an intermediate for the export of oil and gas from the wider
region. Iran can act as safe transit corridor for oil and gas pipelines to the world
markets with a competitive transit fee. Having the necessary infrastructure, Iran
can enter into swap agreements with these countries, receiving oil in the north,
at Neka, south east of the Caspian Sea, and paying them with equal volumes of
oil at the Persian Gulf, which can be exported to the world markets. Having an
extensive gas pipeline network, Iran can purchase gas from Turkmenistan and
Azerbaijan for consumption in its northern provinces and/or for export to
Turkey, rather than transporting gas from its gas fields in the south.
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4.       The availability of potential natural gas markets in the east (Pakistan and India)
and the west (Turkey and the European countries).
5.   The policy to replace petroleum products by natural gas. This policy already
makes it possible to export more oil with the current installed facilities. The
domestic market for natural gas, integrated with the neighboring countries,
should be developed further.
6.       Expansion of liberalization and private ownership, and the prevention of further
expansion of the government. Iran has already experienced that the continuous
expansion of state-owned enterprises is a non-successful and uneconomic way
to expand. This has resulted in very low efficiencies in all state firms,
enterprises, and organizations. Misallocation of the resources in state-owned
activities is a well-known phenomenon in Iran. Paring down of the government
sector, especially in the energy sector, would help to improve the efficiency of
these activities nationwide. Well-defined liberalization and privatization of
state-owned firms is required.
7.       The Iranian government is aware of the fact that a system of good standards and
regulations is needed. This can be considered as a strong point. Establishment of
a system for energy auditing and cost accounting will make the energy systems
more  sensitive to energy saving issues. Experiences of other countries  show that
10 to 20 percent cost reductions can easily be achieved with a productive energy
auditing system.
8. The execution of training courses in energy management. There are
governmental and private entities that are capable to transfer knowledge on
energy management and technology to the individual users, households,
factories, etc. for energy auditing and conservation programs. These entities are
under the authority of the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Petroleum.
4.6 Strategic issues
Based on the above analyses the following strategic issues of Iran's domestic energy
sector can be determined:
1.    Reduction of energy intensity. As our analysis shows, Iran's domestic energy
use is not based on good practice, and energy intensity is high compared to the
level and structure of economic activity.
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2.    Improving the technology base. The technologies used in Iran are outdated and
urgently need to be updated to improve the efficiency of all economic sectors,
especially the domestic energy sector.
3.     Improvement of decision making in the energy sector. The organization of the
energy sector and the structure of decision making needs to be revised. Without
such a revision, it will be hard to improve the sector.
4.    Paring down of the role of the government. The energy sector is completely
controlled by the government. The government entities have roles as regulator,
decision maker, executer, and entrepreneur throughout the sector. This has lead
to inefficiencies and paralyses energy sector improvement via red tape
procedures and slow decision-making.
5.          Reserves are depleting, resulting in declining oil production. Most reserves are
over their peak production. Without new investments and improved technology,
Iran will not be able to keep up oil production at its current level.
6. OPEC quota. Since the quota covers all production, it needs to be reviewed in
the light of domestic energy consumption development and production capacity
decline.
7. International political issues. These play an important role for future energy
sector development, and the role Iran can play as an energy producer and, given
its location, as an energy broker. Especially the U.S. sanctions policy needs to
be addressed.
8. Energy pricing mechanism and the related subsidies. As the analysis shows,
improving the domestic energy pricing policy is an important prerequisite for
improvement  of the domestic energy sector.
9. Energy conservation. Improvement of the pricing policy is not enough to
address this issue. Better regulation and the introduction of standards and energy
labels, such as energy construction requirements for buildings, energy tags for
appliances, etc., are called for.
10.  Natural gas reserve utilization and oil by gas substitution. Given the large gas
reserves and the fact that oil is easier to trade than natural gas requires a
continuation of the gas for oil substitution policy.
These strategic issues can be grouped into three main categories. First, energy
intensity, technology improvement, energy pricing and subsidies, non-price energy
policies fall into the category of energy conservation. Second, natural gas reserve
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abundance, reduced oil production capacity, and the OPEC quota restriction can be
categorized as natural gas for oil substitution. Third, the improvement of decision-
making and the paring down of the government sector fall into the category of
improving decision-making within the government, and the liberalization and
privatization of now government owned energy entities. Note that the international
political issues (no. 7) affect all three categories and that it is beyond the scope of this
research.
Of course, the categories are not independent. For example, an improved
pricing policy will result in the substitution of oil products by natural gas, but
complemented with efficient decision-making such a policy will be more effective.
The international and domestic energy market issues mentioned above show that Iran
could continue to play its role in the international energy markets, because it has oil
and gas reserves and the infrastructure to export these. This requires, however, a
reduction in the growth of domestic oil consumption. On the basis of the three
strategic categories identified, Iran should develop the following three broad
strategies:
1. Further development of the domestic natural gas market and continued
replacement of petroleum products by natural gas wherever economically feasible.
2.  Development of a comprehensive energy conservation policy. The conservation
policy requires, among others, a well-defined energy pricing policy, the
establishment of energy standards, compulsory restrictions of, and codes for,
energy use.
3. Iran's domestic energy sector needs to be reorganized to improve decision-
making. The government institutions should be improved. For the now state
owned enterprises in the domestic energy sector, liberalization and possibly
privatization should be the leading principles.
These three strategies need to be translated into policies. Execution of these policies
will improve Iran's energy basket. It is clear that these strategies require many issues
to be resolved and the application of many instruments. Not all of these will be
discussed here. In what follows we will mainly concentrate on what a new energy
pricing policy means in terms of energy conservation and economic benefits, and
what Iran's additional energy conservation potential is given the experiences of other
countries. The reader should realize that this can only be implemented when Iran pays
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attention to the third strategy also. Currently the NIOC and the Iranian government
are already working on this strategy.
4.7 Conclusions
Through SWOT analysis, three major strategies   for   Iran' s domestic energy sector
were identified. These are the achievement of energy conservation (with improvement
of Iran's energy pricing policy at its core); continuation of the natural gas for oil
substitution strategy; and reorganizing the domestic energy sector, with improved
government decision-making through downsizing and liberalization of government
owned enterprises at its core. How to support these measures remains to be discussed.
This will be addressed in the following chapters. Chapter 5 discusses what type of
model best suits our analyses. In Chapter 6, an econometric energy demand model
and a no-policy-change (business as usual) scenario are developed. The trend in the
demand per energy carrier shall be forecasted. In Chapter 7, the pricing and non-
pricing energy conservation strategies will be quantified.
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In this chapter a tool to quantify part of the strategies formulated in Chapter 4 is
developed. Since the gas for oil substitution policy is already underway, special
emphasis will be on developing a tool to quantify the energy conservation policy, with
the domestic energy pricing policy as its backbone. Of course not all aspects o f such a
policy can be modeled explicitly. For example, the political problems related to a
major revision of the domestic energy policy are not part of the model and will only
be addressed marginally in this study. Also the restructuring of the government sector
in general and the Ministry of Energy, and the Ministry of Petroleum and its main
subsidiary the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is not modeled explicitly.
There are many ways to model energy in an economy; see Girod (1991),
Grubb et al. (1993), Hourcade et al. (1996), Kleinpeter (1995), and Beeck (1999).
Choosing the correct model to evaluate strategies is a difficult task. What is required
is a good balance between detail and goal; that is, choosing the system borders right
and minimizing the possibility that variables that are outside these borders strongly
affect the results.
The main goal of this research is to evaluate the opportunities of energy
conservation in Iran, especially through an adjusted energy pricing policy, and the
effect of continued gas for oil substitution. For this a model of Iran's domestic energy
sector is required, that allows the evaluation of these strategies. Because the reduction
in oil export capacity is a major problem, the effect of the domestic energy policy on
oil exports and gross domestic product should be part of the analysis. These indicate
the success of a strategy.
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However, what is required first is a discussion on what types of models are
available for the type of analysis we want to perform, and choose one. The most well
known distinction in energy modeling is that of top-down and bottom-up, where top-
down models analyze aggregate behavior, whereas bottom-up models rely on detailed
description of technologies (Hourcade et al.,  1996).
Another well-known distinction is that of general equilibrium as opposed to
vector autoregressive models, with traditional structural economic or simultaneous
equation models somewhere in between. These three general types of models are
discussed and based on the pros and cons of each approach with respect to the goal of
this research, the most appropriate model type is chosen.
Furthermore, models require data and data are often lacking in Iran. What is
available for Iran and how these data were obtained is discussed separately.
The model should allow for the evaluation of changes in domestic energy
policy, and the comparison of different scenarios over a time period of twenty to
twenty-five years. The model is, however, not a tool to get precise forecasts of energy
use development over the next twenty years. It should adequately cover the structure
of Iran's domestic energy sector and indicate the effects of changes in Iran's domestic
energy policy.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses criteria to guide the
selection of an adequate model type and model specification. In Section 5.3 three
different types of models, vector autoregressive, general equilibrium, and
simultaneous equation, are briefly discussed, as well as the type of analysis they can
be used for. Based on this discussion a type of model is chosen for our analysis.
Section 5.4 reviews the data available for Iran. Section 5.5 combines the results of
sections 5.3 and 5.4 to outline a model deemed most adequate for our analysis, taken
into account the data restrictions. Section 5.6 draws conclusions.
5.2      Criteria for model selection
In Section 4.4 the strategic issues were grouped into energy conservation, which
included energy intensity, technology improvement, energy pricing and subsidies,
non-price energy policies. the continuation ofgasfor oil substitution policy, which is
based on Iran's gas reserve abundance and its decreasing oil production capacity; and
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improving the ftinctioning of the government, and more specifically Iran' s energy
sector is organized, was identified as a third strategic issue.
What can we infer from these issues for our model? First and most
importantly, the model should allow the evaluation of changes in energy prices and
how this affects the real gross domestic product, domestic energy use, and export
revenue. So the model should clearly show the link between the real gross domestic
product, domestic energy use, and export revenue. Therefore, the real gross domestic
product should be endogenous.
The question is should the model cover factor income, that is, should the
model cover economic activities as labor supply and demand? Since we are interested
in the domestic energy sector and how it affects export revenue, this is not strictly
necessary. Of course, a complete macroeconomic analysis allows the identification of
who is going to gain and who is going to lose. However, for our purposes it is
sufficient to identify the contribution of the policy to export revenue, which is
dominated by oil revenue. Given the central role of the government in Iran's economy
in general and the complete control over the energy sector in particular, it is up to the
government how the extra oil revenue is used and there are many ways to let the
Iranian people benefit. As we shall show in Section 5.4, there is one other good reason
not to include factor income, and that is a lack of reliable data. For our purposes, a
model that includes the main effects of domestic energy demand and oil export
revenue, is sufficient. Since Iran is a developing country, it is assumed that an
increase in the real gross domestic product is a sufficient indicator for improvement of
the overall economy.
Domestic energy use can be divided into final energy demand and primary
energy demand by the energy transformation sectors (electricity and refineries). The
model should reflect this distinction  if we want to analyze the potential contribution to
energy conservation by Iran's inefficient transformation sector as well as that of the
final demand sector.
Furthermore, the model should distinguish the demand per energy carrier in
order to analyze the domestic energy sector in sufficient detail. Without knowledge on
the demand for each petroleum product it is impossible to estimate the domestic
demand for oil.
One of the strategic issues was technology improvement, since Iran's
technology base is weak and obsolete. However, modeling technologies explicitly is
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difficult. The most well known approach is the MARKAL model, which has been
(and still is) developed in a cooperative multinational project the Energy Technology
Systems Analysis Programme (ETSAP) of the International Energy Agency. (See
http://www.ecn.,11/unit bs/etsap/main.html.) In the MARKAL model individual
technologies are evaluated as well as their future development. Forecasting
development paths of individual technologies for the next twenty years requires the
expertise of many different experts, and is typically done by large research institutes,
such as the International Institute of Applied System Analysis (IIASA) and the Dutch
energy research institute  ECN.  (For an example, see Gielen 1997.) Furthermore,  a
detailed description of technologies used in Iran is not available, and as we will show
below is also not required for the type of analysis we want to perform. Since virtually
no energy efficiency improvements programs have been implemented in Iran so far,
the potential for energy utilization improvement, on top of the energy pricing policy,
can be estimated using experiences from other countries. Only when energy saving
and technology improvement policies will be developed in the future, a detailed
analysis of Iran's technology base is required. Finally, models based on detailed
descriptions of technologies tend to be too optimistic with respect to energy
conservation (Hourcade et al., 1996).
The model should confront domestic energy consumption and oil production,
although a detailed analysis of actual oil production is not required. There certainly is
a lot of room for improvement in this respect, but a detailed analysis of all producing
fields,   as   well   as   all new reserves, is beyond the scope   of this research.    Iran' s
production potential is, however, an important input for the model. Without this, oil
export cannot be determined. Furthermore, Iran has difficulties filling its OPEC quota,
since its production capacity is gradually decreasing. Given the fact that Iran is in
great need of foreign currency, we assume that Iran will always produce according to
its production capacity.
Finally, the model should reflect the current situation in Iran, since this is the
starting point of the analysis. The most important point is that the Iranian government
sets energy prices, so these are policy variables and not the result of market forces;
also see Chapter 2. Although the Iranian government is considering forms of
deregulation and privatization in the energy sector, free markets for energy products,
and as a result market prices, are not part of this policy. For this research we assume
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that the domestic energy prices remain administered prices. As was shown in Chapter
2, the current pricing policy results in very large implicit subsidies.
From this discussion we can deduct that the model:
-    Should link domestic energy demand to GDP and export revenue,
-        Does not require detailed descriptions of energy technologies,
- Should cover final and primary energy demand,
- Should distinguish between the different energy carriers,
-   Include a representation of oil production in order to obtain oil available for
export, and last but not least,
- Energy prices remain administered prices. Depending on the price path chosen
implicit subsidies remain high or vanish.
Before we outline a model, we discuss three popular approaches to modeling, to see to
what extend they meet our requirements for policy analysis.
5.3 Types of Models and Their Use
In this section we review three major types of models and discuss to what extend they
fit our purposes as discussed in the previous section. A large number of energy
models, many of which are special purpose models, have been developed; see
Kleinpeter (1995), and Bunn and Larsen (1997). However, most modeling approaches
analyze energy use in various sectors of the economy of non-energy producing
countries. Another problem is that, especially when individual energy carriers are
distinguished, it requires a level of detail that is at odds with macroeconomic analysis.
What is required is a detailed analysis of energy carriers in combination with
macroeconomic analysis.
Looking at the family tree of comprehensive economic models this can be
thought of as varying from (applied) general equilibrium models (or (A)GE) via
traditional structural economic or simultaneous equation (SID models to vector
autoregressive (VAR) models. In this range, AGE models have the most economic
theoretical depth, but have a very liberal view on statistical methodology. VAR
models on the other hand are very precise on the statistical level. Their economic
content on the other hand is very low. Macro-econometric models have economic
structure, but less stringent than AGE models. They do, however, apply statistical
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estimation methods to support equations, although data for sufficient statistical rigor
are often lacking.
Next, these three types of models are discussed as well as their pros and cons
for this study.
5.3.1 Traditional Econometric Models
Econometric models have been popular for a long time and were widely used in the
Keynesian tradition. Despite many criticisms they are still widely used in applied
work. The most well known macro-econometric model is most likely the Klein-
Goldberger model (for a discussion, see Theil, 1971, pp 468-483), and the approach
used was based on previous work by Tinbergen and Haavelmo. This type of model is
called structural economic models or structural equation systems (the term structural
was introduced by the Cowles Commission), because they are based on specific
models of consumer, producer, etc. behavior. Others, with the statistical aspects of the
models in mind. prefer to talk about simultaneous equation models (Jacobs and
Wallis, 2002). We prefer this latter interpretation, since it better covers the approach,
which not necessarily requires rigorous economic modeling. Many of the SE models
used for policy support were (and are) often a mixture of theory and ad-hoc
explanations, that is, partly based on economic theory and partly more descriptive
with some economic common sense as a foundation for the equations in the model.
With the growth of computer capacity macro-econometric models for policy
analysis became very popular, but due to data problems the statistical support was
often flawed. Systems with thousands of equations were developed to support policy
analysis. An example is the HERMES-model developed by the European Commission
(Italianer,  1986).   At the same time the economic foundation of this type of model
was often incomplete. Many of the models used, were/are, despite their size, partial
models and can be qualified as ad-hoc or descriptive models that, from an economic
theoretical and a statistical point o f view, are incomplete.
The  general  form of a linear SE model -which  is  the most widely used one-  is
A(L)Y, = B(L)X, + E, (5.1)
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with  Y, e R" the vector of endogenous variables,  X, e R a vector of exogenous
variables, and e, e R" a vector of random disturbances with E{E,} = 0  and F{E,} = Es.
A(L) and B(L) are matrix polynomials in the lag operator L (LX, = 4), and A(0) is
normalized such that the diagonal elements are all equal to 1 and the matrix has full
rank.
We can rewrite (5.1) as
11 =A(L)-'B(L)X, + A(L)-' E„ (5.2)
which is called the final form. The coefficients in A(L)- B(L) are called the dynamic
multipliers or impulse responses. When cumulated the long run multiplier effects are
obtained.
Note that the disturbance term is interpreted as being the result of neglected
variables (Theil, 1971, p. 104). If the model is formulated in line with economic
theory these effects will be small and random, hence they can be neglected. This is in
contrast to VAR models that have a different view on the role of the disturbance term
in economic modeling; see Section 5.2.3.
The most fundamental economic theoretical criticism on structural economic
models is the Lucas critique, which states that any change in the rules of economic
policy will have an impact on the behavior of economic agents (Lucas, 1976).
Therefore behavioral equations obtained by standard econometric methods will never
adequately predict the result of policy changes.
In terms of model (5.1) the Lucas critique means that part of the parameters in
the SE model,  for example those of the private sector, are not independent of those of
the other sectors, say the government.  As a result these parameters might change in
case  of new government policies.
Although the Lucas critique points at a serious theoretical flaw in many
economic empirical models, the quantitative effect of this omission might not be that
serious. For example, VanBergeijk and Berk (2001) show that the policy advice based
on econometric analyses of key financial economic relations remained valid for many
European countries despite a major institutional change, the introduction ofthe Euro.
The Lucas critique has led to changes in the way economic problems are
modeled. Two main directions can be distinguished. First general equilibrium models
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that try to take into account all economic behavior in an economic theoretically
correct way. Contrary to SE models, general equilibrium models incorporate
optimizing behavior of economic agents an their expectations  in a consistent way, and
identify the basic (or deep) parameters of taste and technology. Second, vector
autoregressive models that are based on reduced form equations and as such do not
suffer from mis-specified economic behavior, because they don't require any
behavioral theory.  We will briefly discuss these two types of models, and then discuss
the pros and cons of all three types of models.
5.3.2 General Equilibrium Models
Applied General Equilibrium or AGE models are based on the rigorous theoretical
economic concept of a multi-market equilibrium, where all markets clear due to price
adjustments. The central idea underlying this work is to convert the Watrasian general
equilibrium structure ( formalized  in the 1950s by Kenneth Arrow, Gerard Debreg
and others) from an abstract representation of an economy into a representative model
of the actual economy. Empirically based GE models, better known as computable or
applied general equilibrium models, have been developed to evaluate concrete policy
options. Shoven and Whalley (1992) describe all aspects of developing applied
general equilibrium models, including developing an appropriate equilibrium
structure, calibrating the model, compiling counterfactual equilibriums, and
interpreting results. They state that the Walrasian general equilibrium model provides
an ideal framework for appraising the effects of policy changes on resource
allocation, for assessing who gains and who loses, and that these policy impacts are
not well covered by traditional SE models.
Note that the econometric estimation of equations has in most AGE models
been replaced by calibration of the model. The typical structure of an AGE model is
one of nested functions of the Leontief, CD, CES, and CRESH type; see for example
Adams et al. (1994) and Naqvi (1998). The coefficients used are not based on
estimation, but (at best) on setting the parameters to meet the data in one or a few
years. The coefficients are determined through what is called calibration, not
estimation.
The functional forms used in many AGE models have been seriously criticized
by McKintrick (1998). Although correct from an economic theoretical point of view,
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the functional (and numerical) structure used in AGE models strongly affects the
results of policy simulations for small as well as large shocks. Based on a comparison
between a CES based AGE and the normalized quadratic functional form, McKintrick
concludes that better and more flexible functional forms for policy analysis in AGE
models need to be investigated.  Fox and Fullerton (1991) argue that the level of detail
in AGE models should be considered carefully and show that similar results can be
obtained with less detail.
The AGE-methodology allows the analysis of the impact of changes in the
level of macro policy variables on protection, or the impacts of tax changes on
different part of the economy. For example, an AGE-model could be developed to
evaluate the effects   of  Iran' s protection policy of non-oil import  and its promotion
policy of non-oil export. see for an attempt World Bank (2001). This calls for
calculating the price indices for exportable, importable, and non-tradable goods. A
drawback of AGE models is that they are not dynamic. They allow for a static
comparative analysis only.
For dynamic general equilibrium modeling (DGE) a second type of general
equilibrium model has been developed. A DGE is based on a concise mathematical
formulation of the long-term behavior of all agents, and fully accounts for the effects
of policy changes on model parameters. However, this type of model is not based on a
complete description of the economy, but computes the equilibriums of fully specified
but small artificial economies (Cooley and Dwyer, 1998). Many still see DGE models
as too stylized and too remote from fitting the data fur actual policy analysis (Sims,
1995)
Furthermore, DGE models are also often calibrated instead of estimated, and
therefore are not based on a sound, complete and probabilistic assessment of model
and data (Diebold, 1997).
5.3.3 Vector Autoregressive Models
Where general equilibrium models try to cover all economic theoretical criticisms of
SE models, vector autoregressive or VAR models originally ignored all economic
theoretical aspects. Sims (1980) criticized traditional structural economic (and rational
expectations) models because they rely on unrealistic identification restrictions.
Traditional SE models are often developed in parts. The restrictions introduced per
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part seem reasonable, but they become less reasonable when considering the complete
system of equations. Furthermore, the assumptions on what is exogenous and what is
endogenous are not based on economic theory.
Sims proposes to estimate models of the form
C(L)}1 = Et, (5.3)
with C(L) a matrix polynomial with the identity matrix as the leading matrix, so the
system is a reduced form system, and the elements of p, are correlated, so the
variance matrix   E{kt,pr } = Ep   is  not a diagonal matrix.  (5.3)  can be presented  as  a
vector moving average model
Y,  = C(L)-1 B„ (5.4)
which can be used to calculate the impulse responses.
A clear distinction between VAR models and SE models is the absence of
exogenous variables. A VAR model is a closed system in which all variables are
endogenous. This approach meets with an important objection made by Sims, that the
distinction between endogenous and exogenous in economic modeling is rather
arbitrary. System   (5.4)   can be transformed   via the Choleski decomposition   of  the
variance matrix of the A, that is, TB,=E, such that E{E,2,}=TE„Tr=E„ into a
recursive system
TY,=TC(L)-'p,=6, + C'(L)E,-1 . (5.5)
6, is white noise and the covariance matrix E{E,Er} = E, is diagonal;  T  is the lower
triangular matrix with ones on the diagonal from the Choleski decomposition.
An important difference between the SE approach and the VAR approach is
the interpretation of the error process. Where in the SE approach these are interpreted
as errors in equations due to the neglect of non-essential variables with minor
influences, in VAR models the error terms are called structural innovations and are
driving the stochastic dynamics of the equations (Gottschalk, 2001).  In the VAR
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literature it is quite normal to name the individual error terms when analyzing the
dynamics of the model.
A problem many researchers have with the VAR approach is its a-theoretical
character and as a result that the impulse response analysis has no economic
interpretation. Furthermore, the Choleski decomposition is not unique and leads to an
arbitrary ordering of the variables, not an economic one, and the results so obtained
can be sensitive to the ordering (Gottschalk, 2001).
This has lead to the development of the structural VAR or SVAR approach.
Instead of using a-theoretical restrictions only, some of these are substituted by a-
priori restrictions  on the variance matrix o f the orthogonal errors and/or restrictions on
the impulse response based on economic theory. An example of the latter can be
found in Blanchard and Quah (1989) where a monetary shock, interpreted as a
demand disturbance, has no long-term effect on output or employment; also see
Cooley and Dwyer (1998).
The popularity of the SVAR approach is increasing, because it allows an
economic dynamic analysis rather than a dynamic analysis sec as the VAR approach
does. For our analysis the SVAR approach rather than the VAR would be the one to
use if this type of model were to be selected, since we are interested in economic
policy rather than dynamics.
53.4 Pros and Cons
Each of the three model types in the previous three sub-sections has its strong and
weak points.
The SVAR model, especially when the number of endogenous variables is
large, requires a large number of covariance and/or economic restrictions to identify
the model. In case of n variables, n(n-1)/2 identifying covariance restrictions are
required (Garratt et al., 2000). These restrictions are difficult to obtain and it is
unclear how they are related to an adequate economic theory. Furthermore,
introducing these identifying restrictions was exactly what the original VAR approach
wanted to avoid.
Cooley and Dwyer (1998) analyzed the exact nature of the identifying
restrictions in an SVAR approach and compared these with those of a completely
specified economic model. They argue that the SVAR approach uses a mixture of
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theoretical and a-theoretical restrictions. The, from an economic point of view, a-
theoretical assumptions are concerned with the type of (non-)stationarity of the data,
which can be tested, although these tests lack power. These assumptions are, however,
crucial in an SVAR approach (Cooley and Dwyer, 1998). The a-theoretical
assumption that the structural shocks are orthogonal  is of crucial importance also, and
this restriction cannot be tested, although it strongly affects the systems dynamics.
The economic theoretical restrictions refer to economic theory, without formulating
this theory explicitly, as DGE models do. Cooley and Dwyer conclude that the SVAR
approach can easily lead to misinterpretations ofwhat the important shocks are.
The number of variables in a macroeconomic SVAR model based on annual
data is normally rather small due to data limitations. For this analysis, however, a
larger model is needed, since we already distinguish eight types of fuels. Furthermore,
a number of truly exogenous policy variables can be identified, the domestic energy
carrier prices. Our analysis in Chapter 3 showed that these prices are set by the
government and till now have hardly been affected by the development of Iran's
economy; political gain seems to be a better guide. So there is no reason not to
consider energy prices as exogenous variables.
The static AGE approach seems inappropriate for our purpose for the simple
reason that the domestic energy market is not cleared through price adjustments. Of
course one could argue that with prices set by the government, there will be market
clearance through quantity adjustment. This is, however, not the case, because the
energy carriers are produced in government owned facilities, and in several years and
for several energy carriers the amount produced was not or hardly enough to meet
demand.
The DGE approach seems promising, but for our purpose not suitable, since it
is still in its development phase and only applied to artificial and small economies.
This leaves us with the simultaneous equation or SE modeling approach.
Although this approach has its disadvantages, it seems the only approach that is robust
enough to analyze Iran's domestic energy situation. We should, however, keep in
mind the many problems that are inherent to this approach when analyzing the results.
Finally, in the literature there seems to be some convergence between VAR,
SVAR, and SE modeling. Clements and Mizon (1991) suggest an approach that starts
with VAR to search for the adequate dynamic structure, which is then used as a basis
to search for an adequate SE model.
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5.4     Available data
Consistent qualified data with the same frequency -needed for analysis and modeling-,
are lacking in Iran. For example, the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) reports the main
macro economic variables in the national accounts statistics, but also the Management
and Planning Organization (MPO) (previously named the Planning and Budget
Organization (PBO)) produces these data. However, the data from these two sources
are not the same, which leads to ambiguity and inconsistency.
The same holds true for energy data. These are provided by different energy
related ministries;   for the structure  of the energy sector see Section  3.5.1.  And  even
within one ministry, one can find different values for the same variable. Furthermore,
some data are classified as confidential by the Ministry of Petroleum and cannot be
accessed by the public. When modeling Iran's energy sector this is a problem when
building a consistent and disaggregated database.
Next, we discuss the data available and how we used the data to build a
consistent database for our research. In Subsection 5.4.1 the available macroeconomic
data are discussed. Subsection 5.4.2 reviews the energy data.
5.4.1   Macroeconomic data
Data on macroeconomic variables of the System of National Accounts (SNA) are
collected and processed by the Central Bank of Iran (CBD, and the Management and
Planning Organization *IPO). The MPO does this through its affiliation with the
Iranian Statistic Center (ISC). The macroeconomic data produced by both, the CBI
and the MPO, are not the same and in some cases, they are strongly inconsistent.
To be sure the macroeconomic data used are consistent, we tried to avoid
using data from different sources.  Here we use the data of the CBI, unless mentioned
otherwise, since the CBI data are updated each quarter and each year, and are the
most recent data available.
A problem that has to be resolved is the fact that the base year for
macroeconomic data is updated every ten years. Therefore, one has to approximate
the  data  when  the  base year changes. Fortunately, macroeconomic  data  in 1982 prices
have been made available for the period 1974-1998. We will use these for our
analysis and model estimation.
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Although the databank on macroeconomic variables is relatively complete,
there are still many problems when one tries to use these data. For instance,
definitions have changed and new categories were added to the data set. An example
is government income in Rial. The main categories were oil, tax, and other incomes,
and the share of oil income was the highest in the portfolio. But recently a new
category was introduced, called income initiated from "dollar sales". Actually, this
category is oil income also, but now accounted for differently. "Dollar sales" is the
value in Rial of dollars sold by the government on the free market (which officially
did not exist for many years). These sales were recently added to the government
budget as a new category, while these should be accounted for "oil income", as was
the case in past before the government sold dollars at the free market.
Also, data on several important macroeconomic variables are lacking, making
it impossible to construct a model for several parts of the economy. For example,
including the labor market in the model is almost impossible due to lacking data. The
numbers of employees for government and private sectors are available for the years
of census (1966,1976, 1986,1991,1996) while for the years in between the data are
interpolated. The data on wages in the private and the government sector for different
categories of employees are not available. The employment and unemployment rates
in [ran are approximations also, since there is not an online system of registering the
number of employees (full time or part time) in the private and the government sector.
Although capital formation is reported in nominal and real prices, these data
are highly unreliable.
Constructing a model for financial and money markets has some data
problems too. Lack of information on interest rates in the banking system and in the
free markets is an example. Although recently (since 1995) all interest rates (reported
as service commission) except for the free market are reported by CBI.
Different formal exchange rates during one financial year and in the course of
time within the government allocation system and in the free market (which is not
reported by CBI) is an obstacle  for the formulation of a model of the trade sector.
5.4.2    Availability of Energy data
Data registration and collection differ for each energy carrier. Electricity and natural
gas are registered at the end-user level through metering. These data are then gathered
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electronically; that is, registered manually on a regular basis and entered into a special
recorder, which is then connected to a computer to read the recorded data. As a result,
the final demand data for electricity and natural gas are fairly reliable and consistent.
Electricity consumption is the only energy carrier for which the data can be
aggregated up to the generation level. These reliable and consistent data for electricity
make it possible to draw up an electricity balance, which includes the final demand of
all economic sectors: Residential and Commercial, Industry, Agriculture, and Others.
By "Others" we mean wholesalers (mostly for very small villages), parks, mosques,
etc. The net export of electricity to neighboring countries is reported as final demand
also.
Natural gas is also registered at the end-user level, but not in the same detail as
electricity. Although there are gas-metering systems in various sectors of the
economy, the data published by National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC) is not based
on these metering data. They report on the basis of larger metering systems, for
example those at the entrance of distribution networks located in different parts of the
cities. Therefore, data on natural gas demand in, for example the Residential and
Commercial sector, are not exact data, but best guesses. The data for gas use in larger
industries and in power generation are based on metered data. Because of the
incomplete accounting, a gas balance for Iran is not provided.
The National Iranian Oil Refinery and Distribution Company (NIOR&DC)
handles the distribution of petroleum products at the wholesale and the retail level.
The major portion of gas oil and gasoline is sold by the private-owned gas stations,
mostly to the gasoline and gas oil using cars. Farms buy their fuel from the gas
stations too. The amount of gasoline and gas oil sold in the gas stations is ascribed to
the transportation sector.
The gas oil for other sectors is distributed directly by NIOR&DC, which does
not register the final users. Fuel oil is directly distributed by NIOR&DC also and the
final user is registered. Jet fuel is used for aviation only. LPG is distributed in
capsules, mainly to the Residential and Commercial sector. Bulk distribution of LPG
to industry, large commercial firms, and the transportation sector is registered.
Although fuel consumption in the various sectors is approximately registered, this is
not reported.
Because of the differences in registration between fuels, all data regarding the
consumption of petroleum products in different sectors of the economy as reported by
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the Ministry of Energy in the yearly energy balance are approximations. Therefore,
reliable data on petroleum products consumption in different economic sectors are not
available in Iran. This is especially true for the earlier years. Only for recent years the
NIOR&DC reports the share of each petroleum product in the energy consumption of
each economic sector. So, these data are available for a short period, but not enough
to support econometric modeling.
The most reliable data for petroleum products are those of consumption per
fuel, since they are registered when leaving the refineries or when imported or
exported. These fuel consumptions are reported yearly by NIOR&DC and can be
traced to the amount of crude oil feed to the refinery sector. Then using the amount of
export, we can reach to the level of oil production. In other words, the balance on
crude oil can be calculated.
The Ministry of Agriculture produces renewable energy in rural areas, and the
Iran Atomic Energy Organization in other parts of the country. There is not a formal
yearly report on the amount of renewable energy produced. Only recently the
Ministry of Energy started to collect these data systematically and report them in the
annual energy balance. The amounts are, however, rather small.
From the above we can conclude that consistent time series per fuel per
economic sector are not available.
Although  Iran is divided into 24 provinces by the Ministry of the Interior, this
does not mean that all governmental entities will produce their data and information
on the basis of this division. For example, the consumption of petroleum products are
not available per province. But one can find data on specified geographical areas.
These geographical areas (defined by NIOR&DC) do, however, differ from those of
provinces. Therefore a good spatial model is not feasible either.
Energy balance
The Ministry of Energy processes the energy data and generates them in a yearly
energy balance. Production of primary energies, import and export, demand of
international bunkers, and domestic demand for primary energy are reported on the
basis of barrel of oil equivalent or BOE values. Taking into account the changes in
stocks and statistical discrepancies, the energy balance of primary energy is reported.
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Losses that occur during the processing and own fuel use by the energy sectors
are estimated and reported too. Therefore, by subtracting the losses and own use from
the total primary energy demand, total final energy demand can be obtained.
The final energy demand for petroleum products, electricity, natural gas, and
solid fuels is reported in BOE. Petroleum products are reported as a group, not as
individual fuels, so separate data for jet fuel, LPG, gasoline, kerosene, gas oil,  fuel oil
are not provided in the yearly energy balance. As a result, one cannot use these data to
construct a fuel model for the different petroleum products.
Remark: As was mentioned above, the data on economic sectors are only available for
recent years. Therefore, when analyzing the structure of energy use in earlier years by
economic sectors in Chapter 3, we had to use approximations based on the share
information provided by the energy balance. We will, however, not use these
approximations for our model.
As was mentioned in Chapter 3, border prices are used to calculate the implicit
energy subsidies. However, these prices are not available for all fuels. For LPG only
the prices for its components, i.e. butane and propane, are available. By applying the
average share of these two as currently used to produce LPG we found that the price
of LPG for the years for which we have data, was very close to the price of kerosene.
Therefore, we use the price of kerosene as a proxy for the price of LPG.
The same price  is used for jet fuels. The price o fjet fuel in Iran is not available
either. Since the price of jet fuel is very close to the price of kerosene in the
international market, the price of kerosene was used as a proxy for the price ofjet fuel
also. Note that the demand for jet fuel is very small compared to the other fuels.
Energy data for modeling and forecasting
In order to construct a consistent and reliable database that can be used for
econometric modeling, all energy time series have been collected on the basis of the
units in which they are reported, and for each series the most reliable source was used.
For petroleum products, including jet fuel, LPG, gasoline, kerosene, gas oil, and fuel
oil, the formal reports of the NIOC and the NIOR&DC have been used. The data are
reported by NIOR&DC in "Yearly performance of the NIOR&DC", in Farsi
"Gozaresh Amalkard Salyaneh Sherkat Pakhsh". The data for the years before the
formation of the NIOR&DC were obtained from the department of Corporate
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Planning of the NIOC via direct correspondence. In case of inconsistencies, we
discussed these with the persons responsible for the data. The total petroleum
products consumption includes the consumption in final demand sectors and in power
generation. In order to calculate the final petroleum product consumption from the
total consumption one has to deduct the consumption in power plants. The petroleum
products consumption in power generation was taken from "Detailed Electricity
Industry Statistics", in Farsi "Amarhaye Tafsili Sanateh Bargh", published by the
Ministry of Energy.
Total natural gas consumption is from the "Yearly report on natural gas", in
Farsi, "Ghozaresh Salaneh Gas", published by the NIGC. The natural gas demand by
the power sector is taken from "Detailed Electricity Statistics" published by the
Ministry of Energy. Final demand for natural gas was obtained by subtracting the
demand by the power sector from the total demand for natural gas.
The consumption of petroleum products in oil refineries is included in the
crude oil feed. For natural gas consumption by refineries there is a technical relation,
as will be explained in chapter 6. This relationship was calculated using the data
reported in "Yearly performance of the NIOR&DC", issued by NIOR&DC.
The electricity data used are from "Detailed Electricity Industry Statistics", in
Farsi "Amarhaye Tafsili Sanateh Bargh", and " 40 years electricity industry in Iran",
in Farsi " Chehel Sal Sanat Bargheh Iran", published by the Ministry of Energy.   The
demand for solid fuels    is    from    Iran' s annual Energy Balance, published   by   the
Ministry of Energy.
Using conversion factors, see Chapter 6, all energy data can be transferred to
barrel of oil equivalent or BOE. The conversion factors used are those constructed by
the Iranian Institute for Energy Studies (IIES). These may differ from those used by
the Ministry of Energy and used to construct Iran's energy balance, but the factors of
the IIES seem more reliable.
The prices of heavy and light Iran's crude oil on the international market are
available, for our purpose we use the weighted average of heavy and light crude oil
published by OPEC in Annual Statistical Bulletin (ASB).
Domestic energy prices are taken from different sources. The petroleum
products and electricity prices are taken from the Energy Balance as published by the
Ministry of Energy. Most recent prices were obtained through direct correspondence
with the NIOC, the NIGC, and the Ministry of Energy.   For the years of rationing of
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petroleum products (1987-1990 for gasoline and 1987-1989 for gas oil) the prices are
the weighted average of the prices of the rationing system and the market prices set by
the government. The weights are the shares of consumption in the two systems.
The price of natural gas was obtained via direct correspondence with the
NIGC, Corporate Planning department.
5.5 General Outline of the Energy Model
This section contains a general outline of the SE model for our analysis and discusses
the choices made. Based on the general outline of an energy system, types of models
that can be used to derive an SE model are discussed. Based on data availability and
the goal of this research, an adequate structure is formulated. In Sub-section 5.5.1  the
main theories -not yet rejected above- used in energy modeling, are discussed. In Sub-
section 5.5.2 an outline for the empirical analysis of Chapter 6 is formulated.
5.5.1     Review of Energy Models
Individual researchers, national organizations, and international organizations, such as
the Iranian Institute for Energy Studies (IIES) and UNCTAD, have formulated several
macroeconomic models of the Iranian Economy. Surprisingly, none of these models
includes the domestic energy sector. This is mainly because domestic energy demand
was, till recently, not considered an important issue. Implicitly it was assumed, as
many Iranians still do, that Iran, as one of the leading oil exporters in the world, has
sufficient resources to meet domestic demand and that this could never seriously
affect export. As we have shown in Chapter 2, this assumption is false. As a result
none of the models previously developed can be used as a starting point for our
analysis.
For the formulation of the domestic use of energy, Figure 5.1 can be used.
This figure starts with the demand for energy by the various sectors of the economy.
The level of detail of the analysis (2.3 or 5 digit according to the international data
classification) is up to the researcher. Each sector demands one or more of the nine
fuels distinguished for final demand: six petroleum fuels (jet fuel, LPG, gasoline,
kerosene, gas oil, and fuel oil), plus natural gas, electricity, and others. In Iran the
latter category is small and consists mainly out of coal and charcoal.
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Figure 5-1. General outline ofthe domestic Iranian energy sector
Two transformation sectors, together covering the primary energy sector, are
responsible for the production of the energy carriers demanded, the power sector and
the refinery sector. In its thermal power plants Iran uses three fuels, gas oil, fuel oil,
and natural gas. Iran also produces hydroelectricity, but for clarity reasons this is not
depicted in Figure 5.1. In Chapter 6 hydroelectricity will, however, be modeled
explicitly. Note that also own power production by factories and others is not included
explicitly, but only through the demand for fuels.
The next question is how to model the final and primary energy demand. The
first decision to make is whether the economic sectors or activities, or the fuel
demand should be used as a starting point. The advantage of using economic sectors




To model final demand by the household sector a large number of demand models
based on utility maximization subject to a budget constraint have been developed.
This line of reasoning started with the Stone-Geary model based on a Cobb-Douglas
utility function and a linear budget constraint. Since then many models have been
developed, of which Theil's Rotterdam model (Theil, 1965), and Deaton and
Muelbauer's Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) (Deaton and Muelbauer, 1980)
are perhaps the most well-known. A wide variety of related models has been
developed, see for example Neves (1994), and various forms have been tested
(Tridimas, 2000).
For our purpose this approach has two disadvantages. First, energy is only a
small fraction of consumer expenditure and small fractions tend to be poorly
estimated. This would be especially true if, instead of using the general category
energy, all fuels would be introduced. This disadvantage can be overcome somewhat
by using an approach based on nested demand functions. Expenditure systems
require, however, detailed data over a longer period. This brings us to the second
disadvantage, the data to support such an approach for Iran are lacking.
Production and cost functions
For the manufacturing sector (or its sub-sectors) a large number of models have been
developed too. Two important approaches are the production function approach and
the cost/profit function approach.
Production functions are a powerful tool to model factor demand. Normally
the production function is not used directly to derive factor demand, but factor
demand is based on the assumption that producers (or in a macroeconomic context, a
representative producer) minimize costs (or less widely used, maximize profit). Using
Shephard's lemma share equations can be derived which can be estimated. For a
comprehensive discussion of this approach we refer to Fuss and McFadden (1978).
Since then many contributions and more flexible forms have been introduced. In
applied work, the translog approach is the most popular one. For this research this
approach would be a viable one, but as for household demand, Iran is lacking data,
especially on capital stock and labor input.
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Note that the mathematical formulation of production functions and their
possibilities for a nested approach to demand is also popular in AGE models; for
example see Naqvi (1998).
Descriptive models
Another approach that is popular in energy demand modeling is the use of energy
intensity, which can be applied on the macro, sectoral or sub-sectoral level. For the
development of future demand the adjustment of the intensities can be modeled as a
function of energy prices and technology (Van Groenendaal, 1998). From an
economic theoretical point of view this types of models can be regarded as ad-hoc
models, since they are not based on optimizing behavior as the previous two
approaches are. This approach requires, however, detailed information on the costs of
various technologies, which is not available for Iran. This would require an energy
audit of many production facilities, companies, and other users, which is beyond the
scope of this research. This brings us to an approach that is feasible, fuel demand
models.
Another type of descriptive models, which lack any economic theoretical
content, and as such are really descriptive, use an index, to analyze different patterns
in industrial energy demand (Unander et al, 1999; Luukkanen and Kaivo-ajo, 2002).
This type of analysis is very useful to determine different effects in energy intensity,
but for policy analysis it can only serve as an input not as analytical tool.
Fuel demand models
In a fuel demand model, the demand for a fuel is modeled as a function of the
economic activity, its own real price and that of its main competitors, and other
relevant explanatory variables. This approach can be applied for a single fuel as well
as for several fuels (Belhaj, 2002; and Chow, 2001). The main difference between this
approach and those based on explicit economic theory is that the explanatory
variables are introduced on an ad-hoc basis, although they are similar to those in
derived demand equations. Given the lack of detailed economic data for Iran this
approach will be applied here too. The only reliable information available on energy
use is total fuel demand for each of the nine categories mentioned above. The only
refinement that can be made is based on the fact that data on total final energy
demand; that is, energy demand by households and small commercial enterprises,
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agriculture, manufacturing, transport, etc., are available, as well as energy demand by
the power and the refinery sectors.
5.5.2   A Simultaneous Equation Model for Iran's Domestic Energy Sector
In this subsection a model is formulated that shall serve as a starting point for the
estimation in Chapter 6. The model contains four sub-models: the final demand per
energy carrier, the primary energy demand that results from the final energy demand,
a small Keynesian macroeconomic model to link the effects of the domestic energy
use to the gross domestic product, with special emphasis on the effect of oil revenue
on domestic expenditure, and finally equations to calculate the implicit subsidy on
final energy demand.
Final energy demand
For each fuel the following general equation will be used as a starting point for the
empirical model of Chapter 6:
Di, =  f(RPj„EA,)+gi,. (5.6)
Di  denotes the demand  for  fuel  i,  Rpj  the real price  of fuel j,  EA the indicator  for  the
relevant economic activity, and ij € {jet fuel, LPG, gasoline, kerosene, gas oil, fuel
oil, natural gas, electricity}. As was mentioned in Chapter 2, in Iran the government
sets the prices of all energy carriers. In Chapter 6 Equation (5.6) will be made more
precise and attention will be paid to the dynamic structure.
What is used to indicate economic activity will depend on the actual fuel. In
some cases this will be real gross domestic product, but for others this can be
pinpointed more precisely. For example for jet fuel the amount of cargo and the
number of passenger kilometers are better explanatory variables. For the demand for
gasoline the stock of cars seems a logical choice. Of course the model has then to be
augmented to cover these additional variables.
Primary energy demand
The demand for fuels in the transformation sector will be based on the technical
coefficients of the power and the refinery sector. Since energy prices for these sectors
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are not available (and seem to play hardly any role in the decision process), the
demand for fuels in thermal power plants (gas oil, fuel, oil and natural gas; see Figure
5.1) will be based on the demand for electricity only.
Di, =  f (Delectricity,) + d,. (5.7)
Di denotes the demand for fuel i by the power sector, Delectricity the demand for
electricity, and  i e  {gas oil, fuel oil, natural gas}.
The final demand for petroleum fuels in combination with the demand for gas
oil and fuel oil by the power sector results in the total demand for petroleum products,
which has to  be met by the refinery sector.  In the past the capacity of this sector was
in most years sufficient to meet domestic demand, with the exception of gasoline,
some of which has to be imported from neighboring countries. The gross demand for
oil by the refinery sector is modeled by the technical coefficients of historical
production efficiency.
The demand for natural gas needs extra attention, since Iran has already
implemented a natural gas for petroleum products substitution policy. The model
should adequately reflect the effects of this policy.
Since we require   the real prices of energy carriers in Equation   (5.6),   the
consumer price index (CPI) is modeled also. The analysis of Chapter 2 shows that this
variable will depend on Iran's policy on liquidity creation over real economic growth
(GDP), which according to the quantity theory of money is the main contributor to
inflation. For our analysis it is assumed that liquidity is an exogenous variable.
Oil for Export
A result of the analyses of final and primary energy demand in combination with the
technology coefficients of the transformation sector will, among others, be the
demand for crude oil for domestic use. If this is subtracted from the amount of oil
produced, the amount of oil available for export is obtained. Since oil prices are
determined by global oil demand and supply, oil prices are exogenous for Iran. So
with the export of oil and a reference path for oil prices, the value of oil export is
determined. This revenue is by far the main component of Iran's dollar income, which
in turn affects expenditure. This part o f the model is depicted in Figure 5-2.
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Figure 5-2. Oil production and export
Implicit Energy Subsidies
The border prices of all energy carriers are exogenous to our approach. Given the
domestic prices of petroleum products, as well as natural gas and electricity, the
implicit subsidies can be calculated.
To calculate the implicit subsidies we need either domestic energy prices in
US$, or the border prices of the energy carriers in Rial. Either way, the free market
exchange rate is required for this. Therefore, the free exchange rate is included in the
model.
Economic Activity
The final part of our model is the link between real gross domestic product (GDP) and
the effect total dollar inflow (R$) has on it. For this we model the main components of
GDP, real private consumption (CP), real investments (I), real government
expenditure (G),  and real import (M). Note that the major part of export (X) is already
determined above by oil export. Iran's non-oil export is relatively small (around 20%
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of the total) and diverse, subject to much government regulation, and therefore not
endogenous in the model.
Each demand category is assumed to be affected by real income, dollar inflow,
and possibly other variables. The latter depend on the particular demand category.
The general formulation of the equations is:
Cp, = f(Income„RS„Z,) + E, (5.8)
I, = f (Income„RS„Z,) + 6, (5.9)
G, = f (Income„ RS„Z,) + 6, (5.10)
M, = fUncome„RS„Z,1 + 6, (5.11)
Z, denotes the possible exogenous variables. The real effect of the dollar inflow
depends of course on a much more complex politically motivated decision process.
However, we assume that this effect can be adequately quantified in this way. The
total real gross domestic product GDP is defined as:
GDP,=CP,+I,+G,+X,-M, (5.12)
In Figure 5-3 all models are combined. A darker background indicates the
boxes containing the most important variables. If we start reasoning from real gross
domestic product, the figure shows that this will affect the final demand of energy
carriers, as do their real prices. On one hand, this final energy demand allows us to
calculate primary gross energy demand, and on the other, it allows us to calculate the
amount of implicit subsidies on final energy demand. For the latter the border prices
and the free market exchange rate are required.
The domestic demand for oil together with oil production results in another
variable of major importance. oil export. If we multiply this by the price of oil, oil
revenue is obtained. This in turn determines, together with non-oil export revenues
and foreign direct investment, the total dollar inf'low. This variable is again an
important input for the demand categories that constitute gross domestic product,
which shows the main feedback mechanism in the model.
Another important feedback is between GDP, as a measure of real income, and
the main demand categories. We will return to this in Chapter 6.
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The main exogenous variables are the price of oil, oil production, and
liquidity. The other exogenous variables are of course important also, but are expected
to have a less significant effect.
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Figure 5-3. Main relationships in the overall model
Note that two exchange rates are distinguished, a regulated one and the free
exchange rate. The regulated exchange rate is used solely to transfer export in US$ to
real export in Rial, so it actually covers the exchange rate effect and the domestic
price of exports. This is necessary to account for the many exchange rate regimes that
were used by the Iranian government in the past; see Chapter 2. The free exchange




Before a model can be formulated, it is wise to investigate the boundaries of the
problem. The main requirements for the model are that (i) it should link domestic
energy demand to real GDP and export revenue, (ii) detailed descriptions of the
energy technologies used in Iran are not required, (iii) the model should cover final
and primary energy demand and distinguish the different energy carriers used in Iran.
Furthermore, it is assumed that Iran's domestic energy prices remain administered
prices, so these will not be modeled as market prices when introducing a new energy
pricing policy. A model based on these constraints allows us to analyze Iran's
domestic energy market and how it affects economic growth, which is one of the main
goals o f this research.
Next, the pros and cons of three important ways to formulate a model -
simultaneous equation or SE models, general equilibrium or GE models, and vector
autoregressive or VAR models-, were discussed. Each of these approaches has its
merits, and each can be criticized. We concluded that the traditional SE approach
suited our purpose best, despite its drawbacks.
Since sound data is a problem in any study, and especially in a developing
economy -which Iran still is-, attention was paid to the data available for Iran. This
analysis shows that many of the popular approaches used to model energy demand
cannot be used to model Iran's domestic energy sector.
With the type of model and the data restrictions in mind we used an outline of
Iran's domestic energy system as a starting point to formulate a model that is suitable
for our purpose. Figure 5-3 contains a general outline of the model that will be made
more precise and estimated in the next chapter. The model is only a partial model of
the economy, with emphasis on domestic energy. We are, however, convinced that it
is sufficiently well specified for our analysis.
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Estimation, Simulation, and Forecast of
Iran's Final and Primary Energy Demand
6.1 Introduction
The general outline of the model developed in Chapter 5 will be made concrete and
estimated in this chapter.  The goal  of the model  is to describe the interactions between
Iran's energy sector (more in particular its domestic energy sector) and Iran's macro
economy in sufficient detail for our long-term analysis of domestic energy policies.
Indeed, the major variables that affect the demand for different energy carriers shall
be obtained through analyzing the main energy consuming sectors for each energy
carrier. Each equation specified in this way is then estimated in order to select the
proper one using econometric criteria. Finally, this set of estimated equations is
completed with identities to form a complete model that can be used for policy
analysis and projection.
The objective of this research is to analyze the effect of possible energy policy
rules that will increase the overall benefits of Iran's oil and gas production. For this it
is necessary to forecast the level of domestic energy demand based on the current
non-optimal situation of low energy prices and a large government sector, resulting in
inefficient energy use (see Chapter 2 for details). The model developed in this chapter
will be used to forecast domestic energy demand for each energy carrier in case of no
change in policy. In Chapter 7 the model will be used to analyze the effect of
removing the implicit energy subsidies reported in Chapter 2. The effect of this policy
on the trend of energy demand and on energy efficiency of the whole economy is
evaluated.
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Because of the feedback mechanisms between the macro economy and the
energy sector identified in Chapter 5, the overall model actually comprises four sub-
models: (i) a small Keynesian macroeconomic model to simulate the main economic
activities, (ii) a model for final energy demand, (iii) a model that translates total final
energy demand into primary energy demand, and (iv) a model for implicit subsidies.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the statistical
procedure used to obtain the estimated equations. The estimation results are reported
in Section 6.3. Subsection 6.3.1 discusses the macroeconomic model, Subsection 6.3.2
the final energy demand model, Subsection 6.3.3 deals with the energy transformation
activities (power plants and refineries), and finally Subsection 6.3.4 discusses   the
subsidy model. Section 6.4 first covers the assumptions on the models exogenous
variables up to 2020. next the business as usual or reference scenario is discussed.
Section 6.5 contains conclusions.
6.2 Methodology Applied
The behavioral equations of the model are estimated using either two stage least
squares, (Greene, 1993, pp. 603-605), denoted as 2SLS, or ordinary least squares,
denoted as OLS (Greene, 1993, pp. 358-381). Each estimated equation is evaluated
using:
-  the goodness-of-fit measure RS, which indicates the portion of the variance
explained by the model over the total variance in the endogenous variable, but is
adjusted for the number of explanatory variables used. The adjustment is based on
the philosophy of parsimoniousness  in model building.   Note that the value of R 
is smaller than one, but can in extreme cases become smaller than zero.
-   the Student t-statistic for individual coefficients is used to test the hypothesis that
an individual coefficient is equal to zero. With K+1 the number of explanatory
variables and N the number of data in the sample, the t-statistic is defined as
,-P,/ , which  has a t  distribution with  N  -  K-1   degrees of freedom;   #*   is.k-   / %
/    A
the estimated coefficient, and SB its estimated standard error that can be obtained
from the regression variance matrix.
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the F-statistic on joint significance of the estimated coefficients, that is, the test
Ho :Bo =P,=...= Bk  =0.  This test is based on the residual  some of squares of
the restricted and the unrestricted model.
-  the Durbin and Watson or DW-statistic on first order autocorrelation and the h-
DW in case tagged endogenous variables are present in the model. The DW
statistic ranges from zero to four, with a value near 2, indicating no first-order
serial correlation.
If the lagged endogenous variables are present in the equation, the DW statistic
cannot be used. In this case it is substituted by the Durbin h-statistic, which is
defined as      h - D Ii'  =  1 - .2Wl   1
N
,   with   var< B ) the estimated
C        2   )1111- N[var(B)]
variance of the coefficient of the lagged endogenous variable (Pindyck and
Rubinfeld, 1998, p. 169). h-DWis approximately standard normally distributed, so
the test can be done by using the quantiles ofthe standard normal distribution. The
null hypothesis is "no serial correlation", and if rejected first-order serial
correlation exists. In other words, if the estimated h-DW is larger than the critical
value, the residuals are autocorrelated.
-  the Augmented Dickey-Fuller-test (ADF) is applied for unit root diagnostic
checking. In empirical econometric work, it is assumed that the time series used
are each from a (covariance) stationary stochastic process, that is, a process with a
finite constant mean and variance, and autocovariances that only depend on the
distance in time between two observations (Verbeek, 2000, p. 229). If the time
series data are non-stationary, the criteria to evaluate equations discussed above
are corrupted and may result in what is known as spurious regression (Verbeek,
2000, p. 281). The relationship between the non-stationary variables can be based
on the fact that they are both trended and this should not be mistaken for a causal
relationship that may not exist. Therefore, it is tested if the residuals of each
estimated equation are stationary using the (augmented) Dickey-Fuller test (ADF
test) with an intercept and one lag. The null hypothesis is that the residuals are not
from a stationary stochastic process as assumed; this is also known as the unit root
hypothesis. In case this hypothesis is rejected, the equation is cointegrated. The
MacKinnon critical values for the rejection of the unit root hypothesis as reported
in the statistical package Eviews will  be used;  at  the  l %,  5%,  and 10% level  and
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for 23 observations these are -3.785, -3.011, -2.645 respectively. In the sequel we
will indicate these three significance levels when we report on the ADF test by *,
**, *** respectively.
Remark: For a SE model a more comprehensive test is actually required, but this
testing is still in its infancy; see Hendry and Juselius (2001).
Finally, for each equation a figure is included in which the actual and the
simulated data are confronted. Note that the simulated data are based on the
dynamic simulation of the complete SE-model over the sample period.
The estimated equations reported in Section 6.3 below are judged on the tests
discussed above. The log-log autoregressive distributed lag model is used as a starting
point for the estimation of each equation. One of the advantages of this approach is
that the coefficients are elasticities. Only in a limited number of cases the log-log
linear form had to be abandoned due to unsatisfactory results. For more detailed
explanations  of the theoretical foundation of the statistic and diagnostic tests used, as
well as statistical tables to apply them, we refer to Greene (1993), Pindyck and
Rubinfeld (1998), or Verbeek (2000).
Finally, the estimation period used covers three hectic periods in the history of
Iran; the period before the Islamic revolution (1974-1979) in which the political
situation was already unstable; the period 1979-1988, with the revolution in 1979 and
in which Iraq invaded Iran, resulting  in a seven year war; and the period 1989-1998  in
which Iran is still in a politically difficult period, but which is a quiet period compared
to the previous periods. Econometric modeling is difficult as it is, without data that
account for such difficult times. We did not test whether different models are valid for
these different periods. The data periods are too short for formal testing. However,
every equation was re-estimated for other periods than 1974-1998,   and the results
were compared to those based on this time period. These results indicated that the
estimated equations reported below are stable in the sense that the most of the
explanatory variables remain significant and that the estimated coefficients do not
change too much. The only exception is the equation for CPI, which is therefore based
on a different estimation period (1979-1998).
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6.3 Estimation Results
Each of the four sub-models mentioned above are developed in this section. In Sub-
section 6.3.1 the Keynesian macroeconomic model is formulated, in Sub-section 6.3.2
the final energy demand model, in Sub-section 6.3.3 the primary energy demand
model, and finally in Sub-section 6.3.4 the subsidy model.
Since we estimate behavioral equations of a SE model, each individual
equation needs to be identified. It ca be shown that all equations in the simultaneous
part of the model are over-identified and can be estimated by 2SLS Or the
instrumental variables or IV method. The recursive equations and other auxiliary
equations can be estimated by OLS. For the estimation time series data for the period
1974-1998 are used.
6.3.1 The Keynesian model
The Keynesian macroeconomic model is very small and only contains equations for
private consumption, investment, government expenditure, and net exports (i.e. export
minus import);   also see Chapter   5. All endogenous variables   are   in 1982 market
prices. The individual equations o f this model are discussed next.
Consumption expenditure
Consumption expenditure, further denoted as CP, is a function of real gross domestic
expenditure (GDE), population (POP), and the level of Dollar inflow (R$). The
estimation method used is 2SLS.
LOG(CP) =    -7.898 + 0.137*LOG (GDE) + 0.663*LOG(POP)
(-4.36) (1.38) (4.70)
+ 0.152*LOG (R$) + 0.376*LOG (CP(-1)) (6.1)
(2.67) (2.82)
EM: 2SLS; RL, = 0.96; DW = 1.55; h-DW = 1.43; ADF = -3.18**
All coefficients have the expected sign and all but one, GDE, are statistically
significant. The critical value of two-tailed t test at  the 95 percent and with 19 degrees
of freedom is 2.093.
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With Rt* equal to 0.96, the equation has a good fit.
Figure 6-1 shows that the values of the dynamic simulation of the complete  SE
model (denoted by CPRF) are in line with the actual values (denoted by CP).
Since the calculated h-DW is 1.43, which is lower than the 0.95 table value of
1.645,  the null hypothesis of serial correlation is rejected.
The ADF statistics rejects the null hypothesis of being non-stationary at the
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Figure 6-1: The actual and simulated values of CP in billion 1982 Rial
The short and long term elasticities for GDE, the income effect, are 0.137 and
0.220 respectively, which seems rather low. Iran's population growth has a larger
effect on consumption expenditure,  0.663  in the short  and  1.063  in the  long  run.  For
R$ these values are 0.152 and 0.244 respectively.
Investment Expenditure
Private investment (I) is a function the dollar inflow R$, the dollar value of capital
goods import (CAPIM$). A higher level of dollar inflow enables a higher level of
investment. The capital goods import indicates the government policy on lifting
import restrictions. The following equation was obtained.





EM: 2SLS, RJ= 0.78; DW = 1.28; h-DW = 2.00; ADF = -2.82***
All coefficients are statistically meaningful, except for the intercept, and the signs of
the estimated coefficients are as expected. The adjusted R-squared of 0.78 indicates a
proper goodness of fit, given the fact that investment equations are hard estimate.  The
h-DW statistic rejects the null hypothesis of first order serial correlation. The
investment equation satisfies the cointegration test at the 90 percent level. Figure 6-2
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Figure 6-2. Actual and simulated values of I in billion 1982 Rial
In Iran the dollar inflow is an important determinant of investment
expenditure, since one percent increase in its level leads to a 0.28 percent and 0.84
percent increase in the level of investment in the short and long term respectively.  In
addition, the restrictive import policy of investment and capital goods as well as the
long term international embargo have affected the overall investment expenditure in
Iran,   since one percent increase  in the level  of capital goods import indicates  0.14%
and 0.44% increase in the short and long run, respectively.
Government Expenditure
Iran's dollar income (R$) is mainly earned by and allocated to the government sector.
So it is reasonable to assume that it affects real government expenditure (G). In recent
years this effect has strengthened, because the government can,  via selling part of its
oil dollar income on the free exchange market, increase its income in Rials. On top of
R$, also a higher level of GDP causes a higher level of tax-income for the
government, encouraging in turn more government expenditure.
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EM: 2SLS; R = 0.88; DW = 2.13, h-DW = -0.40; ADF=-3.70**
All coefficients are statistically meaningful and their signs are as expected.
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Figure 6-3. Actual and simulated values ofgovernment expenditure
in billion 1982 Rial
A one percent increase in R$ causes a 0.21% increase in G in the short run and
0.93% in the long run. This clearly indicates the strong effect oil revenue has on
government expenditure and given the fluctuating nature of this variable, its potential
for destabilizing government policy. This effect is amplified by the effect R$ has on
private consumption and investment. The effect of GDE is much smaller, 0.14% in
the short term and 0.62% in the long term.
Export
Iranian export (X) consists of oil, and non-oil exports. The latter is, however,
relatively small and is therefore not modeled separately, but treated as an exogenous
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variable.  Note that this non-oil trade is also restricted by the boycott of many Iranian
products by the USA.
The amount of oil exported is determined endogenously by subtracting
domestic demand for oil from production. However, this is part of the energy model
discussed below.
Because of the many restrictions on trade and the many exchange rates used in
Iran during the estimation period (see §2.2.3), a separate variable called average
exchange rate (AERC) is introduced to convert US$ into Rial.
The following equation describes export in 1982 prices (X) as a function ofR$
net ofthe exogenously determined foreign direct investment (FDI).
X = AERC*(R$ - FDD (6.4)
This identity is the major link between the macroeconomic model and the
energy block ofthe model. Next, we estimate an equation for AERC.
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Figure 6-4. The actual and fitted values ofAERC
Average conversion rate
The average rate to convert the dollar value of export into real Rial values (AERC) is
affected mainly by the price of oil (POIL) Since the oil prices are exogenous in this
model, the log-log  functional  form  of the  AERC  can be estimated  by  OLS.    It  is
expected that a lower AERC is associated with the higher oil price.
LOG(AERC) = 6.244 - 0.697*LOG(POIL) + 0.133*LOG(AERC(-1)) (6.5)
(12.1) (-10.1) (1.8)
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EM: OLS; Rio = 0.94; DW = 1.01; h-DW = 2.50; ADF = -2.04***
Each coefficient is statistically meaningful and the equation has a good fit.
This is confirmed by Figure 6-4, which, together with the familiar simulated and
actual data, also shows the residuals of the estimated equation in connection with the
higher and lower bound of the standard deviation of the residuals. The ADF test
rejects the unit root hypothesis of the residuals.
Imports
Imports (M) are modeled as a function of dollar inflow R$ and a time trend.  The
dollar inflow indicates Iran's ability to purchase foreign goods and services. As
indicated in Chapter 2, Iran's import is strongly affected by government policy, which
has lead to a continuous reduction in imports in real terms. This effect is covered by a
time trend. The lagged import variables depict the adhesive structure of Iran's Import.
LOG(M) = 4.067 + 0.205*LOG(R$) - 0.022*TREND + 0.847*LOG(M(-1))
(3.2) (1.2) (-2.62) (4.1)
+ 0.461*LOG(M(-2)) (6.6)
(-2.48)
EM: 2SLS; Rfdj = 0.78; DW = 2.17; ADF = -2.54**
All coefficients are statistically meaningful at the 95 percent level, except the
dollar inflow (R$). Because Eq. (6.6) contains two lagged dependent variables, the h-
DW test cannot be used. To test for autocorrelation the residual was modeled as
e, =a+Be,_,+4, and since  B   was not significant the hypothesis of first order serial
correlation can be rejected. The value of R: suggests an acceptable goodness of fit,
which is supported by Figure 6-5. According to ADF the null hypothesis of unit roots
can be rejected, so the equation is cointegrated. The import elasticity of dollar inf'low
shows that a one percent increase in the dollar inflow causes an immediate increase of
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Figure 6-5. The actual and simulated values ofM in billion 1982 Rid
Real Gross Domestic Expenditures
By definition real gross domestic expenditure is the sum of private consumption,
investments, government expenditure and net export. The gross domestic expenditure
at 1982 market prices (GI)ID  is
GDE=CP+I+G+(X-M) (6.7)
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Figure 6-6. Real GDE and real GDP in billion 1982 Rial
Real Gross Domestic Product
Theoretically, real gross domestic expenditure (GDE) should be equal to real gross
domestic product (GDP). In Iran there are, however, significant and persistent
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statistical differences between these two variables, although their general trends are
the same; see Figure 6-6
In the energy demand equations, GDP is an important explanatory variable,
whereas GDE plays an important role in the macroeconomic model. Therefore, we
estimated an equation linking GDE and GDP. The following equation, estimated by
2SLS, produces a simple relationship between them.
GDP = 1826.33 + 0.807*GDE - 1019.6*DGDE + 81.54*TREND (6.8)
(4.8) (22.3) (-4.3) (6.5)
EM: 2SLS R2 = 0.98 DW-1.99 ADF=-3.5**
In Eq. (6.8) DGDE is a dummy variable that is one for the years of 1994,
1995, and 1996, and zero elsewhere. This dummy is needed because the value of GDP
has been greater than that  of GDE except for these three years.
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Figure 6-7. The actual and simulated values of real GDP in billion 1982 Rial
Dollar Inflow
The total level of dollar inflow is the sum of oil and non-oil export revenues, and
foreign direct investment. Since about six years there is one extra item that needs to
be considered, dollar expenditures due to buyback contracts. In a buyback contract
Iran uses foreign investors to develop an oil field and the principal investment plus
interest is paid in US$ out of the oil sales of that particular project. These payments
have to be deducted from the gross dollar inflow to obtain the dollar inflow available
for Iran, previously indicated by R$.
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Iran's oil export is (XOIL) defined as oil production (QOIL) minus domestic
demand (DOILD). Multiplying XOIL by the exogenously determined price of oil
(POIL) yields the U.S dollar value of the oil revenues (OILRS). Note that oil
production is a policy variable and exogenous. The domestic demand for oil is
endogenously determined in the energy models discussed in subsections 6.3.2 and
6.3.3. So annual oil revenues are defined as:
OILR$t = (XOIL,*365*POILt) 1000 (6.9)
XOIL is measured in million barrels per day and OILR$ in billion US$ per year.
XOIL is defined as:
XOILt = QOIL t - (DOILDt/365) (6.10)
QOIL  is oil production in million barrels per day, and DOILD is the annual domestic
demand in barrels. The government-owned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is
responsible for Iran's oil production and produces in compliance with the quota
agreed upon within OPEC; see Chapter 3. Under normal circumstances Iran's position
on the world oil market is relatively weak; thus it is impossible for Iran to influence
oil prices other than through participation in the negotiations within OPEC.
Using Eq.  (6.9) and taking into account the definition of the other variables the
dollar inflow can be defined as:
R$t = OILR$t+ NOILSt + FDIt - BEt (6.11)
All variables in this definition have been explained above, with the exception of BEt.
This variable stands for buyback expenditure, the value in US$ of crude oil foreign
firms receive as compensation and profit in return for investing in projects under a
formula that denies them a direct equity stake.
Consumer Price Index
In the model only one price variable is determined endogenously, the consumer price
index (CPI). This measure of the domestic inflation is used to convert the nominal
prices of energy carriers set by the government into real prices, which are major
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explanatory variables in the energy demand models. Basically the CPI equation is
based on the quantity theory of money, which states that the growth in prices is equal
to the growth in money supply minus the growth in the real economy, under the
assumption that the velocity of money is constant. As was shown by Liu and
Olumuyiwa (2000), reality is slightly more complicated. They developed a dynamic
model of inflation, with inflation being a function of excess money supply, monetary
growth, changes in exchange premium (difference between the parallel market rate),
and the expected rate of inflation represented by lagged inilation rates. For annual
data such an elaborate approach did not work. After some experimentation the
following equation performed best. Note that satisfying results could only be obtained
for the time period 1979-1998, that is the period after the Islamic revolution.
LOG(CPI) = 5.181 + 1.149*(LOG(LIQUID)-LOG(GDP)) (6.12)
(299.1) (73.7)
+ [AR(1)  = 0.235]
(1.83)
EM: OLS; Rio = 0.99; DW = 1.01; ADF = -4.00*
LIQUID stands for quasi money, which is defined as money (Ml) plus pseudo money
(M2). Since GDP is a recursive variable in the overall model, the equation can be
estimated by OLS.
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Figure 6-8. Simulated and actual trend of CPI
All coefficients are statistically highly significant. The unit root hypothesis on
the residuals is rejected, supporting the hypothesis that the equation is cointegrated.
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The effect of an increase in the LIQUID over GDP has an immediate larger effect on
CPI, showing the dominant role of liquidity in the monetary sector of the Iranian
economy. Later we will show that this also has a large effect on the domestic energy
sector, when energy prices are not set in line with inflation.
6.3.2 Final Energy Demand Model
Final energy demand is the demand for energy products by the non-energy sectors,
that is productive sectors such as industry, agriculture, services, and the consumption
sectors such as households and commercials, and the government. In Iran the total
demand for final energy is the combined demand for the following eight fuels: jet
fuel, LPG, gasoline, kerosene, gas oil, fuel oil, natural gas, and electricity. Also solid
fuels (mainly coal) are used in Iran, but their share in total energy supply is very
small. Therefore, solid fuels are treated as an exogenous variable.
For each of the final energy demand equations the real price of the fuel as well
as that of its main competitors was originally included in the specification of the fuel
demand equations. None of the cross price elasticities was, however, statistically
significant, which is no surprise since all real energy prices steadily decrease over
most of the sample period.  We will not report these findings. Surprisingly enough the
own price elasticities turned out to be statistically significant, despite the extremely
low real energy prices. For future policy simulation reasons we included the own real
price of each fuel as an explanatory variable, despite the fact that some are not
significant at he 95% level.
Next we discuss the demand equation for the eight energy carriers.
Jet Fuel
Since jet fuels (JETF) are mainly used for aviation transportation, the main variables
affecting jet fuel consumption are the amount of cargo (LOADA) and the numbers of
passengers (PASA) carried by aviation. Normally these two variables would be
determined by income, but in Iran this is not the case. These variables are to a large
extend based on the government's traveling policy for its employees and its cargo.
Therefore, we can in addition add GDP as an explanatory variable. A time trend was
added to indicate technical progress in aviation leading to a reduction in demand. The
equation is in the log-log functional form and has been estimated by 2SLS.
147
LOG(JETF) = -10.64 + 0.14*LOG(PASA) + 0.54*LOG(LOADA) (6.13)
(-5.6) (104) (2.27)
+ 1.07*LOG(GDP) - 0.05*TREND + 0.21*LOG(JETF(-1))
(2.80) (-4.3) (1.78)
EM: 2SLS; Ri* = 0.91; DW = 2.46; h-DW = -1.30; ADF = -3.20**
All coefficients are statistically meaningful except the coefficient for PASA,
which rejects the null hypothesis only at the 70 percent level. The adjusted R-squared
is 0.91, indicating a good fit, which is also supported by Figure 6-10. (Remember, the
data in the figure are based on the simulation ofthe total model.) The estimated h-DW
is -1.3, so the null hypothesis of first order serial correlation is rejected at the 95
percent level. The ADF test indicates that the equation is cointegrated, since it rejects
the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals.
Changes  in  GDP  have a large effect  on  JETF, 1.07 immediately  and  1.35  in
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Figure 6-10. Simulated and actual trend ofjet demand fuel in million liters
Remark: Originally equations for PASA and LOADA were also developed and
estimated. Reasonable results were obtained, but these equations did not perform well
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Figure 6-11. Simulated and actual trend in LPG demand in million liters
Liquefied Petroleum Gas
LPG is mainly used in the Residential and Commercial sector. There are several
factors affecting the demand for LPG, including the development in the gas for oil
substitution policy. However, the major factor is the increase in the number of
households in rural areas and small cities. To measure this effect we use the number
of rural households (NRHOUS). (Number of households rather than population,
because there is a tendency for young people to leave the family home earlier and live
independent.) The real price of LPG (RPLPG) is another variable that affects the
demand for LPG. GDP is included to measure the income effect. The log-log
functional form did not perform well for LPG. The best result that could be obtained
is:
LPG = - 1799.0 - 31.83*RPLPG + 0.00053*NRHOUS + 0.0618*GDP
(-1.96) (-1.80) (2.25) (2.81)
+ 0.600*LPG(-1) (6.14)
(5.10)
EM: 2SLS; Ri* = 0.98; DW = 1.77; h-DW = 0.90; ADF = -2.80***
All coefficients have the right sign and are statistically meaningful. With 98 percent
the goodness of fit is very high; which also holds for the dynamic simultaneous
simulation as is shown in Figure 6-11. The h-DW statistics indicates that the first
order serial autocorrelation is rejected at the 95 percent level
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Gasoline
The transportation sector is the main consumer of gasoline (GSLN). The stock of
vehicles using gasoline (SGSCAR), the real price of gasoline (RPGSLN), and income
measured through  GDP  are the main explanatory variables.  Due to the 1980-1988 war
between   Iran   and Iraq, gasoline was rationed   in 1980, drastically   limiting   gasoline
consumption, especially up till 1982. The rationing regime was abolished in 1986,
allowing an increase in demand to a new higher level, but the main effect of the
rationing policy took place in the first three years. Therefore, a dummy variable
(DGSLN) is introduced, which  has the value  one  1  for the period  1980  to  1982,  and  is
zero elsewhere.
LOG(GSLN) = -4.429 - 0.024*LOG(RPGSLN) + 0.354*LOG(SGSCAR)
(-2.9) (-2.91) (4.3)
+ 0.425*LOG(GDP) - 0.114*DGSLN
(-18) (1.6)
+ 0 483*LOG(GSLN(-1)) (6.15)
(3.3)
EM: 2SLS; Rlo = 0.99; DW = 2.1, h-DW = -0.28;   ADF = -3.3**
The statistics show that this equation performs well on all criteria used.
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Figure 6-12. Simulated and actual demand for GSLN in million liters
The real price elasticity of gasoline demand is rather small (-0.024), but
significant; as is the long-term effect GO.045). What is surprising, given our analysis
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of energy prices in Chapter 2,  is the fact that there still is an effect. The short and long
term effects ofSGSCAR and GDP are (0.36; 0.68) and (0.43; 0.81) respectively.
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Figure 6-13. Simulated and actual number ofgasoline consuming cars
Sub-model for the stock of vehicles
The stock of the vehicles using gasoline (SGSCAR) is a function of economic
activity, which is indicated by GDP. Increases in the level of GDP make money
available for new vehicles, which in turn increases the total mileage required,
resulting in an increase in the demand for gasoline. The estimation result is:




EM: 2SLS; R  = 0.99; DW = 2.42; h-DW = -1.03. ADF = -2.9**
The statistics indicate that this equation meets all criteria. The negative trend
indicates the technical depreciation of the stock. The short and long-term elasticities
for GDP are 0.214 and 2.019 respectively, indicating that a car as a durable good is
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high on the agenda Furthermore, during the war period and shortly thereafter, it was
difficult to purchase new cars, but a dummy variable was not significant.
12000
/&-1      - ,     ./
10000    -
.....
..k
8000   -
.
6000
.   -   -   1.-
: »4
4:*'1      -,   i
2000       ,  .  ,  .  .  .  .  ,  .  ,  ,  .  .  ,  .  ,  .  .  .  .  .  ,  .
74   76   78   80   82   84   86   88   90   92   94   96   98
./- KER -- KERRF   1
Figure 6-15. Simulated and actual trend ofKER in million liters
Kerosene
Kerosene is mainly consumed in the Residential and Commercial sector for cooking
and heating purposes, especially in rural areas and small cities. The demand for
kerosene (KER) is modeled as a function of its own real price (RPKER) and the real
gross domestic product (GDP).




EM: 2SLS; R  = 0.84; DW = 2.33; h-DW = -1.32; ADF=-3.4**
All coeficients are statistically meaning&1. The estimated h-DW rejects the
null hypothesis of the first order serial correlation. The goodness of fit is less than in
the previous equations, but still acceptable. Figure 6-15 shows that the simulated
variable captures the trend in the data.
The short and long term  own real price elasticities of kerosene demand are -
0.143 and -0.231 respectively. Given Iran's energy pricing policy these effects are
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Figure 6-16. Simulated and actual trend ofGSOIL in million liters
Gas Oil
Gas oil is mainly used in transportation for vehicles carrying cargo and passengers.
However, a considerable amount ofgas oil is used by the Residential and Commercial
sector also for heating purposes. Because ofthe natural gas for oil substitution policy,
the consumption of gas oil is declining over the time. The following result was
obtained:




EM: 2SLS; Ri* = 0.98; DW = 1.83; h-DW = -0.61; ADF = -3.90*
All coefficients are significant, except the one for the real price of gas oil. The
h-DW rejects the null hypothesis of first order serial correlation at the 95 percent
level. The null hypothesis ofthe unit root test on the residuals is rejected. Figure 6-16
shows that the simulation ofthe equation performs well.
The  own real price elasticity of demand  is low (-0.067),  but  is still minus  0.31
in the long run. The immediate income effect as measured by GDP is 0.221, and in the
long run the effect is almost one.
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Fuel Oil
Fuel oil (FOIL) is mainly used in the industrial sector. It is affected by economic
activity, measured by the GDP, and by the real price of fuel oil (RPFOIL).




EM: 2SLS;  Ri  = 0.94; DW = 1.78, h-DW = 0.55; ADF = -3.40**
This equation is rather weak, with the explanatory variables barely significant.
Figure 6-17 shows that the simulation  of fuel oil demand follows the trend in the data
reasonably well in the beginning of the sample period, but that the deviations become
larger towards the end of the sample period. This might be due to the gas for oil
policy executed by the government, which becomes more effective towards the end of
the period.
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Figure 6-17. Simulated and actual demand offuel oil in million liters
Equation (6.19) indicates that the short run own price elasticity of demand is -0.154
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Figure 6-18. Simulated and actual trend ofNG in billion cubic meters
Natural Gas
Natural gas  is  used  in many sectors of the economy,  but  the main consuming sectors
are residential and commercial, and industry. The market for natural gas in Iran is still
incomplete and its development is one of the major energy policies of the energy
authorities of Iran; also see Chapter 4. To measure the effect of the gas for oil
substitution policy we use the number of natural gas consumers (NNGC). Also the
real price of natural gas (RPNG) is used as an explanatory variable. A natural gas
equation that performed well in the complete model could only be obtained using a
linear functional form instead ofthe log linear form.
NG = 0.650 - 0.0523*RPNG + 3.005e-06*NNGC + 0.759*NG(-1) (6.20)
(1.01) (-0.24) (181) (3.69)
EM: 2SLS; R:,4 = 0.99; DW = 1.97; h-DW = 0.36; ADF = -2.9***
As expected, the coefficient of tDe real price of natural gas is insignificant.
Since real prices will play an important role in the policy scenarios to come, it is,
however, included in the equation. The other statistics meet the criteria set.
Electricity
Electricity demand (ELEC) is the last final energy demand category modeled. It is
modeled as a function of the real price of electricity (RPELEC) and the number of
electricity customers (NELECC) as a measure of market development. Unfortunately
RPELEC has a perverse effect on the demand for electricity, although not significant.
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Therefore, we fixed the coefficient of RPELEC on -0.041, to have at least some effect
of RPELEC  on ELEC. (The value of -0 041 is based on results for shorter estimation
periods.) The equation is estimated using the OLS technique and the result is:




EM: OLS; Rit = 0.99; DW - 2.13; h-DW - -0.36. ADF = -3.45**
Although Eq. (6.21) has a good fit, it is obviously not a good equation since its
strength mainly depends on the lagged endogenous variable. Unfortunately, better
results could not be obtained
The short and long term elasticities for RPELEC and NELECC are -0 04 and
0.19, and -0.20 and 0.96 respectively.
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Figure 6-19. Fitted and actual trend ofELEC in million kWh
Number of Electricity Consumers
Iran's electricity market is going to be completed soon and only a few remote villages
will not be connected to the national integrated grid. The number of electricity
customers (NELEC) was and will be affected by the dynamics in the number of
households (NHOUS) demanding electricity, especially in the urban areas.
LOG(NELECC) = 0.543 + 0.943*D(LOG(NHOUS)) +
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Figure 6-20. Simulated and actual trend ofNELECC in thousands
Solid fuels
Solid fuels include hard coal, charcoal. wood, and the other non-commercial energy
carriers. Together this diverse set of fuels has only a small share in Iran's total energy
basket. Its annual consumption is around 10 million BOE. Therefore, the demand of
solid fuels is treated as an exogenous variable assuming one percent growth rate
annually.
SOLID, -1.01*SOLID (6.23)t-1
Nominal Price of Energy
The nominal price of energy  (PENG)  is the weighted average of the nominal prices of
energy carriers set by the government. The weights are the share of each energy
carriers in total final energy demand. Since the price of solid fuels is not available and
the  share of solid fuels is small,  it is ignored  in the average price of energy. All values
in the equation are per barrel of oil equivalent (BOE), which is indicated by B at the
end of each variable. Pi indicates prices and iB quatity.
EPIB*B
PENG= iEI (6.24)TFEDB-SOLIDB
withie {JETF, LPG, GSLN, KER, GSOIL, FOIL, NG, ELEC}.
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Total Final Energy Demand
Total final energy demand in million BOE (TFEDB) can be obtained by using the
conversion factors in the table below to convert each unit to MBOE.
Energy carrier Unit reported Conversion factor for bbl
JETF million liters 6.036/103
LPG million liters 4.166/103
GSLN million liters 5.525/103
KER million liters 5.928/103
GSOIL million liters 6.189/103
FOIL million liters 6.502/103
NG billion cubic meters 6.388
ELEC million kWh 630.38/106
Note that in the calculation of TFEDB all variables are expressed  in MBOE. Figure 6-
22 contains the simulated and actual data for TFEDB.
14000
12000   - L. -









--.2000 . · - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
74   76   78   80   82   84   86   88   90   92   94   96   98
|-NELECC -- - NELECCRF      I
Figure 6-22. Simulated values for TFEDB in MBOE
6.3.3 Primary Energy Demand Model
In the previous subsection final energy demand was discussed. This subsection
discusses the primary energy demand model, which contains two sectors of the
economy, power generation and refineries. These two sectors are part of the
government, Furthermore, prices do hardly play a role in the decision making process
of these sectors, only fuel availability important. Finally, the prices for these large
consumers are not recorded. Therefore, fuel prices will not occur as an explanatory
variable in the primary demand model. Note that the prices of final demand do,
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however, affect primary demand through their effects on the demand for final energy
carriers.
Power generation
All final demand for electricity (ELEC) is generated by the power sector using either
thermal power or hydropower plants. The amount of electricity produced in thermal
power plants is denoted by QTEG and the amount of electricity produced in hydro
power plants by HEG.
The Iranian power sector is rather inefficient. During the process of
distribution and transmission about     15%    o f the electricity produced    is    lost.
Furthermore, own consumption by power plants is 5% of gross electricity. Adding
losses and self-consumption to final demand results in gross electricity generation
(GEG) needed for end-use consumption. Let EF denote the efficiency factor -which is
thus equal to 0.8-, then GEG can be obtained by dividing ELEC by EF; see Eq. (6.26).
Next we need to know how much of GEG is produced by thermal power
plants and how much by hydro plants. We will model this by subtracting the
development in hydropower production from gross requirements. Iran's hydro
potential is about 42,000 megawatt, but only 5 percent of this potential is used. The
historical data show that the share of hydro (SH) in total gross electricity generation
(GEG) has been decreasing. Also there are no plans to tap Iran's hydro potential in the
near future. It is assumed that this trend will continue; the share of hydro in year t is




HEG, = 0.99SH,_tGEG, (6.26)
SH.  = HEG t (6.27)' GEG,
The demand for thermal electricity generation is obtained by subtracting HE:Gt from
GEG,; that is:
QTEG, = GEGi - HEG, = (1-SHOGEG, (6.28)
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Note that EF is determined exogenously. When analyzing the opportunities for
energy efficiency improvement, this efficiency coefficient shall be adjusted. Finally,
the overall efficiency of Iran's thermal power plants has been rather stable in the past
and around 37%.
Next we will estimate demand equation for fuel oil, gas oil and natural gas for
the power sector using QTEG as the major explanatory variable.
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Figure 6-23. Simulated and actual values of FOILE in million liters
Fuel oil in thermal power generation
The demand for the fuel  oil by the power sector (FOIE)  as a function of the quantity
of electricity generated in the thermal power plants is estimated by using the 2SLS
method.




EM: 2SLS;  Ri* = 0.98; DW = 1.7, ADF = -3.6**
All coefficients are significant at the 95 percent level. The hypothesis of first
order autocorrelation is rejected. The simulation of the trend in the data in the total
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Figure 6-24. Simulated and actual trend ofGSOILE in million liters
Gas oil in thermal power generation
The demand for gas oil by the power sector (GSOILE) is considered as a function of
thermal electricity production (QTEG). However, the demand for gas oil by the power
sector is also affected by the gas for oil substitution policy for the power sector, which
started in  1991.  This is introduced through the use of a dummy variable (DGSOIL),
which is one for the years of 1991-1998 and zero elsewhere. Note that this dummy
plays a role in the demand for gas oil and not in the demand for fuel oil, since fuel oil
is relatively cheap and substitution aims at the more expensive gas oil.




EM: 2SLS; Ri*= 0.90; DW = 2.57; h-DW = -1.51; ADF-3.16*
All coefficients are significant at the 99 percem level. The hypothesis of first order
autocorrelation is rejected, using the h-DW statistics. Figure 6-24 shows that the
simulated values in the overall model are close to the actual values.
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Natural gas in power generation
The demand for natural gas by the power sector (NGE) is a function QTEG and the
policy dummy DGSOILE. It is estimated by 2SLS since the thermal electricity
generation is determined endogenously.
LOG(NGE) = -2.898 + 0 328*LOG(QTEG)+0.725*LOG(NGE(-1)) (6.31)
(-1.20) (1.31) (4.18)
EM: 2SLS; R = 0.98; DW = 1.9. h-DW = 0.53; ADF = -3.76**
This  equation is rather weak  and the coefficient  of QTEG is only significant  at
the 80 percent level. Based on the h-DW statistics, the first order autocorrelation is
rejected. The equation has a good fit, but the simulated values in the overall model are
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Figure 6-25 Simulated and actual trend  of NGE in billion m2
Oil Refineries
The gross demand for oil needed by the refinery sector to produce the final demand
for petroleum products can be estimated through the use of a technical coefficient,
which transforms crude oil into its composite products. Table 6-1 contains some
historical data that show that Iranian refineries have transformed one barrel of crude
oil into 0.87-0.89 composite barrels of petroleum products. In other words, to obtain
one composite barrel of petroleum products about  1.14 barrel ofcrude oil is required.
Note that this includes own consumption and losses during the refining process, which
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are in Iran about 7% of the total crude oil feed, 2% higher than normal practice
elsewhere.
The factor of 1.14 will be used to calculate the amount of crude oil needed to
produce the required amount of petroleum products. The factor is treated as a constant
since the number of refineries in Iran has not changed for some time. We assume that
for the future the composition remains constant. When estimating the potential for
energy savings in Chapter 7, this factor shall be adjusted due to increased efficiency.
Table 6- 1. Input-Output ratio of Iranian petroleum refinery
Year    Crude oil feed Petroleum Products Output/input ratio
Million bbl/day Million bbl/day                 %
1995            1.3 1.2 0.89
1996 1.4 1.2 0.87
1997           1.5 1.3 0.87
1998             1.5 1.4 0.88
Source: Energy Balance of Iran, Energy Ministry,  1999.
The total demand for petroleum products is the sum of the final demand for
petroleum products plus the demand for fuel oil and gas oil by the power sector.
Using the conversion factors introduced before to transform final demand from liters
to MBOE, we can write
TPPC,= IiB,10-,    +(GSOILEB, +FOILEB,)10-1 (6.32)
i€{JETF. LPO,GSLN,KER,GSOILFOILI
TPPC stands for total petroleum product consumption in million composite barrels.
The domestic demand for oil (DOILD) can be obtained as:
DOILD, = 1.14 TPPC, (6.33)
Total natural gas demand
Total natural gas demand is the sum of final demand consumption (NGC), demand for
power generation (NGE), to which gas used in petroleum refineries (NGR) has to be
added.  This is the total amount of natural gas required at the beginning of natural gas
network. A proportion of that gas is lost during transportation and data for 1998 show
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Figure 6-26. Simulated and actual TFPEDB in MBOE
percent  is own consumption for operating the network. The amount of natural gas  that
has to be delivered to the network (NGT) is considered the primary demand for
natural gas, and is calculated as:
NGTt = 1.0504 (NGG + NGEt +NGRO (6.34)
The natural gas demanded by oil refineries is a based on a technical relation and can
be modeled as a fraction the daily demand of oil feed for refineries; that is:
NGRt = 0.87(DOILDt/365) (6.35)
Note that NGT can be transformed into MBOE via the conversion factor of Table 6-1;
that is NGTBt = 6.388*NGrt.
Total Primary Energy Demand
The following identity calculates total primary energy demand measured in MBOE
(TPEDB).
TPEDBt = DOILDBi + NGBTt + SOLIDBt +HEGBt (6.36)
Figure 6-26 shows the simulated and actual data of 1PEDB. From this figure we can
conclude that the model simulation over the estimation period is accurate.
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6.3.4 Energy Subsidies on Final Energy Demand
As was already discussed in Chapter 3, each of the eight energy carriers distinguished
has its own border and domestic price. The difference between these two is the
subsidy per unit of that particular energy carrier. The subsidy per energy carrier is
pi. 1
Si,  =1 PBi. - 'I Di„  with  i  E   {JETF,  LPG,  GSLN, KER, GSOIL,  FOIL,  NG,
   ,  ER,J
ELEC }  and Dit the final demand for energy carrier i.
The domestic energy prices -set by the government in Rial- are evaluated at
their dollar value by using the free market exchange rate (ER). Total subsidy is
defined as:
SUBSID, =ISi, (6.37)
In Chapter 2 the data for the border prices were obtained. For the future these
are linked to the development in the international oil price; see next section.
To estimate subsidies the free market exchange rate (ER) is needed. This
variable is therefore also made endogenous. ER is modeled as a function of inflation
(CPI) and the dollar inflow (RS) Increases in domestic inflation will increase the
exchange rate, thus depreciate the value of the national currency Rial. The dollar
injection has an opposite effect; more dollar inflow will strengthen the value of the
Rial. The estimated equation is:




EM: OLS; R  = 0.98; DW = 2.05; h-DW = -0.15; ADF = -2.9***
The equation meets the statistical criteria set. A one percent increase in CPI
leads to 0.386 percent increase  in  the  ER  in the short term  and 1.135 percent  in  the
long term. The effect of the dollar inflow is only marginally smaller -0.368 percent in
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the short term and approximately one percent in the long run. This again (also see
CPI) shows the importance of Iran's monetary policy and how sensitive the nominal
part of the economy is.
Table 6-2. Dynamic simulation performance overview
Correta- Theil Mean Standard deviation
Variable tion coef. Data Simul. Ratio Data Simul. Ratio
AERC 0.960 0.011 4.806 4.776 1.006 0.305 0.360 0.846
CPI 0.995 0.012 5.664 5.614 1.009 1.207 1.254 0.962
CP 0.977 0.003 8.891 8.899 0.999 0.217 0.216 1.009
DOILD 0.988 0.004 5.771 5.746 1.004 0.288 0.291 0.992
ELEC 0.991 0.004 10.494 10.474 1.002 0.551 0.569 0.968
ER 0.991 0.017 6.911 6.778 1.020 1.141 1.251 0.912
FOILE 0.982 0.007 8.245 8.155 1.011 0.367 0.329 1.117
FOIL 0.948 0.005 8.913 8.880 1.004 0.256 0.252 1.016
GDEM82 0.972 0.003 9.388 9.407 0.998 0.213 0.221 0.962
GDPM82 0.972 0.002 9.434 9.452 0.998 0.184 0.189 0.974
GEG 0.991 0.004 10.701 10.681 1.002 0.547 0.566 0.966
GSLN 0.997 0.002 8.958 8.981 0.997 0.349 0.363 0.960
GSOILE 0.915 0.009 7.159 7.072 1.012 0.239 0.221 1.084
GSOIL 0.968 0.004 9.640 9.616 1.002 0.333 0.319 1.041
G 0.949 0.005 7.482 7.530 0.994 0.189 0.191 0.992
HEG 0.658 0.039 8.840 9.370 0.943 0.162 0.566 0.286
I 0.854 0.009 7.567 7.627 0.992 0.249 0.222 1.1
24
JETF 0.922 0.008 6.490 6.516 0.996 0.259 0.272 0.953
KER 0.915 0.006 9.003 8.991 1.001 0.241 0.246 0.980
LPG 0.955 0.017 7.598 7.501 1.013 0.472 0.653 0.723
M 0.767 0.016 7.002 7.008 0.999 0.354 0.246 1.437
NELECC 0.999 0.001 8.986 8.973 1.001 0.417 0.404 1.031
NGE 0.985 0.067 1.692 1497 1.130 0.790 0.761 1.038
NG 0.992 0.028 2.000 1.992 1.004 0.999 0.988 1.011
NGT 0.993 0.022 2.650 2.595 1.021 0.894 0.865 1.033
OILR$ 0.997 0.005 2.646 2.656 0.996 0.288 0.292 0.987
PENG 1.000 0.002 7.912 7.920 0.999 0.918 0.909 1.010
QTEG 0.990 0.009 10.508 10.367 1.014 0.642 0.566
1.134
R$ 0.998 0.004 2.793 2.802 0.997 0.288 0.290 0.994
SGOCAR 0.997 0.001 12.749 12.759 0.999 0.250 0.250 0.996
SGSCAR 0.996 0.001 14.570 14.591 0.999 0.241 0.244 0.986
TPED 0.994 0.004 6.086 6.067 1.003 0.406 0.410 0.992
TPPC 0.988 0.004 5.640 5.615 1.004 0.288 0.291 0.992
XOIL 0.998 0.015 0.677 0.687 0.985 0.404 0.407 0.993
X 0.967 0.007 7.599 7.578 1.003 0.406 0.428 0.948
As a final evaluation of the model presented above we give an overview of the
correlation coefficients between the data and the simulated data together of the overall
SE model and Theil's inequality coefficient. For a review of the model we refer to
Appendix A and for a list of variables to Appendix B.
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6.3.5 Additional Performance Measures
The development of scenarios for policy analysis requires a sound simulation of the
model developed in this section. As a final check we calculate for each variable the
correlation coefficient between the simulated and the actual data, the ratios of their
means and standard deviations, and Theil's inequality coefficients; see Table 6-2.
Theils' inequality coefficient is defined as (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998, p.
210)
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N is the evaluation period, and Y„   and C  are the simulated and actual data
respectively. In case of a perfect fit U is zero, and the upper bound for U is one;
values for U smaller than 0.4 are considered acceptable.
Table 6-2 shows that for all endogenous variables the correlation between the
actual and simulated data is high, that the calculated Theil-inequality coefficients are
small, and that the mean and the standard deviation of the actual and the simulated
data are close to each other (see columns Ratio). This final check makes us confident
that the model can be used for scenario analysis for the time period 1999-2020.
Note that statistical tests could have been developed to support the conclusions
drawn from Table 6-2. However, since such tests would, among others, depend on the
estimated parameters and the estimation method used, this would be a cumbersome
task. Since the results of our "eyeballing" approach give no reason to further
substantiate our conclusions, statistical testing is omitted.
6.4 The Reference Scenario
The goal of this research is to determine the reduction potential of domestic energy
consumption  for the period  of the 1999-2020.  For  this  it is necessary to formulate  a
scenario that represents the case without any policy changes, further referred to as the
reference case. In Subsection 6.4.1 the values for the exogenous variables are
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discussed. Subsection 6.4.2 discusses the reference scenario based on the assumption
s
formulated in Subsection 6.4.1.
6.4.1    Values for the Exogenous Variables
For this, assumptions on the values of the exogenous variables up to the year 
2020
have to be formulated. The exogenous variables can be classified into four categories:
dummy variables, demographic variables, money and price variables,
and others. (An
overview of all the assumptions discussed below is in Table 6-5.)
• Dummy variables used to account for extraordinary occurrences, such as the
fuel  shortages  at the start of the war with  Iraq.  For each dummy variable a values have
to be established. Luckily the model contains only three dummy variables: DGDE,
DGSLN, DGSLOILE. Of these three only the dummy for the oil for gas substitution
policy (DGSOILE) is 1 for the period 1999-2020, since the Iranian go
vernment will
continue this policy.
•        Demographic variables comprise population (POP), the
 number of households
(NHOUS), and the number of rural households (NRHOUS). The average
annual
growth  rate of Iran's population between  1974  and  1998 was about 2.
8%. Compared
to most countries, especially industrialized countries, this growth figure is very
 high.
However, due to Iran's population policy, the growth rate has declined to
an average
of about 2 % for the last decade. Birth control and health training programs, as a part
of the latest 5-year development plans, along with the economic pressure on
households due to Iran's slow economic growth, have lowered the population growth
rate even further. The most recent figure on the birth registration indicates a growth
rate  of  1.65%  per  year  and this figure is expected  to  go  down even further.  The
average growth rate for POP is therefore set at 1.5% per year.
The growth rate of the number of rural households was  1.3% over the sample
period, but reduced  to   1.1%  over the period 1988-1998.  This is partly  due  to  the
decrease in population growth and partly to the urbanization process that is goi
ng on.
On the other hand the traditional living style of one big family in one household is
abolished and young people start their own household. This results in an upward trend
in the number of households. This is especially true for cities and urbanized areas.
The overall affect is an increase in the number of households. Based on this we
assume that the growth rate of NRHOUS is 1.1% and that of NHOUS 2%.
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•      Money and price variables comprise the domestic nominal final demand
energy prices (PJETF, PLPG, PGSLN, PKER, PGSOIL, PFOIL, PNG, PELEC),
liquidity (LIQUID), foreign direct investment (FDI), the import of capital goods
(CAPIM$), non-oil export revenues (NOILR$), and the crude oil price (POIL). The
future values of these variables for the reference case are based, as far as possible, on
their past performance.
Developing scenarios for the economic exogenous variables is the most
difficult part. The main problem is that the macro economic exogenous variables, for
example liquidity and nominal energy prices, are to some extend interrelated.
Therefore, the formulation of scenarios has to be done with care.
Table 6-4. Average annual growth rate of some economic variables
Period Variable 1974-98 1988-98 1995-98
Liquidity LIQUID 22.3% 23.9% 23.2%
Inflation CPI 18.4% 21.4% 18.4%
Energy price* PENG 14.4% 21.4% 23.8%
Capital goods import CAPIM$ 5.2% 9.2% 30.8%
* Weighted average
Table 6.4 contains the growth rates of some economic variables for three time
periods 1974-1998, 1988-1998, and 1995-1998. During the post-war period of 1988-
1998, the Iranian economy showed some improvement (World Bank, 2000). This is
clearly indicated the high growth rate of CAPIM$ for the period 1995-1998. On the
other hand, this high growth rate cannot be continued, because this would require
more than the dollar inflow towards the end o f the simulation period. For CAPIM$ we
therefore assume an annual growth rate of 5% until 2020.
Liquidity growth has been high (see Table 6-4), and, without a change in
domestic energy policy, will remain high in the future. The Iranian government wants
to decrease the growth in liquidity, because it destabilizes the economy. However, we
assume that the government is to some extend successful and able to reduce the
growth rate of LIQUID to an average of 15% per year. Although this assumption is to
some extend rather arbitrary and cannot be further substantiated, the actual
assumption is not that important since the monetary sector is not part of our model.
Note that this assumption does, however, strongly affect our real prices of energy,
since it plays a dominant role in the equation for CPI.
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The weighted average  of the annual nominal energy
price  was 14.4 percent
during the period of 1974-1998. During the final years of the sample period t
he largest
changes occurred, which are related to the Second Fiv
e-Year plan. During this plan
energy prices were on average raised by about 20 percent per
year. However, these
price increases have been strongly criticized in the Iranian parliament an
d became a
political issue. For the 3rd five-year plan (1999-2005), ra
tified by the Iranian
parliament, it is agreed that the increase in the energy
price will not exceed 10 percent
per year. We therefore assume that the increase in the nomi
nal domestic energy prices
will be 10 percent per year in the reference case.
Non-oil revenues and direct foreign investment are expe
cted to grow
according to their past levels of 5% per year each. The current le
vel of non-oil export
in year 2001 is estimated at 4.8 billion US dollar.
An important input for our analyses  is the price of oil. Forecast
ing oil prices is
notoriously difficult problem (Huntington, 1994; Stevens, 1996
). Most model-based
and judgmental forecasts have been too optimistic, foreca
sting large price increases.
These were based on the belief that oil demand would ra
pidly outgrow supply.
However, supply has been able to keep up and n
ew more efficient technologies have
lowered the growth in demand. Therefore, assumpt
ions on long-term oil price
development have been tempered, and the one used her
e will be moderate too.
The oil price in the IEA's 2020 outlook is assumed to grow to
21 dollar per
barrel till 2010 and 28 dollar per barrel by 2020 (IEA, 200
1). This price is the average
the cost of crude oil import for IEA countries. In gene
ral, the price of 21 dollar per
barrel exceeds the full costs of oil production for the new proje
cts outside the Middle
East OPEC area. Full-cycle costs comprise capital and operating
costs, including an
acceptable rate of return on investment for the oil companie
s. In the second decade,
the gradual rise in oil prices to 28 dollar per barrel is consistent w
ith the maturing and
leveling-off of the non-OPEC production (IEA, 2001). For this
study this oil price
scenario is used as a starting point.
The U.S. Department of Energy on the other hand uses a pri
ce of 24.68 US$
per barrel in 2020 for its reference sc
enario and a price of US$ 30.58 for its high price
scenario (DOE/EIA, 2001). Many experts do, however, find
the DOE/EIA's reference
scenario rather pessimistic.
OPEC tries to keep current oil prices in the range 22-28 US$
and expects the
average production cost outside OPEC to grow till at least 26
 US$ per barrel by the
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year 2020. Gately (2001) compares several scenario's and shows that prices will
strongly depend on the increase in supply by the OPEC members.
Iranian oil is slightly cheaper than the average oil due to quality differences.
The average differential between the crude oil import cost of IEA countries and the
Iranian oil (light and heavy average) was about $1.5 per barrel during the period
1988-1998. Since the price assumptions by the various institutes differ, we use the
IEA  forecast  for  2020 (28 US$/bbl) minus  1.5 US dollar  as our assumption  on  the
average Iranian oil price in 2020. We have chosen the IEA forecast because this
forecast is in line with unpublished OPEC studies and the EIA reference scenario
seems rather pessimistic. We use the value of 22 US$/bbl in the year 2000 as a
starting point, and assume  that this price  will  grow  by  a  bit  less  than  1 %  per  year  to
reach 26.50 US$/bbl in 2020. Note that our price assumption is, according to Gately's
analysis, in line with a growth rate in OPEC's output between 2% and 3%.
•        There are four other exogenous variables: oil production (QOIL), airline cargo
(LOADA) and passengers ((PASA), and the number of natural gas customers
(NNGC).
The level of Iran's oil production capacity has been the subject of several
studies and experts tend to disagree on the potential capacity available. The IIES
(1998) showed, however, that Iran's oil production capacity would decline quickly if
no new oil fields were developed. This is because Iran's major oil fields passed the
peak production in their life cycles. Since no untapped resources of similar size are
available, Iran's level of oil production cannot be increased drastically. (Although
improvement in technology might increase the potential ofexisting fields.)
The Petroleum Engineering and Development Company, an affiliation of the
NIOC, has shown that the amount of oil that can be economically produced from new
developments and redevelopments will not exceed 1.029 million-barrel per day during
the next ten years (PEDC, 2001). This requires eighteen new and redevelopment
projects, including the recently discovered Azadegan oil field, which contains 4
billion barrel of proven reserves.
About 30 percent of the oil produced in these oil projects is needed to pay the
oil companies for the production cost via the earlier mentioned buyback contracts. So
this share times the price of oil results in the dollar value of the buyback contract
(BE); also see Eq. (6.11).
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The total oil available from these development projects to fill Iran's OPEC
quota is limited. The best guess by oil experts is that 55,000 to 65,000 barrels per day
can annually be added to Iran's production capacity. It is assumed that the production
capacity will be increased by 55,000 bbl/d per year for the period of 2002 to 2020,
and that this new capacity remains available until the end of the period. As a result,
the addition to the oil production capacity will reach 1.045 million barrel per day till
2020. The total capacity  (old  plus new development)  will  be  3.35  million  barrel  pe
r
day in 2020. Figure 6-27 shows the trends in existing oil production capacity and new
investments.
Table 6-5. Exogenous variables assumption overview
Variable Value in 1999 Unit
POP 1.5% 64,320,209 Head
NHOUS 2.0% 13,370,266 Household
NRHOUS 1.1% 4,667,042 Household
PLPG 10% 135    Rial/liter
PGSLN 10% 385 Rial/liter
PKER 10% 110      Rial/liter
PGSOIL 10% 110       Rial/liter
PFOIL 10% 55 Rial/liter
PNG 10% 54 Rila/CM
PELEC 10% 85    Rial/kWh
LIQUID 15% 225,803 Billion Rial
CAPIM$ 5.0% 5.17   Billion US dollar
NOILR$ 5.0% 3.63    Billion US dollar
FDI 2.0% 0.70   Billion US dollar
POIL 0.94% 22.0 US$ per barrel
1)
Oil production 55 bbl/d 0.0 1000 barrel per day
PASA 8.0% 7,176 Million passenger/KM
LOADA 5.0% 38,877 1000 tons/Km
NNGC 7.6% 3,752,105 Costumer
N For POIL we used the actual price of oil for 1999 and started in the year 2000
The average growth rate of passenger/kilometer carried through the aviation
system (PASA) was 6.1% per year within 1974-1998, but this is strongly affected by
the war period. During the period 1988-1998 the average growth  was only  4.4%
.  In
recent years passenger transportation has, however, shown
a slightly higher growth
rate, 5.7% within 1995-1998.   For the period  till  2020 the growt
h  rate for passenger
transport is set at 5%.
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The growth rate for cargo/kilometer (LOADA) was 5.1% over the sample
period, but 8.9% for the period 1988-1998. Therefore, LOADA is assumed to increase
by 8% per year until 2020.
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Figure 6-27. Iran's oil production capacity
The number of natural gas customers  (NNGC),  used  as an indicator of natural
gas market expansion, is affected mainly by the efforts of the energy authority to
expand the infrastructure for the domestic market for natural gas. The Ministry of
Petroleum and its subsidiary the NIOC execute the expansion policy. They are
currently developing the greatest natural gas reserve in the world called "South
PARS". The amount  of gas available for Iran's domestic market is virtually unlimited
Also, the number of potential customers is no real restriction for the period until 2020.
The growth rate of the number of natural gas customers was about  18.8% over the
sample period 1974-1998,    but has decreased in recent years   to 7.6 percent.    We
assume that the growth  rate of NNGC  will on average remain 7.6 percent till the year
2020. This assumption seems reasonable, since more than half the country is  not yet
covered by the natural gas network.
6.4.2 Forecasting
Using the assumptions on exogenous variables of the previous section,  we will now
use the SE model to simulate the period 1999-2020. This simulation has been done
using the package Eviews 4.0 for Windows, marketed by Quantitative Micro
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Software. In this subsection we will discuss the results for the four sub-models and
report on some other derived variables, such as energy intensity.
Macro Economic Variables
The growth in the overall economic performance decreases. Figure 6-28 shows the
growth path of the main macro economic demand variables. The growth rates of some
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Figure 6-28. Main real macro economic variables
As Figure 6-29 shows, all macroeconomic demand categories show a strong
increase at the start ofthe simulation period.  This is the result of the strong increase in
the price of oil in 1999 and 2000 (resulting in higher oil revenue), when oil prices
recovered  of the  very low prices  in 1998. After  the year  2000 oil prices increase
gradually, which explains the absence of hikes. Since we are interested in the long-
term structural development and not in forecasting actual erratic behavior due to oil
price dynamics, this is of no concern.
Because growth in real domestic energy prices is negative, domestic energy
demand will increase faster than GDP, resulting in a decrease in oil available for
export and thus the dollar inflow. Since the government depends the most on R$ for
its expenditures, this demand category sukers most as is shown in Figure 6-29. At the
end ofthe simulation period the growth rate is even slightly below zero.
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If we compare the actual growth rate of the GDP  for the period 1999-2020
with the growth rate over the sample period 1974-1998, these two are rather close,
2.4% and 2.2% respectively. The other variables also show only moderate differences,
although on average government expenditure (G) grows a bit faster in the reference
scenario due to the high long-term elasticity with respect to R$, whereas the average
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Figure 6-29. Growth rates of some macro demand categories
Two other variables are of interest, CPI and ER.  As was shown in Chapter 3
these variables grew very fast, 20.6% and 23.0% respectively, over the sample period,
especially in recent years, which was due to the high growth rate in liquidity (almost
25% annually). In the reference or RF scenario these growth rates are smaller due to
our assumption on liquidity growth (15% annually). The growth rates of CPI and  ER
are of the same magnitude, 14.4% and 13.1% respectively. Note that the real price of
energy is decreasing over the sample period as well as over the simulation period on
average by almost 5% annually.
From this analysis we conclude that the  results ofour macroeconomic model
although it is only a partial model ofthe economy, can be used as a reference for the
domestic energy policy analysis we want to perform.
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Final Energy Demand
The growth rate of final energy demand (TFEDB) is on average 4.5% per year,
whereas the domestic demand for oil (DOILD) increases on average by only 2.3% per
year. This is mainly due to growth in the demand for natural gas; see Figure 6-30,
which is the result of the gas for oil substitution policy. For the sample period these
figures are 7.6% and 6% respectively. This indicates that the growth in energy
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Figure 6-30. Simulated final energy demand in million barrels
In terms of barrel per day, the final demand for oil (DOILD) increases from
1.21 million barrel per day to 2.02 million. The total final energy demand (TFEDB)
increases from 1.71  to 4.50 million barrels per day.
The growth in energy use, mainly by the non-productive demand categories as
explained in Chapter 2, results in a constant increase in energy intensity based on final
energy demand, since the growth in real GDP is only 2.4% per year compared to 4.5%
in TFEDB. The oil product intensity is, however, almost constant, since DOILD
grows by 2.3% only; also see Figure 6-30.
Figure 6-31 shows the shares of the different petroleum products in the total.
The main changes are the decrease in the share of fuel oil (FOILB) and the increase in
the share of gasoline (GSOIL). These developments are similar to the developments









4096- - - -  _ _ --  _     ILPGB
i m i l l i l l i l :-0-:-i Fi-:-i-FC,- - - „81511$
-jilitillililli lilitil;##f##,4   f0f#ff
„ i / 1 1.1 1.1,1 i 1 1 -1 t.1 1 1 1 i i i I
lf// 18/1/ 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2006 /08 2007 2008 20[10 2/10 2011 2012 2013 /14 2015 2018 2017 201 8 /19 20/
Figure 6-31. Shares ofpetroleum products in total petroleum product demand
Primary Energy Demand
Growth in total primary energy demand -power generation and refining- depends on
the growth in final energy demand. As was the case for final energy demand, natural
gas demand as a share of primary energy demand shows a strong increase; from 68%
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Figure 6-32. Primary energy use in the power sector
This is especially true for the power sector; see Figure 6-32. The total demand
for energy by the power sector increases from 153.4 million boe per day to 263.1 boe.
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Figure 6-33 shows the total primary energy demand (TPED), and two of its
main contributors, the demand for natural gas in barrel oil equivalent (NGTB) and
domestic oil demand (DOILD). Figure 6-33 also contains the annual oil production
(QOIL/y) and the difference between QOIL/y and DOILD, which is the annual
amount of oil available for export (XOIL/y). It is obvious that this amount is
constantly decreasing.  As a result the amount of oil revenue is decreasing also from
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Figure 6-33. Primary energy use versus production
For those that are more familiar with barrels per day reasoning we provide the
following. TPED increases from 2.18 million barrels per day to 5.48 and natural gas
consumption in barrels (NGTB) more than triples from 0.92 to 3.35 million barrels
per day. Because production (QOIL) is going down from 3.73 million barrels per day
to 3.35 million and domestic demand in barrels per day (DOILD/365), despite the
success  of the gas for oil policy, is still going up from 1.21 million barrels per day to
2.02 million, the export is decreasing from 2.52 million barrels per day to a meager
1.33 million.
Next the results ofthe subsidy sub-model are briefly discussed.
Implicit Subsidies
The implicit subsidies on final demand for fuels under the reference scenario keep
growing and reach a staggering 34 billion US$ in 2020; see Figure 6-34. The
subsidies on fuels used in electricity production and refining are neglected, because
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Figure 6-34. Total subsidies and its main components
With the final demand for electricity and for natural gas growing faster than
the demand for petroleum products, the share of implicit subsidies on these fuels is
increasing; see Figure 6-34. The fast growth in subsidies in the years 1999 and 2000
has  to  do  with the extremely  low oil prices  in  1998  and the recovery  of this price
thereafter.
The figure also contains the income from oil export (OILR$) and the total
dollar inflow (R$). As is indicated by two solid lines, the total amount of implicit
subsidies will become larger than the total oil revenues by 2008, and by 2014 they
will be larger than the total dollar inflow (R$) Although implicit subsidies are not
actually paid, it is obvious that they are a strain on all government policy (and
domestic energy policy in particular), and will seriously hamper all efforts to improve
the health ofthe Iranian economy.
Finally, we add figure that shows the shares the different petroleum products
have in the subsidies on final demand for petroleum products. This total increases
from 9.35 billion US$ in the year 2000 to 20.6 billion in 2020. Between 2000 and
2020 the share of gasoline increases from 21.7% to 27.2%, whereas that of fuel oil
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Figure 6-34. The shares of subsidies on petroleum products in the total subsidy on
these products
6.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, the general model developed in Chapter 5 was specified and estimated.
Although the Iranian data are of poor quality -in the model this has lead to separate
equations for GDP and GDE-, the equations obtained are robust and show good
performance, individually as well as a simultaneous equation system.
Next the model output for the sample period was used to compare the actual
data per endogenous variable with the actual data using the correlation coefficient,
Theil's inequality coefficient, and the ratios of the mean and the standard deviation
From this analysis it was concluded that the in sample simulation of the model
performs well.
A reference or business as usual scenario was developed against which the
new pricing policy introduced in the next chapter can be evaluated. For this scenario
assumptions had to be made with respect to the values of the exogenous variables.
These assumptions were based on sample behavior and known policy intentions. For
example, the increase in the domestic energy prices was restricted, as was the increase
in liquidity.  We are aware of the  fact  that the model developed is only  a partial model
of the economy and that the Lucas critique is ignored. However, we believe that the
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links between our model and the assumption that energy prices and liquidity are
exogenous variables do not affect our results too much. The model covers the main
links between Iran's dollar income and macro economic demand. As was argued in
Chapter 5, a more complete and concise investigation of the links between Iran's
monetary sector and the domestic energy policy is beyond the scope of this research.
Analysis of the reference scenario shows that in spite of a low level of real
economic growth, the high growth rate of the population and development of urban
areas, in combination with sustained decreases in real energy prices, result in a strong
growth in final and primary energy demand. This implies a further increase of the
overall energy intensity.
The increase in energy demand is mainly met by natural gas, which almost
triples. The model clearly shows the effect of the gas for oil substitution policy. In
spite of the substitution policy the domestic demand for petroleum products, and thus
oil, still increases from  1.21 million barrels per day to 2.02 million. Since many of the
oil fields are past their peak production and the capacity from new developments that
can be added is restricted (55,000 barrel per day per year), production decreases
slightly from 3.73 million barrel per day to 3.35 million. As a result, oil export is
decreasing  from 2.52 million barrels per day to a meager 1.33 million, leading  to  a
decrease in export earnings from 20.1 billion US$ in 2000 to 12.9 billion in 2020.
The implicit subsidies on final energy demand on the other hand show steady
growth rates. The total amount by 2020 is a staggering 34 billion US$, compared to
14.4 billion in the year 2000. This figure includes subsidies on natural gas and
electricity. For petroleum products these figures are US$ 9.35 billion and US$ 20.6
billion respectively.
[n the next chapter we analyze the effect of removing the implicit subsidies
and calculate the total potential for energy savings.
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Optimizing Domestic Energy Demand
7.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses  Iran' s opportunities for energy conservation, which  is  one  of
three main policies resulting from the SWOT analysis in Chapter 4. The first policy
investigated is removing the implicit energy subsidies, and how this affects energy
demand and the main macro economic variables. The analysis is performed within the
framework of the model developed in Chapter 6. The same assumptions on exogenous
variables as for the reference scenario (further indicated as RF scenario) are used,
with the exception for the domestic energy prices. The latter will, over a period of
five-year period (2001-2006), be raised to the level of their respective border prices.
This scenario is called the removing subsidy scenario (further indicated as RS
scenario). After the year 2006 the real energy prices are based on the development in
CPI and the increase in the international oil prices. The difference between energy
demand  in the  RF and RS scenarios is interpreted as the amount of conservation from
the upward adjustments of energy prices.
The results of this new pricing policy are discussed for the two periods 2002-
2007 and 2007-2020 separately. The main reason for this is that during the first period
domestic prices will be affected by the large energy price increases and we want to
know how this affects the economy and inflation. (Most Iranians fear lower economic
growth and higher inflation.) The second period is one of moderate price increases,
but hopefully better economic performance. This also needs to be analyzed and
compared to the reference scenario. It might be that positive effects of the new pricing
policy during the second period offset possible negative effects of the price increases
during the first period. The evaluation of pricing policy should be based on the effects
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of the policy over the whole period. The discussion will concentrate on aggregate
variables, such as, primary and final energy demand, energy conservation, real energy
prices, energy intensity, oil revenue, oil for export, GDP, CPI, and the exchange rate.
Although the energy prices are set equal to the border prices, Iran's energy
prices in the RS scenario will still be among the lowest energy prices in the world,
even when we compare them to current energy prices in other countries. In other
countries domestic energy use is a major revenue raiser for the government which is
certainly not true for Iran, even after the price increases. This price comparison
suggests that there is more room for energy price increases to conserve energy.
However, with the Lucas critique in mind, analyzing such an additional long-term
pricing policy with the model of Chapter 6 seems asking too much. The price
increases will certainly change the attitude of consumers, which needs to be analyzed
before the effects can be quantified.
To quantify the energy conservation potential for Iran, which can be achieved
by higher energy prices and/or other conservation policies and measures, the
conservation potential in some other countries along with their energy policies are
analyzed next.  This is a difficult task, because of the differences in economic structure
and level of development between countries. However, despite these differences, such
a comparative analysis makes sense if used with care.
The price and non-price energy conservation policies of the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, and Thailand are reviewed. These three countries were used because
extensive information was readily available.   Iran' s energy conservation potential  on
top of the pricing policy will be based on this comparative analysis. However, where
possible this will be complemented with available information on Iran's conservation
potential. The capacity for energy conservation trough additional policy measures, so
in excess of the pricing policy, will be estimated and it is assumed this will be
effective within the period 2008-2020. This scenario is labeled as the Improved
Scenario and is denoted as IM.
Since the conservation potential on top of the pricing policy is determined
exogenously, the effects of conservation on macro economic variables cannot be
analyzed. However, the effects on oil revenue and the energy sector, i.e. electricity
system and oil refinery, are discussed.
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Finally, in order to investigate whether our assumptions are realistic, the trend
in the energy intensity in the IM case is compared to the prospects of energy
intensities in other countries.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 introduces the RS scenario
for the period 2002-2007 and 2007-2020 respectively, and discusses the overall effect
of the new pricing policy for the period 2007-2020. Section 7.3 compares Iran's
increased energy prices in 2020 to the current prices in other countries. In Section 7.4
the energy conservation policies in the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, and
Thailand are discussed. In Section 7.5 the conservation potential for Iran. In Section
7.6 this additional conservation potential is quantified. Section 7.7 presents the
conclusions.
7.2 Removing Energy Subsidies
The RF scenario of the previous chapter shows that the amount of oil available for
export is squeezed between a slightly decreasing production capacity and strong
increases  in the domestic demand  for oil,  to a meager  1.3 million barrel  per day  by
2020. The result is a steadily decreasing inflow of foreign currency, which in turn
threatens   Iran' s development potential   and the welfare   of its people.   This   loss   of
market, in combination with high inflation could lead to similar problems as
Argentina is currently facing, a complete loss of confidence internationally as well as
domestically.
To avoid this the first policy action should be the removal of the implicit
energy subsidies over a short period of time. Removing the implicit subsidies will
improve Iran's energy efficiency and provide the government with financial funds to
adjust its current monetary policy. This can be achieved by using the extra income
from domestic energy sales to lower the growth rate of liquidity. As we shall show
this will substantially lower the increase in the consumer price index.  Part of the extra
income can also be used to compensate the poor, who suffer most from the energy
price increases. We will, however, not develop a scheme for this.
Note that real income in Iran is currently decreasing, because wage increases
are lower than the rate of inflation.
In the RS scenario the implicit energy subsidies will be removed over a five-
year period, from 2002 to 2006. To achieve this prices are increased by a fixed
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percentage every year during this period. These annual price increases for the various
fuels in US$ per unit are:
PJETF PLPG PGSLN PKER PGSOIL PFOIL PNG PELEC
62.4% 59.0% 27.3% 61.2% 60.4% 53.7% 40.8% 33.1%
After 2006, the energy prices will be set equal to the border prices, which are
exogenous in our model. This is the Removing Subsidy or RS scenario. All other
assumptions on exogenous variables, with the exception of LIQUID, are the same as
in the RF scenario; see Sub-section 6.4.1.
In Sub-sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 the effects ofthe new energy pricing policy are
evaluated for 2002-2007 and 2007-2020 respectively. In the first five years of the
forecast period, the energy subsidies are partially abolished. In the second period the
prices are set at their expected border prices to gurantee zero implicit energy
subsidies. In Sub-section 7.2.3 the total period is briefly discussed and some
conclusions are drawn.
7.2.1    Removing the Implicit Subsidies (2001-2007)
All macroeconomic and energy variables are affected by the policy to remove the
implicit energy subsidies. In the following the effect the new pricing policy has on the
main economic and energy variables is discussed.
Real gross domestic product (GDP)
In Iran many people are convinced that an increase in energy prices will reduce
economic growth. However, in the long run a better economic performance can be
expected, indicated by the rate of growth of GDP, when the implicit energy subsidies
are removed. Economic agents improve their energy consumption, freeing oil for
export. This in turn increases the dollar inflow R$. Since investment, consumption,
and government expenditure are directly and indirectly affected by R$ this is expected
to lead to a higher GDP. In the RS scenario, GDP is predicted to grow on average
3.9% annually within 2002-2007, which  is an increase of one percent compared to the
RF   scenario; see Figure   7-1. So removing the implicit subsidies results in higher
annual GDP growth rates, instead of lower economic growth.
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Figure 7-1. Forecasts ofGDP growth in the two scenarios
Consumer price index (CPD
Inflation is a critical macroeconomic variable. Many in Iran expect that drastic energy
price increases,  as the ones proposed here, will increase the already high rate of
inflation even further. Removing the implicit energy subsidies increases the costs of
supplying goods and services, especially the energy goods in the household
expenditures basket. This would be true,  if no other measures were taken.
Eq.  (6.12)  is not completely adequate  for the analysis ofthe RS scenario.
Strong energy price increases will, as expected, affect  CPI,  but this  is not made
explicit  in our model. To account for this a study by the World Bank (2000) is used.
This study estimates the share of energy expenditures in the budget of the average
Iranian household  at 0.018, which indicates the direct effect of energy prices on CPI.
For the period 2002-2006, we include this percentage in Eq. (6.12), which becomes
LOG(CPI) = 5.179 + 0.018LOG(PENG) + 1.149 (LOG(LIQUID)-LOG(GDPM82))
+ [AR(1)=0.235] (6.128)
The dynamic effect  of the increase is accounted for by the AR term. For the analysis
of the period 2007-2020, when energy price increases are small, we again use
Equation (6.12).
Because the government receives a large amount in cash when the policy is
implemented, some further adjustment of the model is required. The extra income
(which  in  the end amounts  to over 10% ofthe GDP; see Chapter 3) can be used for
many things. An obvious one is the reduction in liquidity growth, since the
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government  is no longer strapped for cash. In the RF scenario liquidity was assumed
to  grow  at   15%  per  year.   In   the  RS  scenario we replace this by an equation. We
assume that the government uses 50% of the extra income to reduce liquidity growth.
LIQUID, =1.15 LIQUID,4 -0.5 ER (SUBSID -SUBSID ) (7.1)
RS
LIQUID is defined as before, ER is the free market exchange rate  in the RS
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Figure 7-2. CPI trends in the two scenarios
become available after removing the implicit energy subsidies. As a result, the
rampant inflation can be controlled instead of increased. In RS scenario CPI grows at
about 1.08 percent annually against 11.9 percent in the RF scenario, an improvement
of  more  than 10 percent. As figure 7-2 shows how the RS scenario outperforms the
RF scenario after  2004.   In the reasoning about removing the implicit subsidies, it is
the link between the extra funds for the government and how these are used that most
people forget.  If used properly, their positive effect will more than compensate the
negative effect ofhigher energy prices.
A second important issue when discussing removal of the implicit subsidies is
the  effect this would  have on poor people. Although  not in absolute terms, these
would suffer  the  most. This problem should be addressed also. Although not part of
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this   investigation, we are convinced that the extra income for the government is more
than sufficient to compensate the poor.
Real price of energy (PENG/CPI)
The   average real price of energy has decreased during the last decades, which led to a
high domestic consumption ofenergy; see Chapter 2. In the RF scenario the average
real energy price is decreasing, in line with its historical trend. In the RS scenario the
adjustment of energy prices to the border prices, in combination with the lower
inflation rate, results in an increasing trend for the real price of energy. As Figure 7-3
shows,  the real price of energy in the RS scenario is expected to increase sharply; on
average 32.7 percent per year.
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Figure 7-3. Average real energy price (PENG/CPI)
Oil revenue (OILRS)
As was shown in Chapter  2, the Iranian economy strongly depends on the oil dollar
revenue. Historically, the revenue has fluctuated  with the international price of oil  and
to  a much lesser extend the amount ·of oil exported, although the latter shows a
decreasing trend due to the strongly increasing trend in domestic oil demand. The
increase in domestic oil consumption cannot be compensated by an increase in oil
production, sin
revenue  in  the RF scenario is decreasing; see Figure 7-4. The figure also shows that
with an increase in real domestic energy prices, revenue strongly increases from about
US$  21  billion  to  over US$ 24 billion. As we shall show later this is due to a strong
decrease in domestic oil consumption.
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Figure 7-4. Oil dollar revenue (OILR$)
Exchange rate (ER)
In Chapter 6 we discussed the free market exchange rate, Eq. 6.42, as a function ofthe
consumer price index  (CPI)   and the total dollar inf'low (R$). The higher the CPI the
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Figure 5-7. Rial-Dollar exchange rate (ER)
exchange market,  the  more the exchange rate is expected to appreciate. In the RF
scenario the exchange rate deteriorates due to lower oil revenue and due to the high
inflation rate, which is caused   by   the high growth rate of liquidity; both negatively
affect the exchange rate. In the RS scenario these tendencies are reversed. The dollar
inflow increases and due to the adjusted monetary policy CPI growth decreases
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drastically.  As a result, the exchange rate slightly increases when the new pricing
policy is introduced, but after the  year 2004 the situation sharply improves and the
exchange improves; see Figure 7-5.
Total primary energy demand (TPEDB)
Removing the implicit energy subsidies will result in lower domestic energy demand.
In our model this is due to the own price elasticities, which represent the rationalizing
behavior of consumers. Although energy is still a cheap commodity after the price
increases,  the use of more efficient technologies and better energy management
become profitable.  In  the RS scenario, primary energy demand increases on average
by   only 1.2 percent annually, 3.1 percent   less   than    in  the RF scenario. Figure  7-6
shows that the annual growth rate ofprimary energy would be even slightly negative
in  2006. In the RS scenario the growth rate is diminishing, while in the RF scenario it
remains  high at about 4 percent per year. The total primary energy demand (TPEDB)
of 2.46 million barrel  per  day in 2001 will be 2.64 million barrel per day in 2007 in
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Figure 7-6. Primary energy demand (TPEDB)
The  amount  of oil in TPEDB  is   the most interesting component, since this
directly affects  R$.  In  the RF scenario domestic oil demand (DOILD) is expected to
increase by 2.83 percent per year, from  1.26 million barrel per day to 1.50 million; see
Figure 7-7.  In  the RS scenario domestic oil demand decreases on average by 2.37
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Figure 7-7. Domestic oil demand (DOILD)
Except  for the solid fuels, which  we kept exogenous, all energy carriers are
affected  by the new price policy. Since  in our model the energy demand by the
transformation sector is only indirectly affected by the price increases, we next
energy basket . Figure 7-8 depicts the ratio ofenergy demand in the RS scenario over
the  demand  in  the RF scenario. Except  for  jet  fuel, the ratio is smaller  than   1,
indicating a lower demand  in  the RS scenario for all energy carriers. The opposite
effect  for jet fuel is the result of the higher GDP growth in the RS scenario. However,
as was shown in Chapter 2, jet fuel  is only a small fraction oftotal final energy
demand.
Comparison  of the average growth rates of each energy carrier shows that in
the RS scenario all energies, with the exception ofjet fuel, gasoline, and natural gas,
show negative growth rates. The positive growth rate for gasoline in the RS scenario
is   mainly  due   to the higher GDP growth, resulting in a higher number of gasoline-
using vehicles. Although the growth rate ofthis fuel is positive, it is still much less
than  in  the RF scenario. Natural gas demand increases in both scenarios because of
the  continued  gas for oil substitution policy, but the growth rate in gas demand in the
RS scenario will be lower than in the RF scenario.
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Figure 7-8. The ratio of final demand per carrier in the RS and RF scenario
Energy conservation
The purpose ofremoving the implicit energy subsidies is to increase foreign exchange
income, to decrease the financial burden  of the government -currently resulting in
high liquidity growth-,  and to promote energy conservation. Because ofthe price
increases about 543.2 million barrel ofoil equivalent will be conserved. The value of
this  amount of energy on the basis of the final energy prices, which are lower than the
border prices within 2002-2006, is estimated at US$ 12.8 billion. The value based on
the opportunity costs or border prices is US$ 13.02 billion.
This is the value of the energy conserved in the final demand sectors only.
Lower demand for electricity, however, reduces  the need for electricity generation
and distribution, which  in turn reduces the amount of energy needed in these two
segments  of the energy chain. The same holds true for the oil refineries, less demand
for petroleum products leads to less demand for refinery  and  in turn reduces the
losses. Therefore, the amount ofenergy eonserved mentioned above is a lower bound
rather than an upper bound.
Energy intensity
As  is shown above, an effective and efficient domestic energy policy will reduce
From an economic theoretical point of view this makes sense since inefficient
domestic energy use is replaced by extra dollar revenue, which boosts domestic
193
spending.  This is completely in contrast  with what many Iranians fear, namely that
energy price increases willlead to a reduction in economic growth.
The ratio of energy demand and GDP is known as energy intensity. The
energy intensities  for both scenarios are depicted in Figure 7-9, which shows two
opposite trends.  In  the RS scenario the energy intensity is expected to decrease by
2.74  percent  per year, while it is expected to grow by 0.90 percent per year in the RF
scenario.
38
2 370 36 /*
8 35 -*





28  "i 1
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Figure 7-9. Final energy intensities
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Figure 7.10. Removing subsidies
Energy subsidy
Along  with the upward adjustment of energy prices towards the border prices, the
implicit energy subsidies vanish; see Figure 7-10. The energy subsidies, which are
194
about  US$ 14.6 billion in 2002, are completely removed in 2006 and afterwards. The
total implicit subsidies in the RS scenario would be US$ 38.7 billion; while in the RF
scenario these amount to US$ 79.1 billion.
7.2.2 Energy Demand Under Border Prices (2007-2020)
Under the RS scenario the nominal domestic energy prices are set equal to the border
prices, so implicit subsidies are removed for the whole period (2007-2020). To show
that  this  is a rather modest pricing policy, we look at the real domestic energy prices.
These   do of course still change due to changes in CPI. Since the growth rate of CPI is
larger than the increase in domestic energy prices, the real domestic energy prices will
still  show a slow decrease after 2006.  This in turn will affect all  of the above-
mentioned variables.    In what follows the effects o f the new pricing policy are briefly
discussed.
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Figure 7-11. Annual growth rate of GDP in the two scenarios
Real gross domestic product (GDP)
In  the RS scenario  the real gross domestic product (GDP) is expected to grow faster
than  in  the RF scenario within 2007-2020. The reason for this is the lower domestic
oil demand, which results in higher oil revenue. The average growth rate of GDP is
expected  to  be 1.87 percent annually, on average 0.63 percent higher than in the RF
scenario; see Figure 7-11. Although the growth rates are decreasing in both scenarios,
it stabilizes at a higher level (1.6%) in the RS scenario.
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Consumer price index (CPI)
For the period 2007-2020 the growth rate of LIQUID  is  set at 5% per year. This
assumption seems reasonable, since the government receives substantially more cash
from domestic energy sales. Therefore,  CPI is expected to be more stable in the RS
scenario. The lower liquidity growth,  due to a better monetary policy, stabilizes the
CPI  growth  rate at about 3.8 percent. The ratio of CPI in the RS and the RF scenario
(see   Figure 7-12) shows a sharp decrease from about 43 percent in 2007 to about  10
percent  in  2020. This reduction in inflation is one of the most important results of the
improved energy pricing policy, since the extra income for the government that
results from this policy can be used to curtail liquidity growth
Note, that this is only an indication of what is possible with adequate monetary
monetary policy is required to formulate precise policy measures. This is, however,
beyond the scope of this research.
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Figure 7-12. The ratio of CPIRS over CPIRF
Real energy prices
Because the growth rates of domestic prices of energy are lower than that of CPI, the
real  prices of energy are expected to decrease slowly within the period 2007-2020. It
is  expected that the real average price of energy (PENG/CPI) decreases 2.98%
annually in  the RS scenario, against 6.22% in the RF scenario, see Figure 7-13. This
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difference between  the  two real prices will result  in a lower growth rate in energy
demand in the RS scenario, leading to continued considerable energy savings.
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Figure 7-13. Real energy prices in the two scenarios
Oil revenues (OILRS)
The oil revenues in both scenarios are expected to decrease after the year 2006. But in
the RS scenario the revenues are, of course, considerably higher than in  the RF
scenario; see Figure 7-14. The decrease in oil production is the main driving force for
the decrease in the level of revenues in the RS scenario. The oil revenue in 2020 in the
RS   scenario is expected to be about US$ 20 billion, while it would be around US$ 13
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Figure 7-14. Oil revenue in both scenarios
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Exchange rate (ER)
Because  of the lower increase in liquidity (5  % per year instead o f 15%) the value of
rio  is much more constant than in the RF
scenario.  In the latter, the domestic currency is expected to lose more than 15 percent
of its value annually. Because of the more stable economic situation in the RS
scenario  the  Rial  will  be much stronger and loses only 1.4% ofits value against the
US$ annually; see Figure 7-15.
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Figure 7-15. Rial-Dollar exchange rate
Energy demand
After the strong decrease in energy demand due to the removal of the implicit
subsidies, total primary energy demand will start growing again. This is because of
the decrease in real energy prices. The average growth rate of primary'energy demand
is   estimated   at 3.9% annually, about 0.33% lower than in the RF scenario. Primary
energy demand  will  grow from 2.64 million barrel per day in 2007 to 4.39 million in
2020;  which  has  to be compared  to 5.48 million barrel per day in 2020 in the RF
scenario; also see Figure 7-16.
Domestic oil demand  will  grow on average 1.5 percent each year and will
reach 1.33 million barrel per day in 2020, which is close to the demand in  1998. The
annual growth  rate of domestic oil demand is expected to be 2.27 percent in the RF
scenario, and demand would be 2.02 million barrel per day in 2020. Figure 7-17
shows the considerable differences between the two scenarios.
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The demand for final energy carriers  in  the RS scenario is expected to be
lower than  that  in  the RF scenario. Although the real prices in the period 2007-2020
are not increasing, the effect    of the price increases  in the previous years does affect
the  demand  for this period. Figure 7-18 contains the ratios of the demand for each
carrier in the RS scenario over that in the RF scenario.
6.0













Figure 7-16. Total primary energy demand
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Figure 7-17. Oil demand
The demand  for jet fuel  in the simulated model is not affected by its price;
therefore,  we have excluded it from this comparison. It will keep on growing and will
be about 20% larger in 2020 than it was in 2007.
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Figure 7-18 shows  that the demand for gasoline in the RS scenario is higher
than  that  in  the RF scenario. This is mainly due to the higher GDP growth under the
RS scenario and its effect on the stock of gasoline-using vehicles.
The demand for natural gas in both scenarios is close to each other because the
gas for oil policy continues.
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Figure 7-18. Ratio ofdemand per carrier in the RS and the RF scenario
Energy conservation
Despite the  fact  that real energy prices decrease again compared to the period 2002-
2006, the amount ofenergy conserved is still considerable; total energy conservation
amounts  to 4.2 billion BOE during this period. The value of this conservation is,
given our assumptions on border prices, US$ 121.6 billion, which can be obtained by
multiplying the differences in final energy use between the RF and the RS scenario by
the respective border prices. Note that this amount is about 51 percent ofthe total oil
revenues in the RF scenario.
Energy intensity
Energy intensity during the period 2007-2020 increases in both scenarios. The growth
rate of energy intensity is expected to be 3.3 and 2.7 percent per year in the RF and
RS scenario respectively.
Figure 7-19 shows the ratio  of the energy intensities in the RS and the RF
scenario. This ratio is diminishing indicating that under the RS scenario the economy
is more energy efficient. The level of energy intensity in the RS scenario decreases
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mainly because  of the higher real energy prices, which is partly offset by the better
economic performance under this scenario. However, the slowly diminishing real
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energy prices after 2007  in  the RS scenario,  lead  to a slow increase ofthe energy
intensity under this scenario also.
Figure 7-19. Ratio ofenergy intensities in the RS and RF scenario
Energy subsidy
Under  the RS scenario the energy subsidies are completely removed for the period
2007-2020. The total amount of energy subsidies under the RF scenario is estimated
to  be  more than US$ 379.9 billion or 1.6 times the total amount of oil revenues in the
same period.
7.2.3 Overall Results Under the RS scenario
The RS scenario was discussed  for two separate periods, 2002-2006 during which
period the implicit subsidies are removed, and 2007-2020 during which domestic
energy prices in dollar terms  are  kept at their border values. We showed that, even
when energy price increases are high, the positive effects of the policy quickly
overtake the negative effects of temporarily higher inflation. This requires, however, a
monetary policy that is consistent with the new domestic energy pricing policy.
Table  7- 1 contains  the most important variables for the whole period, 2002-
2020, which makes it possible to compare the overall results. The table shows that the
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RS scenario outperforms the RF scenario on all reported variables. The annual GDP
growth rate is 1.11 percent higher than under the RF scenario. The inflation rate (CPI)
is, on average, low and quite stable in the RS scenario. The average real price of
energy increases 6.0 percent per year in the RS scenario, while it decreases about 5.5
percent annually  in the RF scenario.  In the RS scenario the total revenue of oil export
is expected to be US$ 423.3 billion or 1.26 times the revenues in the RF scenario.
Table 7- 1. Overall performance ofthe economy in the two scenarios (2002-2020)
Value Better Description
Variables RS RF performance
GDP 2.44% 1.73% RS per year
CPI 0.37% 14.07% RS per year
Real energy price 6.00% -5.54% RS per year
Oil revenues* 423.3 US$   335.0 US$ RS billion
Exchange rate 0.44% 13.72% RS per year
Energy demand 3.07% 4.23% RS per year
Energy conservation* 4.56               - RS billion BOE
Energy intensity 1.32% 2.87% RS per year
Implicit energy subsidies*      38.7 US$    441.7 US$ RS billion
* The amount for the period 2002-2020
The exchange rate is a very critical variable in the Iranian economy, and an
unstable exchange rate results in instability of the whole economy due to its high
dependence on export income. Iran's recent economic performance shows that the
stability of exchange rate plays a key role in fostering economic growth and the
promotion of non-oil export. The latter is vital for future diversification of Iran's
economy. In the RS scenario the Rial loses on average only 0.44 percent of its value
annually against the US$, while this would be 13.72% under the RF scenario.
The slowing down of energy demand growth under the RS scenario results in
a large amount of energy conserved, amounting to 4.55 billion BOE. This is close to
the proven oil reserves of countries such as Qatar, 3.7 billion bbl, Oman, 5.7 billion
bbl, and the United Kingdom, 5.15 billion bbl (OPEC ASB, 2000). Total conservation
comprises about  17.2%  of total energy consumption  in RF scenario. The ratio  of the
total primary energy demands in the RS and the RF scenario is given in Figure 7-20,
which shows the sharp decrease when the implicit subsidies are removed, after which
it stabilizes at about 80 percent. So after 2010 about 20 percent is saved annually.
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The growth rate of the energy intensity under the RS scenario is expected to be
1.32%, 1.55% less than under the RF scenario.
The   value of the implicit energy subsidies under the RS scenario is just 8.75%
(or  US$ 38 billion) of those under  the RF scenario. The total value ofthe implicit
subsidies under the latter scenario is more than US$ 441 billion US, which is a huge
burden for Iranian economy.
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Figure 7-20. Ratio of total primary energy demand in the RS and the RF scenario
We have shown  that a sound domestic energy policy not only can improve
f the
economy as a whole. The pricing policy in the RS scenario shows that all main
economic and energy variables outperform those in the RF scenario. This is in strong
contrast with public opinion  in Iran, which states that removing the implicit energy
subsidies will weaken the economy and lead to an even larger rate of inflation.  As we
have  shown,  if the new pricing policy is supported by sound monetary policy the
overall performance   will be better   and     the rate of inflation will after a short period
strongly decrease instead of increase.
energy use. The next question that arises is whether removing the implicit subsidies is
sufficient or can the pricing policy be enhanced by other policies (or even higher price
increases)? These are the subjects of the next two sections. In Section 7.3
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energy price in 2020 is compared with current prices in some other countries. The
reason to do so is to show that even after the price increases Iran's energy prices are
very low in comparison to other countries. In section 7.4 we analyze conservation
policies in some other countries. These countries have conserved a considerable
amount of energy using price and non-price policies. As we will see, even in the
countries with the highest energy prices, there is still a considerable potential for
energy conservation. This requires, however, additional conservation policies on top
of the pricing policy.  We want to use the potential in those countries to indicate (not
estimate) that the conservation potential in Iran is much larger than the 4.55 billion
barrel  ofoil equivalent obtained above.
7.3      Iran's High Energy Prices in an International Perspective
When asked, the average Iranian will regard the border prices for energy as
introduced in the previous section as too high, unaffordable, and harmful to the
economy. We have shown that this believe is a fallacy. Here we compare the Iranian
price of energy in the RS scenario for 2020 with those in industrialized countries in
the past to see how high the energy prices really are. For this we use the price of a
composite barrel of petroleum products including taxes, which is considered a good
indicator for the final price of energy; see Figure 7-21. The price range in the
industrialized countries was between US$ 30 and US$ 76.5 per barrel in 1980, and
between US$ 43  and US$  142 in  1999.  Over the total period the energy price of the
UK belongs to the highest, whereas that of the U.S.A. belongs to the lowest. In this
comparison Iran is neglected, because its price varied between US$ 2.5 and US$ 3.0
per barrel. However, as Figure 7-20 shows, even in the RS scenario the 2020 price of
a composite barrel of petroleum products in Iran will be only US$ 36.20, far below
the current prices in industrialized countries, and even below the current price in the
United States.
The removal of the implicit subsidies leads to overall energy conservation of
about 17 percent. Compared to energy savings in other countries  this is still rather
low. Most of the countries in Figure 7-21 have achieved higher energy savings. The
main reason is that higher energy prices make energy saving investments profitable,
and the fact that energy saving policies based on prices were supported by other
policies.  It is interesting to look at what other countries have achieved to see if this
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simulate these policies in our model, but we should be able to indicate the potential in
combination with the  policies used. Special emphasis will be on tighter regulation as
support for the energy pricing policy.
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Figure 7-21. The price of a composite barrel of petroleum products
ings potential would be to
estimate the technical-economical conservation potential in the different sectors ofthe
economy by doing energy audits in firms, households, and offices using a stratified
sampling technique and teams ofexperts. However, such a national research project is
conservation potential by using information from studies performed in other
countries. Of course, such an estimate is highly unreliable, but it will indicate if
research that is more detailed is required in the future.
The next section covers some studies for three different countries, the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Thailand, on energy conservation, based on detailed
analysis of economic sectors. The studies typically use a year in the late nineties as a
reference  year to estimate the energy conservation potential. These potentials are,
however, based on sustained high prices of energy; also see Figure 7-21. Since Iran
has had sustained low energy prices, it is difficult to relate the conservation potentials
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to the Iranian situation. So we have to be cautious when estimating Iran's
conservation potential. Luckily, also some sector studies for Iran are available.
7.4 Energy Conservation Policies in Various Countries
Section 7.2 showed that 17 percent of the energy consumed under the RF scenario can
be conserved under the RS scenario by applying border prices only. Other countries
have higher energy prices and a more comprehensive energy policy encompassing
price incentives as well as regulations for energy use. If Iran would develop such a
policy also, the amount of energy conserved could be substantially higher. In this
section we will indicate how much more energy might be saved when a more
comprehensive domestic energy policy is developed. Given our model, this can of
course not be more than an indication or "guesstimate".
In the following the conservation potential and policies in three countries, the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Thailand are discussed. We choose these three
countries because they have a good conservation record, and the policies are well
documented.
The estimated potentials for energy saving in these countries require a
balanced set of measures of price and non-price policies. As we will see, these
policies have to be based on detailed knowledge of technologies and managerial
issues, knowledge that is not (yet) available for Iran. The most important conservation
instruments are institutional settings (energy efficiency agencies, etc.), building codes,
labeling and standards, taxes and subsidies, energy audits, and economic incentives. It
is also beyond the scope of this research to gather this information, which requires
teams of domain experts and years of work. What we can do is identify the most
promising options in other countries and try to link these to the Iranian situation. This
will than be used to formulate a first guess of the potential savings for Iran on top of
the 17 percent in the RS scenario. Of course, we can (and will) not identify the exact
policy mix to achieve this, but we will give a short list of the most promising policy
options.
It should be noted that for a country with an effective energy conservation
program already in place for many years, and with a high level of domestic energy
prices, the potential for energy saving will most likely be less than in a country at the
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early stage of energy conservation, and with low energy prices and almost no
(enforced) regulation.
7.4.1    Establishing the Energy Savings Potential
Before we can discuss the energy savings potential of any country, it is necessary to
define this concept. Different types of energy savings potential have been
distinguished, ranging from technical to economic. Any discussion of this subject that
does not explicitly define what is used is useless.
The Royal Commission on Energy Pollution (RCEP, 1998) distinguishes three
types of energy savings potential, technical, economic, and market. The technical
savings potential is the maximum possible energy saving by applying all possible
measures as soon as they become available, regardless of the cost of the measures.
The economic savings potential means that those measures are applied whose net
benefits are positive. For this the RCEP uses discount rates ranging from 8% in the
housing sector to  18% in industry.  In this case many technically feasible conservation
projects are not economically viable. Note that transaction costs are not taken into
account and the energy efficiency gap is neglected (Van Soest and Bulte, 2001). The
market or likely savings potential is the amount of economic potential that is expected
to actually materialize in the various economic sectors under the current government
policy. This potential shows the actual expected market penetration in the business as
usual scenario. Note that the economic as well as the market savings potential are
strongly affected by the discount rate used.
Others have made similar distinctions in savings potential. Jaffe et al. (1999)
argue that when energy policies and regulations for conservation are discussed, a clear
distinction should be made between economic efficiency and energy efficiency, since
they are not the same and should be distinguished. The optimum level of energy
efficiency based on technical criteria has in general a low economic efficiency.
Economic efficiency and energy efficiency improvements require several steps. First,
all market failures in the market of energy technologies have to be eliminated, next
market failures in energy supply and demand, and environmental extemalities need to
be removed. This leads to the social optimum in the plane of energy efficiency and
economic efficiency.  If only those policies are taken into account that can actually be
implemented, Jaffe et al. call it the "true social optimum". It is this true social
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optimum that should actually be looked for when establishing the energy savings
potential.
Note that this is not the same as the RCEP's market savings potential, since
that potential does not include policy changes, nor is it the RCEP's economic savings
potential since that does not account for transaction costs.
The main reason why most studies use either the technical or the economic
savings potential is that these are the simplest ones to establish. All other concepts
require a more sophisticated analysis and more judgment. For this study this means
that whatever potential savings we calculate, these will only be rough indications that
can only be substantiated by more detailed studies.
7.4.2 Energy Saving Prospects in the UK
A study developed by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution's (RCEP,
1998), which was based on several other studies, has estimated energy conservation in
domestic housing, services, industries, and the transport sector. For these estimates
they used several detailed studies. In the following these estimated conservation
potentials are reported per economic sector.
• Housing sector
Several technologies are available, such as, insulation of loft and walls, improved hot
water supply and boilers, draught proofing and double-glazing, and the application of
energy efficient appliances and lighting. In the various studies used the largest
outstanding technical potential of energy savings are in solid and cavity wall
insulation, and by using condensing boilers. The total technical conservation potential
by all the measures mentioned is estimated to be between 25% and 34% of 1996
energy consumption.
The economic energy savings potential were by all sources estimated at about
15% in the short-term, rising to 30% over a period of 20 to 30 years.
The market potential is estimated to be just enough to offset the increase in
demand due to a growing number of households and increasing use of electrical




The service sector encompasses a wide variety of activities and the main sub-sectors
are health, education, government, sports and entertainment, commercial offices,
communication and transport, hotels and catering, retail, warehouses, and others.
Energy use in this sector is mainly related to the buildings used, such as hospitals,
schools, governmental offices, cinemas and theatres, railway stations, hotels and
restaurants, retail- and department stores, warehouses and storage depots, community
centers, and churches.
Twenty-five techniques have been modeled for estimating the energy savings
potential. These cover heating, lighting, cooling/ventilation, office equipment, and the
fabric of the building. The total technical savings potential is estimated at 39% of the
total 1996's energy consumption. The economic and market potential energy savings
for these measures are 24% and 11% respectively.
Note that combined heat and power applications as well as the effect of good
housekeeping and energy management are not included in this savings potential. The
latter can lead to considerable extra reductions.
• Industry Sector
Six major industrial sectors have a large potential for cost-effective energy savings.
These industrial sectors are in order of energy used, engineering, metals, chemicals,
paper and textiles, minerals and ceramics, and food and drinks. For these sectors it is
important to distinguish between short-term, medium-term, and long-term measures.
In the short term only existing equipment can be optimized; this includes boilers,
motors, compressed air, refrigeration, and lightning and heating.  In the medium term
(3-10 years) improvements can be based on the application of combined heat and
power (CHP), improved boilers and refrigeration systems, waste heat recovery, etc.
All these measures are based on retrofitting and some additional equipment. The long-
term measures are based on rethinking the processes used and investing in benchmark
technology, such as direct reduction instead of blast fumaces in iron production and
large CHP installations; see RECP (1998, 50-51).
The level of potential energy savings has been estimated for these industries
under different scenarios for the years 2000, 2010, and 2020. For the combined
sectors, the total technical savings potential is 29% in the sort-term, 36% in the
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medium-term, and 44% in the long-term . The economic potential for these three
periods, based on a more realistic 15-25% discount rate (instead of 8%), is  15%, 23%,
and 31% respectively.
The market potential is estimated at half the economic potential. The main
reason for this difference is the earlier mentioned efficiency gap.
• Transport Sector
The transport sector in the UK, as in any other country, shows a steady increase in
energy consumption, and its share in total energy consumption is expected to increase
till 2020. For this sector three types of energy savings measures are distinguished:
operational, strategic, and transport demand.
Operational energy saving measures can lead to immediate energy savings by
adopting good operations and fuel management practices, including effective
monitoring of fuel use, driver training, and providing incentive maintenance
programs. In the freight sector energy savings of up to 20% can be achieved without
much additional investments.
In  the cars industry, reductions in energy intensity   from   10%   to   15%   are
predicted for the years of 2010-2020 based on a wide range of measures, such as
lower car weights, lower rolling and air resistance, etc. Improved aerodynamic
resistance of heavy vehicles and aircraft can bring about even larger energy savings of
20-30% per unit of transport.
The improvement in the energy intensity of petrol-engines is possible with the
application of new and advanced engine technology. A reduction in energy
consumption of about  15% to 30% is possible by packaging technologies, comprising
lean burn combustion, varying valve timing, adding valves per cylinder, considering
multi-point injection, and ratifying combustion engine with direct injection. Diesel
engines are already very efficient in heavy vehicles and their potential energy savings
is no more than  10-20% in the long term. An improvement of about 30 percent in fuel
efficiency is expected in the aircraft industry by 2010.
Strategic measures will optimize the use of individual vehicles and the
transport system, and complement the operational measures mentioned above.
Improving travel routes and vehicle load factors are the main goals to be achieved.
Demand reduction can be achieved by land use planning and travel
substitution. Land-use planning covers the places where people live and work, in
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combination with the places where goods and services are produced and sold. Travel
substitution involves the provision of access to services without the need for traveling
(tele-working, video-conferencing, etc.).
For this sector a technical energy saving potential of about 33 Mtoe in the
medium term (2010) and 57 Mtoe in the long-term (2020) is estimated, compared to
business as usual.  This is about 38%  and  111% of the 1996 transport consumption.
The economic potential in 2020 will be about 36 MTOE, which is about 69% of 1996
energy consumption of transport sector. However, the economic potential in this
sector can only be realized when policy adjustments are implemented. The market
potential is much lower, so intervention is required.
Next, the main energy saving policies applied in the United Kingdom are
discussed.
Table 7-2. Energy prices and taxes in the United Kingdom in 2000 in US$/liter
Fuel type Price Tax End-user Tax as % of
component component price final price
Unleaded gasoline 0.296 0.913 1.209 75.5
Gas oil: commercial 0.314 0.730 1.044 69.9
Gas oil: non-commercial 0.315 0.915 1.23 74.4
Light fuel oil 0.263 0.062 0.325 19.2
Natural gas: residential* 278.7 14.1 292.8 4.8
Electricity. residential** 0.102 0.005 0.107 4.8
Source: IAE/OECD, Energy prices and taxes, 2001;
*  dollar per  107  kilo Calorie;  **  Dollar per kWh.
7.4.3 Energy Saving Policies in the UK
In the UK not only prices of energy contribute to energy conservation, but also many
non-price policies promote energy saving. In the following, the main institutional and
regulatory policies are addressed.
•   Prices and taxes
End-user prices in the UK are high compared to many other countries and they are
considerably higher than the international market prices. This is due to the high taxes
and levies on energy consumption. For gasoline and gas oil in the non-commercial
sector taxes contribute about 75 percent to the end-user prices; see Table 7-2 for an
overview of energy prices. This high level of energy prices not only lead economic
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agents to demand energy services more rationally, they also induce them to invest in
energy conservation options.
• Energy efficiency agencies
The focal attention of these institutions is on promoting energy efficiency. All EU
countries have set up national, regional and/or local agencies.
• National programs of energy efficiency
The energy efficiency program is a national program that aims at 20% reduction in
CO2 emissions by 2015, taking the 1990 level as starting point. The main contribution
to this reduction has to come from energy savings.
• Building codes
Energy efficiency standards are defined in building codes and are mandatory in the
UK for both residential and non-residential buildings. The European Commission has
provided the latest building code directives to all member countries. The thermal
building codes are mandatory and a building certificate is compulsory.
•    Labeling and efficiency standards for appliances
These two policies are complementary. Mandatory labeling for most electrical
appliances exits in all EU countries and is based on the same regulation in all
countries. The regulations are based on EU directives and have replaced the existing
regulations. Labeling of refrigerators, washing machines, and lamps, and of all cold
and wet appliances is compulsory (WEC, 200lb, p 135). Also efficiency standards
known as minimum energy performance standard (MEPS) are mandatory for some
appliances in the EU countries. For refrigerators MEPS are mandatory, but for
washing machines voluntary. Average electricity consumption of new appliances has
been  decreasing  for 30 years  in  the  UK  from  710  kWh/y  in  1975  to  645  kWWy  in
1995 (WEC, 2001b, p 136).
• Fiscal measures
Fiscal policies include taxes on car purchases, car ownership, fuel, road user charges,
scrapping old cars, and the introduction of clean and efficient cars. Car purchase tax
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exists in the UK, although the amount of tax is very low compared to other European
countries, especially Denmark. (The car purchase tax without the value added tax in
Denmark is about US$ 16,000.)
In the UK consumers have to register their car every year and pay car
ownership tax of more than US$ 150. Among the European countries, the UK tax is
relatively low. There is no road pricing in the UK and highways are generally free of
charge. It is estimated that the specific taxes paid over the lifetime of a car is US$
11,840 (WEC, 20014 p 85).
Income tax relief related to journeys to work is applied in the UK. In this
country the tax relief is, however, limited either in terms of distance or by allowing it
for public transport use only.
•   Subsidies and economic incentives
A new institution, the Carbon Trust, has been set up in early 2001 and is
responsibility for a program of energy efficiency support measures for businesses.
New taxation measures support this institution. The climate change levy is a major
new energy related tax, applied since April 2001. The levy is expected to raise 1
billion British Pounds in the first year. Investment enabling measures, including an
enhanced  capital allowance scheme, gives capital allowances  of  up   to   100%   in  the
first year for approved energy saving instruments in the corporation or income tax bill
(WEC, 2001b, p164).
•   Policies on Cars
A road tax exists in the UK, and before March 2001 it was € 147 for cars less than
1200  ec,  and €  224  for cars  over  1200 cc.  This has been changed,  and  the tax  is now
based on the amount of CO2 emitted. For petrol cars it is between € 140 and € 217,
and between € 154 and 224 for diesel cars (WEC, 200 tb, p 174).
•   Clean and efficient cars
Subsidies and some economic incentives are considered to promote electric and CNG
cars in the UK.
Next we discuss the Dutch energy policy.
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7.4.4 Energy Saving Prospects in the Netherlands
Several energy conservation studies have been conducted for the Netherlands, with a
national as well as a local scope, and for different time horizons. The method used
was either bottom-up or top-down. In order to have a comparison o f the potentials we
reproduce the estimates of the studies as reported in "Integrated evaluation of energy
conservation: national report for the Netherlands" (Uyterlinde et al., 1999).
Table 7-3. Technical and techno-economic energy conservation potential  as  a
percentage of energy demand for various sectors
1 090 2015
Techno-economic Technical Technical
Sectors Optimum Optimum Optimum
Industry 11.4 20.0 28.5
Agriculture 24.5 68.6 76.9
Dwellings 34.5 42.5 44.0
Services 28.1 38.0 59.9
Transport 10.0 17.1 28.2
Total 20.9 32.2 41.0
Source: Uyterlinde et. at., 1999, p 54.
TNO Study
The Netherlands Institute for Applied Research on Natural Sciences (TNO) has
carried out a study entitled "TNO-Energy saving potentials 2015". This 1990 study
calculated a technical and a techno-economic conservation potential for the year 1990
and a technical optimum for the year of 2015 using a bottom-up approach for twelve
economic sectors. The techno-economic energy conservation potential is based on the
profitability and the technical feasibility of presently available technologies, while the
2015 technical conservation potential is based on a 100% penetration of technically
feasible options. So the latter will overestimate the conservation potential. The base
year is 1986. The energy saving potential is reported in Table 7-3. The TNO study
shows a pattern similar to the UK results discussed above, the techno-economic
potential is between 35% and 81% of the technical feasibility.
ICARUS-3
The ICARUS-3 study was conducted by Utrecht University for the Dutch Ministry of
Economic Affairs, had a national scope, and covered all economic sectors and energy
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carriers. It uses a bottom-up approach and considers a wide range of detailed
technology options for energy conservation. Cost-effectiveness is considered
sufficient to invest and analysis is at the level of economic sectors. The base year is
1990 and the sight years are the year 2000, which is based on currently commercially
available techniques, and the year 2015, based on technology development
assumptions and pre-specified price development assumptions.
Table 74 contains the conservation potential in each sector that can be
achieved based on a combination of technical availability and cost-effectiveness.
Since in the long-term improved technologies become available and market
penetration is increasing, the conservation potential as a percentage of total
consumption is increasing. The total conservation potential for 2000 was 30% of the
primary energy, while it is estimated at 65% until 2015.
Table 7-4. Energy conservation potentials by economic sectors in the Netherlands [%]
1990 - 2000 1990- 2015
Sectors Fuel Power Fuel PowerPrimary Primary
energy energy
Industry           26          20          24           38           26          35
Agriculture 47 44 46 75 57 73
Services           41           40          40           74           52          65
Households 42 40 41 76 35 64
Transport          17           19           17           45           37          45
Total                    30               30              30               52               36              49
Source: Uyterlinde, 1999, p 44.
CENECA
The Dutch Central planning Bureau has developed the CENECA model. A macro-
economic perspective is considered, and energy taxation is modeled to affect the
national economy as whole. This study  is a top-down analysis.  The base year  is  1990
and the sight years are 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015.  In this study the effects of energy
taxes on energy conservation have been studied. The results with respect to energy
conservation due to these taxes are in Table 7-5. Scenario A assumes a 50% increase
of energy tax on prevailing energy prices of fossil fuels in the OECD area, while
scenario B reflects a 50% tax increase in the Netherlands only.
What is surprising in the results of this study is the low savings potential of
households in comparison to most other studies. This indicates that for this sector
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energy pricing measures (the only policy implemented in this study) need to be
accompanied by other policies to achieve the full conservation potential.
Table 7-5. Energy saving by sectors as percentage of energy demand [%]







Source: Uyterlinde, 1999, p 58.
REDUCE model
The "Reduction of Energy Demand by Utilization of Conservation of Energy" or
REDUCE model uses a bottom-up approach and takes into account all techno-
economic aspects of energy conservation options (Uyterlinde et al., 1999). In this
model the driving forces for energy conservation are cost-effectiveness, rates of
return, payback periods, etc. The base year for the analysis is 1995, and two sectors,
households and manufacturing, are analyzed. The forecasts of energy demand are
reported in three scenarios, i.e. "energy use without saving", "actual baseline", and
the "saving case". The actual baseline is the energy demand corrected for energy
conservation reached by conservation equipment installed in the base year. Table 7-6
contains the energy saving in 2020 as a percentage of the actual baseline demand for
household and manufacturing.
Table 7-6. Conservation potential in 2020 as a percent of baseline demand
Sector Economical Technical
Household 10-30                                     50
Manufacturing*                             17                               21
* Unaffected industries and non-energy use of energy demand is excluded.
Source: Uyterlinde et. al., 1999; based on the REDUCE model.
In REDUCE two types of energy savings are distinguished, technical and
economic (based on a sufficient IRR). In 2020 in the household sector the energy
savings potentials are for lighting 25% (technical 50%), for cooling 35% (technical
85%), for cooking 20% (technical 35%), for appliances 35% (technical 55%), for
216
washing and drying 15% (technical 35%), and for hot water 25% (technical 50%) of
the baseline energy demand in 2020.
For the Dutch manufacturing sector, a total  of 153 technology options  have
been specified, of which 56 options are in the unprofitable range with an internal rate
of return (IRR) of below 10% or even negative. Forty-eighth options have an IRR
greater than or equal to 40%, and the rest is in between. However, energy tax policies
as well as subsidies make a wider set of options economically viable.
The studies show different types of outcomes and different magnitudes of savings
potential. All use rigorous energy modeling to obtain the results, but the decision
criterion for a technology to become feasible may be too optimistic. The market
potential perspective as used in the UK seems missing. What can be learned, however,
is that energy-pricing policies alone are insufficient to achieve the full energy savings
potential.
7.4.5 Energy Saving Policies in the Netherlands
In their attempts to protect the environment by conserving energy, the Dutch
authorities apply a wide variety of policy instruments. These include prices, taxes,
subsidies, and mandatory and voluntary agreements.
•   Fuel prices and taxes
The prices of final energy in the Netherlands are very far from their border prices
because of high taxes on fossil fuels. The price of gasoline for end-users in the
Netherlands   is,   at   more   than    1 US$ per liter, about 6 times the international   spot
market price. Table 7-7 shows the market prices and the shares of taxes in these
prices.
The high prices of energy for end-users increases the profitability of
conservation options. In the REDUCE model it was shown that an additional 8% of
the reference energy consumption carl be conserved in response to an average price
increase of about 45% (Uyterlinde, et. al; 1999, p 123).
In the Netherlands there is also a green electricity policy in place. The users of
green electricity, which is electricity produced from renewable energy sources, are
exempted from some of the energy taxes, this to make them more competitive.
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Table 7-7. Energy price and tax components in the Netherlands in US$/liter in 2000
Price Tax Tax as % of
Fuel type component component final price
Final price
Unleaded gasoline 0.362 0.708 1.070 66.2
Gas oil: commercial 0.341 0.324 0.665 48.7
Gas oil: non-commercial 0.385 OA97 0.882 56.3
Light fuel oil 0.309 0.210 0.519 40.5
Natural gas: residential* 232.5 126.9 359.4 35.3
Electricity: residential** 0.091 0.040 0.131 30.6
Electricity: industry** 0.055 0.002 0.057 3.8
Source: IAE/OECD, Energy prices and taxes, 2001,
*  US$ per 107 kilo Calorie;  **  US$ per kWh.
• Energy efficiency agencies
The focal attention of these institutions is on promoting energy efficiency. Most
activities are coordinated by the Novem organization, an agent of the Dutch Ministry
of Economic Affairs. Novem mainly works for the Dutch government (Ministry of
Economic Affairs (EZ); Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM);
Transport, Public Works and Water Management (V&W) and Agriculture, Nature
Management and Fisheries (LNV)), but also carries out a variety of international tasks
for clients such as the International Energy Agency, the European Union, United
Nations and the World Bank (http://www.novem.org/). Novem has four offices in the
Netherlands (WEC, 20014 p 55) Novem focuses on four specific themes (closely
related to the ministries mentioned before), sustainable building, sustainable energy
supply, sustainable industry, and sustainable transport. The organization acts as
intermediary between the government and market forces (both industry and end-
users). Novem therefore works closely with various industrial sectors (construction,
energy, agricultural, transport), as well as local and provincial authorities, and
research institutes (http://www. novem.org/).
• Subsidies
Direct or so-called transparent subsidy on energy conservation is an effective
instrument. Subsidies are paid for specific conservation options in the Netherlands,
either as a grant or as low rate credits. Using the REDUCE model, paying 30 percent
of the investment needed for a conservation option, leads to large additional
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conservation in households and industries (up to 20% points extra, Uyterlinde, et. al.,
1999, p 117).
Some options in the industry sector that have received subsidies and are
effective in the long turn are:
- process integration to design an optimum heat exchanger network in plants
producing olefins and sodium,
-        introduction of selective cracking  in the production of olefins,
-    enhanced gas recovery in the blast oxygen furnace, and
- extrusion processes in the fodder industry.
The total budget  for  R&D  in the energy sector  was   130.7,129.8,  and   137.4
million US$ in 1995, 1996, and 1997 respectively, of which 36% allocated to energy
conservation in different sectors (Ministry of Economics Affairs, 2000).
• Regulations
Besides financial instruments, regulatory instruments play an important role to attain
further efficiency improvements. Actually these regulations can help to close the gap
between the realized energy saving and the technically available potentials. Building
codes, and environmental and efficiency standards are mandatory in the Netherlands.
It is believed that present market shares of many conservation options in the market
for individual central heating have been reached because of a combination of
subsidies and regulation.
Also another, softer and therefore less intervening form of regulation is
applied in the Netherlands, the so-called Voluntary Agreements (VAs) which leave
large degrees of freedom for the branches or companies to decide on how an agreed
energy efficiency level can be achieved. The advantage of this approach is that the
companies in a sector formulate and implement the best way to achieve an agreed
upon energy conservation target, instead of the government formulating explicitly
how the conservation goals are to be achieved, utilizing the technological knowledge
ofthose who know best.
• National programs of energy efficiency
There are several national plans on either C02 reduction or energy efficiency
improvement. The so-called Third White Paper program aims for 33% energy
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efficiency improvement (1.50% every year) for the period 1995-2020. Another
program entitled Action Program Energy Conservation 1992-2002,     aims     for
increasing energy efficiency improvement from 1.6% to 2% year.
• Building codes
Thermal energy efficiency standards for new buildings are mandatory since 1995 for
dwellings and other buildings, and they are monitored. The European Commission
has provided the new thermal building codes for the EU member countries, which are
mandatory, and providing a building energy certificate is compulsory.
•    Labeling and efficiency standards for appliances
These two policies are complementary. Mandatory labeling for several electrical
appliances exits in all EU countries and is based on the same regulation. The
regulations are based on EU directives and replaced existing regulations. Labeling on
refrigerators and washing machines is compulsory, and for lamps this is planned
(WEC,  2001 c,  p 213). Since  1999  the  MEPS for refrigerators are mandatory  in  the
Netherlands.
•   Policies on Cars
Car ownership is lower in the Netherlands than in the surrounding countries Belgium
and Germany. The tax level on car purchases in the Netherlands is very high. The
normal  VAT rate applies to the net price, and an additional tax o f 45.2% applies to the
net price. There is an annual ownership tax also, which is based on weight and type of
fuel.
7.4.6 Energy Saving Prospect in Thailand
A study entitled "Thailand energy strategy and policy" has estimated the economic
potential of energy saving in Thailand up to 2025 (ERI, 2000).  It is based on a set of
efficiency assumptions for a business as usual scenario (BAU), that represents the
energy demand associated with the natural development of market forces, and the
effects of currently adopted Thai energy policies and strategies.
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Table 7-8. Energy conservation potential in Thailand
Consumption pattern in 1998 Energy saving in 2025Sector Share in % MTOE* MTOE % of 1998
Transport             39 17.59 12.77               73Industry               32 14.44 6.96                       48Residential             21 9.47 1.38                          15Commercial            4 1.80 1.64                          91
Agricultural                        3 1.35 0.25                          19
Total 100 45.12 23.00                       51
* The primary energy demand is 56.4 MTOE (BP 2001), considering a 20 percent forenergy sector the total final energy demand is split by sectors;Source: Energy Research Institute, 2000.
A conservation case considering all conservation options is used to estimate
the demand for energy in each main economic sector, this to estimate the total
conservation potential. Table 7-8 shows the energy conservation potential in 2025 as a
percentage of energy consumption in 1998. The most promising sectors for
conservation are commercial and transport in which the conservation potential in
2025 is estimated at 90.8% and 72.6% of 1998's consumption respectively. The total
amount of energy  that can be conserved  in 2025 is expected  to be about  51%  of the
consumption in 1998.
Table 7-9. The cumulative reduction as percentage of BAU consumption   [%]
Year Transport Industry Commercial Residential2000 2.4 1.0 0.2 0.12005 5.7 4.0 1.9 0.82010 10.1 8.0 6.1 2.02015 15.5 14.0 12.5 3.22020 21.8 18.0 16.1 3.72025 29.6 21.0 18.9 4.2Source: Energy Research Institute, 2000
Thailand's conservation goals for 2025 are much less than the savings
potential, see Table 7-9. The percentages show the cumulative reduction of energy as
a percentage of a sector's BAU consumption for five-year periods. In the transport
sector the cumulative percent of conservation is estimated to be about 29.6% of the
BAU consumption. The energy savings potentials in industry and commercials are
expected to be 21.0% and  18.9% of the BAU consumption in 2025 respectively. Note
that primary energy consumption of Thailand has been about 56.4 million BOE in
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1998.  So, the ratio of energy savings potential to energy consumption of 1998 is about
40%.
7.4.7 Energy Saving Policies in Thailand
The energy conservation strategy in Thailand encompasses a combination of pricing,
information and awareness, financial and technical incentives, assistance, and
mandatory regulation. Various types of regulation (compulsory, voluntary and
complementary) are used in Thailand. Minimum efficiency standards for new
fluorescent lamps, and energy reporting, audit and action plan requirements for
designated buildings and factories are among the mandatory regulations. The
promotion of the purchase of energy efficient equipment, and the associated financial
incentives are among the voluntary regulations. Energy management training
programs, general awareness programs, technology demonstrations, energy efficiency
research and studies are part of the complementary instruments in Thailand.
Table 7-10. Prices of petroleum products in Thailand in 2002 US$ per liter
Petroleum products End-user Tax As %  of price
Gasoline 0.35 0.13 35.92
Kerosene 0.36 0.10 28.08
Heavy diesel 0.31 0.09 29.51
Light diesel 0.30 0.09 30.95
Fuel oil 0.23 0.02 10.10
Source: NEPO, 2002a and author's calculations.
•   Prices and taxes
The prices of energy carriers differ from the border prices. The domestic prices of
petroleum products include many taxes and levies. To the ex-refinery prices a 10%
excise tax, a municipal tax, and a contribution for an oil fund and a conservation fund
result in the wholesale prices. The consumer prices, see Table 7-10, further include a
value added tax and a marketing margin.
Compared to prices in Europe, Thailand's prices are relatively low, but they
are considerably higher than the international free market prices. These prices result
in an acceptable IRR for many conservation projects, and at the same time are sources
of funding for energy conservation projects.
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• Energy efficiency agencies
The National Energy Policy Office (NEPO) is responsible for financing energy
conservation policies via the Energy Conservation Promotion (or ENCON) Fund
(NEPO, 2002a).
• Subsidies
Subsidies are funded out of the oil fund and the conservation fund. Resources from
these funds are allocated to many conservation projects, for specifics see NEPO
(2002b). The size of the funds from tax on petroleum products was about $350
million in 1999 and the allocations from the funds are to the private as well as the
public sector. The funds provide financial assistance to cover up to 50% of the cost of
energy conservation plans,   with a maximum  of US$ 12,000  (WEC,  2001 a,  p  93).
Applying the simple payback method shows that on average the payback time of
investments in government buildings, designated buildings, and factories is about 2
years (WEC, 2001b, p 152).
• Building codes
Thermal energy efficiency standards for buildings are mandatory and the provision of
an efficiency certificate is required since1995.
•    Labeling and efficiency standards for appliances
Labeling of refrigerators and air conditioners is compulsory; the latter labeling
scheme is based on the one used in Australia. Also voluntary comparison labeling
programs exist and have proved their effectiveness (WEC, 200 l a, p 72).
7.4.8   Comparing the three countries
Conservation options are mostly analyzed per economic sector and as a result
conservation potentials are therefore estimated per economic sector rather than per
energy carrier. Most studies use a modeling framework to compare the conservation
scenarios that result from policy changes with the BAU scenario.
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Table 7-11. Economically viable energy conservation potential   as a percentage   o f
consumption in the base year or baseline forecast [%]
9 0 . 4 4
al 0              0            +            2.           4g  E.  1 S  2  8
Country
4 2 8 8 / - Note
UK 38.0 30.0 24.0 69.0 - - Conservation in 2020,
base year  1996
Netherlands 28.5 44.0 59.9 28.2 76.0 41.0 TNO: Conservation in
2015, base year 1986
Netherlands 35.0 64.0* 65.0 45.0 73.0 49.0 ICARUS: conservation in
2015, baseyear 1990
10.0- REDUCE: ConservationNetherlands 170 -          -         -         -
30.0 in 2020, baseline forecast
Thailand 48.3 14.6* 90.8 72.3 18.9 50 9 Conservation in 2025,
base  year  1998
* Residential.
There are two ways to present the conservation potential: (i) the
conservation potential can be calculated as a percentage of the BAU in each year, or
(ii) the conservation potential is expressed as a percentage of the base year energy
consumption. Both types of analysis have merit. However, type (ii) is most useful in
case one cannot (easily) assign the conservation potential on a year-to-year basis. The
latter is often the case when the analysis is based on technology specifications (the
engineering or bottom-up approach).
Table 7-11 summarizes the savings potentials of the various studies. Note that
we could easily add many more. However, for our analysis this is not required. We
discussed these studies, which are each typical representatives of conservation studies,
only to demonstrate that countries that already have a history of energy conservation
and high prices (the United Kingdom and the Netherlands), as well as countries with
moderate energy prices and that only recently introduced energy conservation
measures, both have a large conservation potential.
All technology based studies show that over a period of more than two
decades, the conservation potentials are considerable. The transportation sector seems
to have the largest conservation potential, ranging from 28% to 69% of base year
consumption. The service sector, except for the UK, shows a high capacity for
conservation also. 24% to 90% of base year consumption. Other sectors show a
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considerable savings potential too, assuming the correct energy conservation policies
are implemented.
Note that all studies distinguish technical and economic energy conservation
estimates and that the latter are sensitive to the assumptions made on economic
decision criteria. As the difference between the economic and the market potential for
the UK shows, all policies require additional regulation and support on top of price
incentives to make them successful.
Note that Table 7-11 does not contain the only top-(town analysis based on the
CENECA model. This study shows the effects of energy tax increases and of
coordination between OECD countries. The role of new technologies was not
introduced explicitly. The conservation potential is analyzed for fuels and electricity
for industry and households, and especially industry shows a large potential (58.7%
for fuels and 32.8% for electricity in case of OECD coordinated policy), but only
5.7% and 3.5% respectively for households.
However, as was pointed out by Grubb et al. (1993, 433-437), engineering
studies tend to be more optimistic than top-down studies. The engineering studies
tend to ignore essential feedbacks, whereas top-down studies tend to ignore the
specifics of technology.
Another interesting point is to notice that Thailand, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom have a high savings potential, despite large differences in energy
prices. The United Kingdom and The Netherlands have very high prices of energy,
whereas energy prices in Thailand were at the time of the study similar to those  in the
United States.
In Table 7-12 the various policies used are reviewed. Fuel taxes are very large
in the United Kingdom and The Netherlands, but less so in Thailand. In all countries
there is a mix of price based policies and regulations. In all countries the government
is very active in implementing energy conservation policies, and in monitoring their
effects and the compliance by energy users. For the implementation and monitoring
special organizations have been established that are (relatively) independent of the
government. These are considered necessary to ensure the success of the energy
policies.
The conservation estimations reported here are very specific; they cover
different periods, are based on different sets of technologies, and use different
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methods. Therefore, they cannot be used for other countries, but can only be used as a
crude guideline of what savings potential can be expected.
Table 7-12 Summary ofenergy efficiency policies
Description UK Netherlands Thailand
Energy saving institutions 1 NR NR         N
National program on energy Yes Yes Yes
efficiency
Thermal Building codes Mandatory Mandatory
and Mandatory and
monitored certificate
Labelling and energy Mandatory and Mandatory and Mandatoryefficiency standard monitored monitored
Fiscal measures on cars 2 PT, RT PT, RT
Subsidies and incentives for Conservation
clean and efficient cars 3 EC,
CC EC
projects
Tax on fuels 4 A, 0.91, 0.73 A, 0.71, 0.73 A, 0.13, 0.09
Energy audits 5 D, C D, C, G
1.   N, R, and L stand for national, regional and local agencies respectively.
2.   PT and RT stand for purchase tax and registration tax respectively.
3.   EC and CC stand for electric cars and CNG cars.
4.   A shows that tax exists for all fuels; the first and second numbers denoting tax on
gasoline and gas oil in dollar per litter respectively.
5. D, C and G stand for dwellings, commercial, and Governmental buildings
respectively; in some cases the cost is partly paid by consumers and in some cases
the audit is conditional on receiving a subsidy; Source:  WEC, 2001 c.
We conclude that these countries show a large energy conservation potential.
They have in common (i) good non-price regulatory policies, and (ii) an extended
network of conservation institutions. They do, however, differ with respect to energy
price levels and targeted energy pricing policies (providing acceptable IRRs for
conservation projects). For Iran these countries can serve as an example on how to
construct and implement its energy conservation policy. The case of Thailand shows
that, from an Iranian point of view, extremely high energy prices are not required for
a successful energy conservation policy, although the prices in the RS-scenario still
seem to be low.
Next, we discuss the energy conservation potential for Iran, based on the
potentials discussed above and information from preliminary studies done for Iran.
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7.5 Energy Conservation Potential of Iran
In recent years energy conservation potentials for Iran have been studied and even
some policy initiatives were ratified in the second (1995-1999) and the third (2000-
2004) five-year development plan. The Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of
Petroleum are responsible for the implementation of the energy conservation policy.
The technical and economic conservation potential has not been estimated for
the Iranian economy as a whole, but some case/sector studies are available. We will
use these estimates in combination with the information on other countries to
guesstimate conservation potential for Iran. In what follows the energy saving
potential based on current prices and regulations are discussed per sector. This will be
used to guess the conservation potential for the whole of Iran, using tables 7-11 and 7-
12 also.
• Residential & Commercial sector
The main energy carriers used in this sector are petroleum products and natural gas;
their shares are 47.3% and 39.9% respectively. This sector has a high potential for
energy conservation. Iran has implemented hardly any policies on efficient electrical
appliances, double-glazing, residential tags, or building codes. Also awareness
programs for the Residential & Commercial sector for efficient appliances and more
energy efficient ways to live and cook are absent. There is no comprehensive study
with estimates of the technical or economic energy conservation potential for this
sector. However, with a good energy policy on prices and regulation, Iran's
conservation potential in this sector in 2020 could be as high as 90% of the
consumption of 2002, the base year. Note that this assumes that prices have been
brought to at least the level of the RS-scenario. As a result, this conservation potential
can only be tapped after 2007 when higher energy prices are in place.
• Industry
According  to  the 1995 census, the manufacturing sector  with  more  than 50 workers
comprises 2,263 establishments (SCI, 1997). The majority of these industrial
establishments are active in textiles and in metallic products, both energy intensive
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industries with a large savings potential. Non-metallic mineral products show a large
potential for energy conservation also.
The energy saving potential of the industrial sector is estimated at 7-8% of the
current consumption when applying low-cost techniques. This level of conservation
can be achieving during the next 5 years. In cement, glass, textiles, and food and
beverages, the short  run  low cost conservation potentials are estimated  at   10%,   10%,
8-9%, and 10% respectively. The amount of potential energy saving in 26 factories of
the textile industry is estimated at about 5.8% in spinning, 4.9% in weaving, and
19.2% in the finishing industries (Ministry of Energy, 1998). The total conservation
potential is estimated at 29% of the current consumption level when applying best
practice technologies. This 29% can be achieved within five years. For the period till
2020 Iran's conservation potential is estimated at about 48% of the base year energy
consumption.
• Transportation
With a share  of 40%  (in   1998), the transportation sector  is the largest consumer  of
petroleum products in Iran. This sector has a high potential for energy conservation,
since Iran's car fleet is highly inefficient. In order to achieve a high level of energy
saving in this sector it is necessary to execute an effective conservation program.
Energy saving should aim at (i) lowering the demand for trips, (ii) renewing the fleet
(with more efficient cars), and (iii) changing the ratio of private use and public
transportation.
Iran's fleet of gasoline cars is very old and mainly produced by domestic
factories according to old specifications, based on inefficient techniques. Only about
10% of the fleet consists of new cars with modern fuel-efficient engines. The larger
part  of the fleet consumes  13  to 15 liter of gasoline  per 100 kilometers, whereas  the
best practice elsewhere in the world is 5.5-7 liter.
Changing the current fleet by replacing old cars by modern efficient ones can
save about 46% of the gasoline consumed  in the transport sector. The saving potential
of gasoline was about 32 million BOE in 1998, which is about 20% of the
consumption in the transport sector.
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In gas oil-consuming cars the average fuel consumption is about 40 liter per
100 kilometer, whereas it is 35 liter in developed countries (Ministry of Energy,
1999), and even less in the latest designs.




Optimizing consumption of current fleet 8.20
Fleet Replacing new cars by old 6.20
Changing technology of car manufacturing 0.37
Changing the pattern of Passenger developing 3.60
from Tehran to other cities
Passenger Increasing public transport 2.80
Traffic Changing the pattern of Passenger developing 0.45
from Tehran to countryside
Increasing the share  of rail road 0.30
Decreasing mileage of cars without cargo 2.68
Decreasing the double transporting of cargo 1.83
Cargo Traffic Increasing the share of rail road 0.48Management of cargo transportation in ports 0.43
Increasing the share of pipeline in the petroleum 0.24
products delivery
Miscellanies Developing nationwide road network 2.94
Developing communication system 1.75
Total 32.04
Source: Ministry ofEnergy, 1999.
The conservation potential can be further increased by developing a healthy
public transport system, decreasing the numbers of cars with only one person,
increasing the number of restricted traffic zones (a zone with limited access for
private cars) in the big cities, and improving fuel quality.
A  study by the Department of Energy Affairs of the Ministry of Energy (1999)
has shown that a cost-effective potential of conservation related to road inter-state and
total road transportation were 22.9 and 32.0 million BOE respectively. The latter
figure includes the potential of conservation in transportation in the cities, but does
not include intra state traffic. Their ratios of potential conservation to energy
consumption were about 13% and 19% respectively in 1998. Table 7-13 shows the
estimation of potential conservation  in  the road transportation.
We can conclude that the long-term savings potential for this sector is very
high, especially with additional fuel price policy and fiscal incentives for public
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transport. Based on international studies by the World Bank and reported by the
Ministry of Energy (1999) Iran's energy conservation potential in 2020 could be more
than 70% of the base year consumption.
• Agriculture
There are no estimations of the conservation potential in Iran's agriculture sector.
This sector is not very energy intensive and to some extent its methods are very
traditional. Therefore, it is not expected that this sector can contribute much to the
conservation potential. Based on Table  7-110 we consider the lowest estimated value
of 19% of the base year consumption as the energy conservation potential.
• Energy conservation as a percentage of total final energy demand
Since Iran has not seriously implemented energy conservation measures yet, the
conservation potential in different sectors in Iran is most likely higher than in the
countries reviewed. Based on Table  7-11  and the discussion of the Iranian situation it
seems save to assume that the energy conservation potential in 2020  is 40% of total
final energy consumption in 2002 (the base year). Of course, we assume that the
energy prices in Iran are increased to the border prices and are kept on that level.
We want to investigate if more energy conservation is feasible and whether
this could result in more economic benefits. To be on the conservative side and given
the fact that Iran's increased energy prices are still relatively low, we assume that the
conservation potential of total final energy demand is 32% ofthe final energy demand
in the RF scenario in 2020.
Note that this 32% energy demand reduction in 2020 of RF scenario is
equivalent to the 40% final energy demand reduction of the final energy demand in
the year 2002 in the RS scenario.
• Power generation and transmission
Iran's power sector shows high levels of energy loss. In electricity generation, the
average efficiency is much lower than the best practice in other parts of the world.
Therefore, a tremendous amount of energy can be conserved in the power sector.
Table 7-13 represents the average efficiency of different types of power plants in
1998. The average efficiency of the steam plants included in the grid is 33.5%, and
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only 29.5% for the plants that are operated outside the grid. In these plants the
maximum achievable efficiencies are 39% and 36% percent respectively.
The efficiency of gas turbine plants lies in the range of 22.6% to 30.1%. The
best available technology is the combined cycle technology, which can achieve
efficiencies of more than 40%.
The overall efficiency of Iran's electricity generation is currently about 30%.
The completion of the steam phase of CCGT plants would improve the overall
efficiency. It is assumed that from year 2008 till 2020 the efficiency is 10% higher
than in the RS scenario. This is translated to an average overall efficiency of 33%.
Table 7-13. Efficiency of thermal power plants in Iran in 1998 [%]
Average Maximum Minimum No. ofType System Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency Plants
Integrated in grid 33.5 39.0 23.0              15Steam
Out of grid 29.5 36.0 25.1                 3
Gas Integrated in grid 30.1 41.0' 16.2              22
turbine Out ofgdd 22.6 25.8 16.2               10
Integrated in grid 30.0               -                                     -Diesel
Out of grid 31.0                 -                    -                    -
Source: Ministry of Energy,  1999.* Gillan Combined Cycled Gas Turbine (CCGT) power plant.
Table 7-14. Transmission and distribution losses and self-consumption of plants [%]
Year Transmission Distribution Self Total
Loss Loss Consumption1967                  1.2 14.0 5.5 20.7
1987 3.3 9.3 4.8 17.4
1997 3.8 11.2 5.0 20.01998                 5.1 10.4 4.6 20.1Source: Ministry of Energy,  1999
Decreasing the loss of electricity transmission and distribution is another
opportunity for energy conservation in the electricity sector; Table 7-14 shows that
about 20% of gross electricity is lost and/or consumed in the transmission and
distribution systems. We assume that these losses  can be decreased  to   15% of gross
electricity generated, which is still far from the losses in efficiently operated
transmission systems in Europe, where losses and own consumption are mostly below
10%.
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.   Oil refineries
The loss of fuels in Iran's oil refineries is on average about 12.2% of the oil feed; also
see Eq. 6.37. The lowest loss rate in refineries in the world is about 5%. Therefore, it
is assumed that Iranian refineries can save at least 2.2% more, which means that only
10% of the feed will be lost. This is equivalent to a transformation factor of 1.11  Eq
6.37.
7.6 Further Improving Iran's Energy Basket
As was mentioned before, under the RS scenario energy and economic efficiency are
expected to improve considerably with respect to the BAU scenario. (Total energy
savings  were  17%  of BAU.) In Section  7.4 we showed that there  is  more  room  for
energy conservation in Iran and in Section 7.3 we showed that, even in the RS
scenario, Iran's domestic price of one composite barrel  of petroleum products in 2020
would still be below the current price in the US. With the current US price among the
lowest in the world, especially when compared to European prices, there is room for
upwards price adjustments in Iran. This can be used to support a more comprehensive
energy conservation policy, the design of which is beyond the scope of this research.
What we can do, however, is analyze the effect of the conservation potential indicated
for Iran in Section 7.5. We call this the improved or IM scenario.
The IM scenario is energy conservation that, in our opinion, can be achieved
on top of the RS scenario with good policy support, but without additional fuel price
increases. Since the fuel price increases will be the main drive for energy savings in
the period 2002-2007, we assume that the additional energy conservation would be
realized from 2008 to 2020. We will use the distribution of fuels in the energy basket
of 2007 to distribute the overall energy savings over the different fuels. Note that all
formulas are based on BOE, and that for notational simplicity the conversion factors
are not stated. The conversion factors used are those reported in Chapter 6.
As we concluded in Section 7.5 we assume that an additional 40% of the final
energy demand in 2002 under the RS scenario can be saved by 2020, that is total final
energy demand under the IM scenario TFED; o is the same variable under the RS
scenario minus 40% of the final demand in under the RS scenario in 2002
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Dj,ZS denotes the annual fuel demand by power plants per fuel type in the RS
scenario.
Conservation in the transmission and transformation is formulated as follows
ETCOm =1 1* 100 (7.7)(ELEC7     ELEC7  1
C EF,Rs 1.0625EP;RS  
ETCOr denotes the amount of electricity conserved in the IM scenario due to
improved transmission and distribution. ELEC  is calculated as discussed in Section
7.5. To calculate the gross electricity demand i.e. the gross production of electricity at
ELEC
power stations we use - as discussed in Chapter 6. Ef in 1998 was 80%,
EF RS
based on 20% losses and own use in distribution and transmission. With a 5% point
improvement we now have 15% losses and own use. To correct for this we introduce
the factor 85/80 = 1.0625.
Using equations (7.6) and (7.7) the improved demand for energy carriers in the
power sector can be calculated. Total energy conservation in electricity system is
deducted from the fuels demand based on the fuel shares (Sjt) in the RS scenario.
Dj 7    =  (Dj     -  Sj    (EGCO7   +  ETCO/   ))   with j e {GSOILE, FOILE, NGE}
and ES.r = 1 (7.8)
The total demand for petroleum products in the IM scenario can be calculated as
TPPCm =Ipi,IM (7.9)
with i E {JETF, LPG, GSLN, KER,GSOIL, FOIL, GSOILE, FOILE}. Taking into
account the improvement in the refinery sector, the primary demand for oil becomes
DOILD:M  = 1.11 TPPC (7.10)
Using (7.5) and (7.8), the primary demand for natural gas can be calculated as
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TFED'Ao  =TFEDZo -(0.40TFED;L:) (7.2)
We assign this savings potential to the period 2008-2020 using a constant growth rate
f TFE:DIM  )
TFED7 =TFED%,e«'-1001, and r = ln\ mm   /13,  t= 2008,..,2020 (7.3)l TFED=7 1
This results in the total final energy conservation TFCON
TFCO7  =TFEDr -TFEDr (7.4)
The amount of conservation calculated in (7.4) is split over petroleum products,
natural gas, and electricity using the shares of these fuels in the RS scenario. The
improved energy basket is defined as
Dj,w    .tpjfs   -Coj r  j
(7.5)
with Dj; the final demand for energy carrierj at time t under scenario i €  {RS, IM};
Cojr the amount of energy carrier j conserved at  time t under the IM scenario; and
j e {JETF, LPG, GSLN, KER, GSOIL, FOIL, NG, ELEC }.
The conservation in the power sector is calculated for generation, and
transmission and distribution according to the conservation figures of the previous
section. The reduction  in fuel demand  due  to  the 10% increase in efficiency  can  be
expressed as





EGCO,m  is the amount of electricity generation conservation under the IM scenario;
Elt„«,ie„  is the overall efficiency of the power production system in the RS scenario.
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The final demand for petroleum products in 2020 is expected to be 850,000
BOE   per   day,   the same level   as   in   1992. The total conservation on final energy
demand  in  the IM scenario will amount to 4.6 billion BOE compared to RF scenario,
which is 1.5 billion BOE above the RS scenario.
In the IM scenario, it is expected that the efficiency of energy sector is
improved, which contributes a tremendous amount of energy to the savings. Figure 7-
23  shows  that  in  the IM scenario the demand ofoil decreases and is about 1 million
barrel  per day  in 2020, while it slightly increases in the RS scenario and demand in
2020    is 1.33 million barrel per day. Because of the domestic gas market development
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Table 7-23. Total primary energy demand in RS (left) and IM (right) cases
Total primary energy demand (TPED) in 2020 is expected to be 3.41 million
BOE  per  day in the IM scenario, against 4.39 million in the RS scenario, a difference
of  980,000    BOE per day. The total amount of energy conserved in the IM scenario is
6.9  billion BOE against 4.5 billion BOE in the RS scenario, of which on average 40%
is achieved in the energy transformation sector.
Note  that the effect of conserving one BOE of final energy demand results  in a
much larger overall savings  due to lower demand  in the (inefficient) power and
refinery sectors.   One BOE of conservation in the final energy demand sectors results
in 0.56 BOE additional conservation in the energy sector in the IM scenario.
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Using (7.5) and (7.8), the primary demand for natural gas can be calculated as
NGT,   = NG M  + NGE;M  + NGRw (7.11)
The  demand for natural gas in refineries (NGR,) is calculated as explained in Chapter
6. We assume no conservation potential in hydro electricity and in the primary
demand for solid fuels.
7.6.1     Impact of Extra Energy Conservation
From the above  it is obvious  that the effects the extra energy savings have on the
Iranian economy  in  the IM scenario cannot be analyzed within the model. What we
can do, however, is calculate the value of the extra oil available for export and
compare  the main variables, such as, final and primary energy demand, domestic oil
demand, oil export, oil revenue, the amount of conservation, and energy intensity,
under the different scenarios are discussed.
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Table 7-22. Total final energy demand in RS and IM cases over the baseline
Total final energy demand  in 2020 is 4.5, 3.8, and 3.1 MBOE per day in RF,
RS,  and IM scenario respectively. Figure 7-22 shows that in  the IM scenario the
TFED is 68% of the BAU scenario, whereas in the RS scenario this ratio is
considerably higher  (85%).  The main portion, about 68%, of the conservation
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Figure 7-24. Oil revenue in the three scenarios
Figure 7-24 compares the oil revenues (OILR$) in the three scenarios. In all
scenarios  the oil revenues decrease, but in the IM scenario the rate of decrease is very
small. The revenue in 2000  is  US$ 20.17 billion, which will increase to US$ 22.43
billion  in  2008,  and  then will be rather constant to end at US$ 22.38 billion in 2020.
The    revenue    in    RF     and RS cases   are   12.96   and 19.56 billion dollar   in   2020
respectively.
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Figure 7-25. Energy intensities in the three scenarios
Finally, we compare the energy intensities of the three scenarios (Figure 7-25),
since   this   is a widely used indicator.  For the IM scenario,  we use the GDP  of the  RS
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scenario to calculate the energy intensity for this scenario. Note that this will
overestimate the energy intensity for this scenario, since the GDP in the IM scenario
is expected to be higher than in the RS scenario.
7.6.2    Impact of Extra Conservation on GDP
As was mentioned before, more energy conservation could be achieved from 2008 to
2020 through non-pricing policies that support  the new pricing policy. The model
developed in Chapter 6 is not detailed enough to analyze the effects of the IM
scenario. However, a way to indicate the effects additional energy conservation has on
the Iranian economy can be obtained by introducing the excess dollar oil income from
additional oil export in the macro-economic model. Since the effect a higher GDP has
on fuel demand is partly neglected, this effect might be overestimated somewhat.
Note, however, that we do not account for the improved financial policy
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Figure 7-26. Real GDP in the three scenarios
Figure 7-26 shows the effect  of the extra oil revenue on GDP growth in the
RF,  the RS  and the IM scenario. A considerable improvement  in GDP growth is
expected  in  the  IM  case.  The GDP growth is expected to be around  10% in the RF
scenario when approaching 2020,  1.6%  in the RS scenario, and 2% in IM scenario.
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7.7 Conclusions
Increasing domestic energy prices until all implicit energy subsidies are abolished
will. contrary to popular believe, fuel the economy and if supported by an adequate
financial policy reduce inflation considerably. In this scenario of removing implicit
energy subsidies and holding the domestic energy prices at their border prices
provides a tremendous amount of funds for the government, which can be used to
lower inflation through lowering liquidity growth. Furthermore, sufficient government
finances will be available to compensate the poor without the need to issue new high-
powered money. The lower liquidity growth will stabilize Iran's economy, with a
lower Rial exchange rate volatility and inflation. Since the economy is fuelled by a
larger dollar inflow due to the fact that substantially more oil is available for export,
the GDP experiences a faster growth when the implicit energy subsidies are
abolished.
In the subsidy-free scenario, the average annual GDP growth  rate  is  1.11%
higher than in the BAU scenario. In the RS scenario, total earnings from oil export are
expected to be US$ 423.3 billion, 1.26 times the revenues in the BAU scenario.
Because of the much lower domestic inflation in the RS scenario, the value of the Rial
isn't depreciating, but stabilizing around the current parity to the US$.
The performance of the energy sector is even greater. The growth rate of
energy demand in the subsidy-free case is about 3%, or 1.16% lower than in the BAU
scenario, despite the increased growth in GDP. Total conservation would amount to
4.56 billion BOE and staggering amount of US$ 403.04 billion in implicit energy
subsidies would be saved. The energy intensity as an indicator of the economies
energy performances shows a much lower growth rate in the RS scenario, depicting
the fact that both, the economy and the energy sector show better performance.
Although energy prices increase quickly over the period 2002-2006, domestic
energy prices in 2020 would still be much lower than the current prices in countries
like the United States and Thailand. In the RS scenario the price of one composite
barrel of petroleum products in Iran would be US$ 30 in 2020, whereas it is currently
about US$ 44 in the United States and US$141 in the UK.
If Iran's energy pricing policy would be linked to additional conservation
policies as utilized in many countries, the energy conservation potential is even much
larger than in the RS scenario. We analyzed this situation also and an additional 2.33
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billion BOE can be saved, leading to an additional US$ 19.36 billion in oil income
over the period 2008-2020.
The additional energy savings can be achieved by policy measures, such as the
installation of energy efficiency agencies, national energy efficiency programs, a
reduction of losses in the primary energy sector, applying mandatory building codes
and providing compulsory building certificates, labeling and efficiency standards for
appliances, fiscal measures, subsidies, and a comprehensive transport policy.
The energy conservation experiences of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
and Thailand, which combine good pricing and non-pricing policies, show that over a
period of two decades up to 40% of the base year energy consumption is realistically
feasible. Therefore, we conclude that by applying higher energy prices in combination
with implementing good non-price policies, a much higher conservation potential is
available that will result is a better performing economy. This policy is needed to
prevent a rapid decrease of oil dollar revenues and the gradual collapse of the Iranian
economy in the next decade.
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The Islamic Republic of Iran has large energy resources that can and should be used
to improve its economy. Currently Iran's domestic energy policy is based on the idea
that the Iranian people should, as much as possible, benefit from these natural
resources, which is a good idea. However, the way this is currently implemented in
Iran's domestic energy policy is wrong and hampers the efficient and effective use of
the energy resources. The extremely low energy prices in Iran have led to
misallocation of the valuable energy resources and actually do not benefit the Iranian
people as much as they could or should. In addition the excessive domestic
consumption of energy, especially petroleum products, lowers Iran's oil export
capacity since Iran's oil production capacity is limited. To analyse this problem, this
research aimed at identifying the strengths and weaknesses of Iran's domestic energy
sector, as well as its opportunities and threats. For this a SWOT analysis was
conducted for Iran's domestic energy sector. This permitted the formulation of a
domestic energy policy that benefits the Iranian economy in the long-term better than
the current policy does.
The SWOT analysis took into account Iran's domestic circumstances as well
as international developments. Domestically Iran is characterized by strong
population growth, low economic growth, and a too large government sector. In the
latter many still believe that the government can control and run large parts of the
economy -including the industrial sector-, an idea that in most other countries, and
certainly in the economically more successful ones, has been abolished.
The SWOT analysis highlighted in a number of strategic issues for Iran in
general (high inflation, high unemployment, etc.), which cannot or only partly be
243
resolved by an improved domestic energy policy, and strategic issues that are at the
core of Iran's domestic energy policy and can contribute to resolving Iran's economic
problems. The latter, improving domestic energy prices and other measures to save
energy became the central focus of our analysis. The main conclusions and future
research will be discussed next.
Before we discuss these issues, it is important to emphasize again that Iran is
located in a geographical part of the world with many political problems -to name a
few, the Palestinian problem, Iraq, and Afghanistan-, that can easily change the
political setting for our analysis drastically. However, we are convinced that
especially with the worst-case scenario in place, Iran has to implement the new
domestic energy policies suggested and analysed here. Only then the Iranian people
will benefit more and longer than they do now from Iran's rich non-renewable
resources and Iran will have sufficient funds to invest in its non-oil based economy.
This chapter is organized as follows, Section 8.2 summarizes the results, and
Section 8.3 looks at future research.
8.2        Summary of Results
Despite the fact that energy intensities are falling and there is a worldwide search for
alternative forms of energy, the international setting for oil trade remains favorable in
the long term. It will, however, take a very long time before an infrastructure for the
widespread use of other forms of energy is in place and affordable for all. This is
particularly true for the use of petroleum products in transport. The current falling
trend in energy intensity, especially in the rich countries, does not mean that absolute
energy demand shows a negative growth rate, but it is mainly the result of a faster
growing and less energy intensive service sector. On the contrary, with the Asian
economies (especially China) growing fast, energy markets in general and
international oil markets in particular are expected to show continuous growth, despite
international agreements on greenhouse gas emissions, such as the Kyoto protocol.
With the reduction o f oil supply from outside OPEC, the importance of supply
by OPEC will increase. Iran is an important member of OPEC and its production
share will remain regulated within OPEC. However, increasing Iran's future oil
production or even stabilizing it at its current level will be difficult, because its main
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reserves passed their peak production. Keeping the oil flowing will require dollar
inflow for capital investment in production capacity.
The SWOT analysis showed a number of weaknesses when evaluating Iran's
internal conditions in general and its domestic energy market in particular. Clear
general weaknesses are a high population growth rate, large (hidden) unemployment,
low capital formation, slow economic growth, and double-digit inflation resulting in
decreasing real per capita income. Furthermore, the main proportion of Iran's total
population is living in big cities, requiring a growth of employment in Iran's
manufacturing and service sectors.
The average growth rate of domestic energy consumption has been 4.2% for
the period 1977-1998, while GDP showed a growth rate of about  1.2% over the same
period. Final and primary energy consumption has increased rapidly in comparison
with GDP, indicating that energy has been consumed inefficiently in Iran.
The main cause for this strong growth in energy demand is Iran's energy
pricing policy. In Iran energy prices are set by the government, but in an inadequate
manner. For many years, nominal energy prices in Iran were kept constant or
increased only moderately. Due to the high inflation rate, real energy prices decreased
continuously, with the exception of gasoline of which the price was drastically
increased  once  in  1980.  In  1998 the average nominal price of petroleum products  was
16 Rial or 1.3 US$-cent per liter and in  1999 the price of premium leaded gasoline
was about 90 US$-cent in OECD Europe against 4.2 US$-cent in Iran.
Iran's energy pricing policy has led to huge implicit subsidies on energy.
Domestic energy prices in the year of 2000 were between 5 percent and 27 percent of
international prices for fuel oil and gasoline respectively. Based on border prices these
subsidies vary between US$ 9.3 and US$ 14.4 billion, which is about 10 to 15% of
total GDP. Iran, as an oil-based economy, earns 75% of its foreign revenue and about
50% of its government budget from oil export.
Low energy prices also resulted in an inefficient and ineffective power and oil
refining sectors. Under normal conditions these sectors should be able to generate
money for their own investments. However, due to the low prices for their products
they have become dependent on government funding. With the many economic
problems Iran is facing, and the government's limited amount of financial resources,
these sectors have been under funded and have become less and less efficient, adding
to  Iran's  list of problems.
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Iran has implemented only one policy to reduce domestic reliability on oil
products. Iran is endowed with large natural gas reserves (24.3 trillion cubic meter or
857 trillion cubic feet, which is  15.8% of total world reserves), which are much more
difficult (and thus costly) to export than oil. For many years Iran has invested in a
domestic gas infrastructure, and in the use of gas in secondary oil recovery. As a
result the share of oil-based products in total energy demand has decreased  from over
80% in 1974 to less than 58% in 1998. However, during the same period final demand
still grew from 0.32 million barrels per day to 1.21 million.
Besides difficulties related to energy pricing and non-optimal usage, Iran's
domestic energy sector is characterized by many organizational problems.
First, there is a complex and centralized structure of decision preparation and
decision taking that does not favor quick responses to changes in domestic or
international energy markets. The current policy structure also hampers negotiations
with foreign oil companies and others, whose expertise is needed to improve Iran's
energy sector capabilities.
Second, ones the governmental bodies agree, there are several ministries, of
which the Ministry of Petroleum and the Ministry of Energy are the most prominent,
that have to implement the policies. The National Iranian Oil Company or NIOC is
Iran's most important executive body in the field of energy and is a subsidiary of the
Ministry of Petroleum. The NIOC is very large and very powerful, and policy
initiatives are often formulated by this organization, since it has all available
information on energy matters. But due to the large and very diverse nature of
NIOC's activities decision-making within the NIOC is also a slow and time-
consuming process. As a result of this organizational structure, decision-making that
in other countries is done by several independent (not necessarily private) energy
companies is in Iran the domain of one company, which is again intertwined with
ministerial decision-making. This has led to very slow and often counter productive
decision-making, and incoherent policy implementations.
An issue that was not studied in this research, but needs to be considered is the
liberalization and eventually privatization of many of the energy related activities that
are now part of the NIOC. Such policies would undoubtedly improve the
effectiveness and efficiency o f the domestic energy sector.
Our analysis has resulted in three important strategic planning issues. First, the
gas for oil substitution policy has to be continued. Second, the domestic energy prices
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need to be increased and this pricing policy needs to be supported by a rigorous non-
price energy policy, including building codes, energy labeling for appliances, etc.
Third, restructuring the domestic energy sector is a necessity in order to
improve decision-making at all levels. The domination of all energy matters by the
government sector has to be abolished.
Natural gas resources are widely available in Iran, cheap to produce, but
di fficult to export.  The gas  for oil substitution policy  is  one of the ways to reduce the
growth in domestic oil consumption and thus increase the amount of oil available for
export.
As we have shown, increasing domestic energy prices to border prices will
abolishes the implicit subsidies, and will, contrary to popular belief, fuel the economy,
and if supported by an adequate financial policy reduces Iran's rampant inflation
considerably. In this scenario, removing implicit energy subsidies and pricing
domestic energy at border prices will provide large funds for the government, which
can be used to lower inflation by lowering the growth in liquidity needed for
government funding. Furthermore, sufficient money will be available to compensate
the poor. The lower liquidity growth will stabilize Iran's economy, with a lower Rial
exchange rate volatility and inflation. The lower domestic energy demand results in a
considerable increase in oil revenues, which will  fuel a faster growth of the economy.
Within two to three years these positive economic effects of the domestic energy price
increases counterbalance the expected increase in inflation. This is in strong contrast
to popular belief in Iran.
In  the RS (removing subsidy) scenario the annual GDP growth  rate  is  1.11
percent higher than in the business as usual or RF (reference) scenario. In the RS
scenario total earnings from oil export is expected to be 423.3 billion USS, 1.26 times
the revenues in the RF scenario. Because of the much lower domestic inflation in the
RS scenario, the value of the Rial does not depreciate, but stabilizing around the
current parity to US$.
Based  on our quantitative analysis  for the period 1998-2020, the growth  rate
of energy demand in the RS scenario is about 3%, 1.2% lower than in the RF
scenario. Total energy conservation amounts to 4.56 billion BOE and US$ 403 billion
in implicit energy subsidies will become available for the government.
Although in the RS scenario energy prices increase quickly between 2002 and
2007 to reach border prices, domestic energy prices in 2020 would still be much
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lower than the current energy prices in most other countries. In the RS scenario the
price o f one composite barrel of petroleum products in Iran would be about 30 US$ in
2020, whereas it is currently about $44 in the US and $141 in the UK.
Additional conservation policies that supplement the pricing policy will
enhance the effect of the pricing policy. An additional 2.33 billion BOE can be saved,
leading to an additional US$ 19.4 billion in oil income over the period 2008-2020.
The additional energy savings can be achieved by policy measures, such as the
installation of energy efficiency agencies, national energy efficiency programs, a
reduction of losses and waste in the primary energy sector, applying mandatory
building codes and compulsory building certificates, labeling and efficiency standards
for appliances, fiscal measures, subsidies, and a comprehensive transport policy.
The removal of the implicit energy subsidies in the period 2002-2007 and
applying targeted conservation policies afterwards will improve Iran's economic
performance considerably. This policy is needed to prevent a rapid decrease of oil
dollar revenues and the gradual collapse of the economy in the next decade.
8.3 Future Research
Almost every Iranian has an opinion about how Iran's energy resources should be
used; however, only a few contribute to this discussion based on facts and scientific
analyses. Through this research, substantial effort was spent to improve the level of
the discussion about Iran's domestic energy sector, using sound scientific
methodologies. Iran's domestic energy sector was analyzed and it was shown that by
better policy, especially drastic price increases, it can be improved considerably. As a
result substantial energy conservation becomes feasible. Energy that can be exported,
and the extra revenue so obtained can contribute considerably   to   Iran' s economic
development. Despite the fact that our analysis is a comprehensive one, it is still only
a partial analysis. The model used to analyze the domestic energy sector includes only
a rudimentary macro model and the financial sector is not endogenous. Furthermore,
the model is based on data that cover several difficult economic times (a revolution, a
war, and a boycott by the U.S.A), and although the estimated equations of the model
are relatively stable many more detailed studies as well as a more rigorous economic
evaluation is required.
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Further research must include detailed studies of the power sector and the
refinery sector to map out plans for improvement. Detailed analyses of Iran's
technology base in these sectors, but in building and transport also, are required when
energy saving and technology improvement policies will be developed. As we have
shown, all other improvements of Iran's domestic energy sector would be futile
without drastic increases of Iran's domestic energy prices. An often used argument
against domestic price increases is that the poor would suffer. However, it has been
shown that the price increases would supply the government with sufficient means to
curtail inflation and the money to compensate the poor. (The latter needs a more
detailed study also.)
Note that the rich would after a few years benefit much more from this policy
than the poor will ever do, because of the decrease in inflation and Iran's overall
economic improvement.
Only through a sound domestic energy policy, with increased energy prices at
its core, the Iranian people will be able to benefit more and longer from Iran's natural
resources.  If this policy is not implemented Iran will suffer the economic and social
consequences in ten to fifteen years time.
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Appendix A: Overview of the Model
KEYNESIAN MODEL
Estimated equations
LOG(CP)   = - 7.899 + 0.137 * LOG(GDEM82) + 0.663 * LOG(POP)
+ 0.152 * LOG(R$) + 0.376 * LOG(CP(-1))
LOG(I) = 0.492 + 0.281 * LOG(R$) + 0.158 * LOG(CAPIM$) + 0.665 * LOG(I(-1))
LOG(G)    = - 0.309 + 0.214 * LOG(R$) + 0.150 * LOG(GDEM82) + 0.774 * LOG(G(-1))
LOG(M)    = 4.070 + 0.205 * LOG(R$) - 0.023 * TREND + 0.847 * LOG(M(-1))
- 0.461 * LOG(M(-2))
LOG(CPI)  = 5.179 + 1.149 * (LOG(LIQUID) - LOG(GDPM82)) + [AR( 1) = 0.235]
In the  IM scenario  the following equation  is  used for  the  period  2002-2006




GDPM82 = 1826.334 + 0.807 * GDEM82 - 1019.602 * DGDE+81.542 * TREND
X              = AERC * (R$ - FDI)
RS             = OILRS + NOILR.$ + FDI - BE
OILR$ = (XOIL * 365 * POIL) / 1000
XOIL = (QOIL) - (DOILD / 365)
In  the  IM scenario the following  additional equation  is  used for  the period  2002-2006
LIQUID       =1.15*LIQUID(-1) - 0.5ER S * (SUBSIDRF - SUBSIDRS)
Exchange rate equation
LOG(ER)   = 1.670  + 0.386 * LOG(CPI) - 0.368 * LOG(R$)  + 0.606 * LOG(ER(-1))
Converting USS into real Rial
LOG(AERC) = 6.244 - 0.697 * LOG(POIL) + 0.133 * LOG(AERC(-1))
FINAL ENERGY DEMAND MODEL
LOG(JETF) = - 10.640 + 0.136 * LOG(PASA) + 0.541 * LOG(LOADA)
+ 1,069 * LOG(GDPM82) - 0.047 * TREND + 0.207 * LOG(JETF(-1))
LPG =  - 1798.973 -31.832 * RPLPG + 0.00053 * NRHOUS + 0.0618 * GDPM82
+ 0.601 * LPG(-1)
LOG(GSLN)    = - 4.429 - 0.0236 * LOG(RPGSLN) + 0.354 * LOG(SGSCAR)
+ 0.425 * LOG(GDPM82) - 0.1 14 * DGSLN  + 0.483 * LOG(GSLN(-1))
LOG(KER) = - 0.1507  - 0.142 * LOG(RPKER)  + 0.618 * LOG(GDPM82)
+ 0.380 * LOG(KER(-1))
LOG(GSOIL)   = 0.115  - 0.069 * LOG(RPGSOIL)  + 0.221 * LOG(GDPM82)
+ 0.781 * LOG(GSOIL(-1))
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LOG(FOIL) = 2.172  - 0.108
* LOG(RPFOIL) + 0.053 * LOG(GDPM82)
+ 0.702 * LOG(FOIL(-1))
NG = 0.650 - 0.0523 * RPNG + 3.004E-06 * NNGC + 0.759 * NG(-1)
LOG(ELEC)    = 0.675 - 0.075
* LOG(RPELEC) + 0.138
* LOG(NELECC)
+ 0.831 * LOG(ELEC(-1))
Additional equations
LOG(SGSCAR) =  - 0.371 + 0.214
* LOG(GDPM82) - 0.0046 * TREND
+ 0.894 * LOG(SGSCAR(-1))
LOG(SGOCAR) =  - 11.149 + 0.212
* LOG(GDPM82) + 0.745 * LOG(POP)
- 0.0136 * TREND + 0.700 * LOG(SGOCAR(-1))
LOG(NELECC) = 0.543  + 0.943
* [)(LOG(NHOUS)) + 0.944 * LOG(NELECC(-1))
PRIMARY ENERGY DEMAND MODEL
Quantity of thermal electricity generated (million kWh)
GEG = ELEC / (EF / 100)
HEG = (SH(-1) / 100) *0.9999 * GEG
SH = (HEG / GEG) * 100
QTEG = GEG - HEG
Fuel demand
LOG(FOILE)   = 1.435 + 0.396
* LOG(QTEG) + 0.755 * LOG(FOILE(-1))
- 0.435 * LOG(FOILE(-2))
LOG(GSOILE) = 0.627 + 0.358 * LOG(QTEG) - 0.549
* DGSOILE
+ 0.424 * LOG(GSOILE(-1))
LOG(NGE) =  - 2.898 + 0.328
* LOG(QTEG) + 0.725 * LOG(NGE(-1))
Domestic demand for energy carriers in million BOE
JETFB = (JETF  * 6.063) / 1000
LPGB = (LPG * 4.166) / 1000
GSLNB = (GSLN * 5.525) / 1000
KERB = (KER * 5.928) / 1000
GSOILB = (GSOIL * 6.189) / 1000
FOILB = (FOIL * 6.502)/ 1000
NGB = (NG * 6.388)
ELECB = (ELEC * 630.38 / 1000000)
Total final energy demand in million BOE
TFEDB = JETFB+LPGB+GSLNB+KERB+GSOILB+FOILB+NGB+ELECB+SOLIDB
Petroleum product demand by the power sector in million BOE
GSOILEB = (GSOILE * 6.189) / 1000
FOILEB = (FOILE * 6.502) / 1000
Total energy demand in million BOE
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TPPC = (JETFB+LPGB+GSLNB+KERB+GSOILB+FOILB) + (FOILEB+OSOILEB)
Domestic oil demand
DOILD = ((TPPC) * 1.14)
Total demand for natural gas
NGT = (NG + NGE + NGR) * 1.0496
NGR = 0.87 * (DOILD / 365)
Total primary energy demand in million BOE
NGTB = NGT * 6.388
SOLIDB = 1.01 * SOLIDB(-1)
HEGB = HEG * 630.38 / 1000000
TPED = DOILD + NGTB + SOLIDB + HEGB
Real prices of energy carriers
RPJETF = PJETF / CPI * 100
RPLPG = PLPG / CPI * 100
RPGSLN = PGSLN / CPI * 100
RPGSOIL = PGSOIL / CPI * 100
RPKER = PKER / CPI *  100
R.PFOIL = PFOIL / CPI * 100
RPNG = PNG / CPI * 100
RPELEC = PELEC / CPI * 100
Prices of energy carriers per BOE
PJETFB = (PJETF  * 1000) / 6.063
PLPGB = (PLPG *  1000) / 4.166
PGSLNB = (PGSLN * 1000) / 5.525
PKERB = (PKER * 1000) / 5.928
PGSOILB = (PGSOIL *  1000) / 6.189
PFOILB = (PFOIL * 1000) / 6.502
PNGB = (PNG * 1000) / 6.388
PELECB = (PELEC * 1000000) / 630.38
Average price of energy
PENG = [(PJETFB * JETFB) + (PLPGB * LPGB) + (PGSLNB * GSLNB)
+ (PKERB * KERB) + (PGSOILB * GSOILB) + (PFOILB * FOILB)
+ (PNGB * NGB) + (PELECB * ELECB)] / (TFEDB - SOLIDB)
IMPLICIT SUBSIDY MODEL (in billion USS)
SJETF = ((PBJETF - (PJETF / ER)) * JETF) / 1000
SLPG = ((PBLPG - (PLPG / ER)) * LPG) / 1000
SGSLN = ((PBGSLN - (PGSLN / ER)) * GSLN) / 1000
SGSOIL = ((PBGSOIL - (PGSOIL / ER)) * GSOIL) / 1000
SKER = ((PBKER - (PKER / ER)) * KER) / 1000
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SFOIL = ((PBFOIL - (PFOIL / ER)) * FOIL) / 1000
SNG = (PBNG - (PNG / ER)) * NG
SELEC = ((PBELEC - (PELEC/ ER)) * ELEC) / 1000
SUBSID = SJETF + SLPG + SGSLN + SGSOIL + SKER + SFOIL + SNG + SELEC
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Appendix B:  List of Variables
Name Definition Unit Source
AERC Average conversion rate to convert the dollar Rial per US$ Own calculationvalue of export into Rial in constant prices
BE National Iranian OilBuyback expenditure Billion US$
Company (NIOC)
CAPIM$ Dollar value of capital goods import Million US$ Central Bank of Iran
Coj Million BOE   Own calculations
Amount of energy j conserved. j={JETF, LPG,
GSLN, KER, GSOIL, FOIL, NG, ELEC}.
Cp                                                                                     Billion Rial Central Bank of IranConsumption expenditure
in constant  1982
market prices
CPI Consumer price index 1982 =100 Central Bank of Iran
DGDE Unit free
Dummy variable, 1 for 1994-1996 and 0
otherwise.
DSGLN Unit free
Dummy variable for the period gasoline was
rationed. 1 in 1980-1982 and 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable for natural gas and gas oil
DGSOILE substitution in power generations; 1 for 1989- Unit free
1998 and 0 otherwise.
DOILD Domestic oil demand Million barrels  NIOC
EGCO Electricity conservation due to fuel use reduction Million barrels  Own calculations
ELEC Electricity final demand Million kWh Ministry of Energy
ER Exchange rate in free market Rial per US$ Central  Bank of Iran
ETCO Electricity conservation due loss reduction Million barrels  Own calculations
FDI Foreign direct investment billion US$ Central Bank of Iran
National Iranain Oil
FOIL Fuel oil final demand Million liter Refinery &Distribution
(NIORDC)
FOILE Fuel oil demand power sector Unit Ministry of Energy
G Government expenditure in 1982 market prices Billion Rial Central Bank of Iran
GDEM82 Billion Rial Central Bank of Iran
Gross domestic expenditure in 1982 market
prices.
GDPM82 Gross domestic product in 1982 market prices Billion Rial Central Bank of Iran
GEG Gross electricity generated Million kWh Ministry of Energy
GSLN Gasoline final demand Million liter NIORDC
GSOIL Gas oil final demand Million liter NIORDC
GSOILE Gas oil demand by the power sector Million liter Ministry ofEnergy
HEG Hydro electricity generated Million kWh Ministry of Energy
I                 Investment in 1982 market prices Billion Rial Central Bank of Iran
jB Mostly denotes an energy variable in barrel BOE
JETF Jet fuel final demand Million liter NIORDC
KER Kerosene final demand Million liter NIORDC
LIQUID Liquidity Billion Rial Central Bank of Iran
1000 Iran Statistical CenterLOADA Aviation carried cargo
tone/kilometer (ISC)
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas final demand Million liter NIORDC
M                 Import in 1982 market prices Billion Rial Central  Bank of Iran
NELECC Number ofelectricity users 1000 customers Ministry of Energy
NG Natural gas final demand Billion m, National Iranian Gas
Company
NGE Natural gas demand power sector Billion m' Ministry of EnergyNGR Natural gas demand in Refineries Billion m' NIORDC
NGT Natural gas demand total Billion m3 Own calculation
NOILR$ Dollar value of non-oil export (Nominal) Billion US$ Central Bank of Iran
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NHOUS Number of households Actual number  ISC
NRHOUS Number of Rural Households Actual number  ISC
OILR$ Oil revenue Billion Rial Central Bank of Iran
OILR$ Dollar value of oil export (Nominal) Billion US$ Central Bank of Iran
OILRES Oil reserves Billion barrel   BP
Million
PASA Aviation carried passengers passenger per    ISC
kilometer
PENG Nominal price ofenergy (weighted average) RiaVBOE Own calculation
                GSLN, KER. GSOIL, FOIL, NG, ELEC. Rial per
unit Ministry of Energy
Nominal price of fuel j  per unit; j  = JETF, LPG,
Nominal price per barrel of fuel j; j  =  JETF,PjB Wai/BOE Own calculationLPG, GSLN, KER, GSOIL, FOIL, NG, ELEC.
POIL Oil price(average price of Iran's oil) US$ per barrel
OPEC Annual
Statistical Bulletin




QOIL Domestic oil production Petroleum
Million barrels
per day Development &
Engineering
Company (PDEC
RS                                                                                              Billion US$ Central Bank of Iran
Dollar value of oil and non-oil export or Dollar
innow
RPj               GSLN, KER, GSOIL, FOIL, NG, ELEC. Rial per unit
Own calculationsReal price of fuel j  per unit; j = JETF,  LPG,
QTEG Quantity ofThermal Electricity Generation Million kWh Ministry of Energy
SGSCAR Stock of gasoline using cars Actual number  ISC
SGOCAR Stock of gas oil using cars Actual number  ISC
SH Percentage Ministry of Energy
Share of hydro electricity in total electricity
generation
SOLIDB Solid fuels Million BOE Ministry of Energy
Implicit subsidy on final demand fuel j; j  =
Sj                 JETF, LPG, GSLN, KER, GSOIL, FOIL, NG, Billion US$ Own calculations
ELEC.
SUBSID Total implicit subsidies on final energy demand Billion US$ Own calculations
TFEDB Total final energy demand Million barrels Own calculations
TFCO Total final energy conservation Million barrels Own calculations
TPED Total primary energy demand Million barrels Own calculations
Million barrels
TPPC Total petroleum product consumption Own calculationsBOE
TREND Time trend with 1974 = 1 Unit free
X                           Export  in 1982 market prices Billion Rial Central Bank of Iran
XOIL Oil export
Million barrels OPEC Annual
per day Statistical Bulletin
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Nederlandse Samenvatting
De Islamitische Republiek Iran beschikt over aanzienlijke voorraden van de
natuurlijke hulpbronnen aardolie en aardgas. In het jaar 2000 was dit een kleine  10%
van de aangetoonde wereld olievoorraad en zo'n 16% van de aardgasvoorraad.
Hiermee was Iran nummer vier op het gebied van olie en na de Russische Federatie
nummer 2 als het gaat om aardgas. Voor de meeste Iraniers is het idee dat er in de
toekomst wellicht te weinig olie beschikbaar is voor export dan ook ondenkbaar. Toch
dreigt deze situatie op de niet at te lange termijn te ontstaan indien het binnenlandse
verbruik van olieproducten een gelijke groei blijft vertonen als in het verleden. Deze
groei bedroeg over de periode 1974-1998 gemiddeld een kleine 5.6% per jaar. In
termen van consumptie betekent dit dat de binnenlandse consumptie is opgelopen van
0.32 miljoen vaten per dag in 1974 tot 1.21 miljoen in 1998. De productiecapaciteit
voor olie bedroeg in 1998 echter slechts 3.84 miljoen vaten per dag, tegenover 6
miljoen in 1974, en de feitelijke productie 3.73 miljoen. Bij een gelijke groei in de
vraag en een verdergaande afname van de productiecapaciteit zal rond 2020 de
binnenlandse vraag groter zijn dan de productiecapaciteit.
De stijging in binnentands verbruik van olieproducten hoeft geen probleem te
zijn indien deze stijging werd veroorzaakt door een groei van het reele bruto
binnenlands product (BBP). De gemiddelde groei van het BBP in constante prijzen
van  1982 over dezelfde periode bedroeg echter slechts een kleine 1.9% perjaar.  Met
andere woorden, de groei van het binnenlands verbruik van olieproducten in Iran was
bijna een factor drie groter dan de groei van de economie in termen van reeel BBP.
Het gevolg van de afnemende productiecapaciteit en de stijgende binnenlandse
consumptie van olie, in combinatie met de lage economische groei, zorgt ervoor dat
de olie-inkomsten, de belangrijkste bron van export inkomsten voor Iran, onder druk
staan.
Er zijn een aantal oorzaken aan te wijzen voor de sterke stijging in het
binnenlands verbruik van olieproducten, zoals de afwezigheid van adequate
regulering op het gebied van energieverbruik en een zeer inefficiente elektriciteit en
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raffinage sector. Daarnaast spelen demografische factoren, zoals de sterke groei van
de bevolking en de trek naar de steden, een rol. De belangrijkste oorzaak vormen
echter de extreem lage nominale en reele prijzen van energieproducten. Zo is de prijs
van benzine in Iran, op 66n na, de laagste in de wereld. De prijs van benzine in het
jaar 2000 was ongeveer 25% van de prijs op de internationale markt. Voor diesel,
stookolie en LPG bedroeg dit percentage in het jaar 2000 respectievelijk 7,0%, 5,4%
en 8,4%. Deze extreem lage prijzen hebben geleid tot de sterke groei in verbruik.
Een manier om de economische kosten van deze prijspolitiek uit te drukken is
het berekenen van de impliciete subsidies op energie. De subsidie in een bepaald jaar
op bijvoorbeeld benzine kan worden geschat door het binnenlands verbruik van
benzine te vermenigvuldigen met het verschil tussen de prijs op de internationale
markt en de binnenlandse prijs. Voor de verschillende energieproducten staan deze
impliciete subsidies weergegeven in tabel 1. Omdat de prijs van olie op de
internationale markt sterk fluctueert, tonen ook de impliciete subsidies sterke
fluctuaties. Zo bedroeg de gemiddelde prijs van een vat olie in 1996 zo'n 20 US$
gedaald, maar in 1998 slechts 10.8 US$.
Tabel 1: Impliciete subsidies op energie in miljarden US$
Jaar Jet fuel LPG  Benzine Kerosine Diesel Stook- Aardgas Elektri- Totaal
olie citeit
1994 0.10 0.40 1.31 1.43 2.74 0.97 1.64 3.55 12.15
1995 0.11 0.42 1.22 1.45 2.71 0.91 2.01 3.79 12.61
1996 0.15 0.54 1.46 1.91 3.54 1.07 2.72 4.44 15.83
1997 0.15 0.48 1.54 1.58 3.22 1.08 2.51 4.15 14.70
1998 0.09 0.31 0.91 0.95 2.04 0.64 1.88 2.60 9.29
1999 0.13 0.46 1.28 1.23 2.68 0.66 1.31 3.42 11.17
2000 0.19 0.68 2.03 1.78 3.79 0.88 1.39 3.64 14.38
De "internationale" prijzen van aardgas en elektriciteit zijn vastgesteld op
basis van respectievelijk aardgascontracten met buurlanden en de kosten van
elektriciteitsproductie in Turkije. De totale waarde van de impliciete subsidies liggen
tussen de  10% en  15% van het BBP in constante prijzen en zijn van dezelfde orde van
grote als de bijdrage van de oliesector aan het BBP.
De centrale vraag die in dit proefschrift wordt bestudeerd is dan ook:
Welke zijn de zwakke en sterke punten van de binnenlandse energiesector in Iran,
welke kansen en bedreigingen kent deze, en welke energiepolitiek kan ervoor zorgen
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dat de binnenlandse energiesector een positieve bijdrage levert aan de Iraanse
economie?
Om deze vraag te kunnen beantwoorden zijn in hoofdstuk 2 allereerst de zwakke en
sterke punten van de Iraanse economie in z'n algemeenheid en die van de
binnenlandse energiesector in het bijzonder in kaart gebracht. Daarnaast is gekeken
naar de kansen en bedreigingen. Naast het bovengenoemde prijsbeleid is de moeizame
besluitvorming als het gaat om de binnenlandse energiesector en belangrijk zwak
punt. De sector wordt volledig gedomineerd door de overheid en de besturing ervan
wordt in grote mate door de regering gedaan.
In hoofdstuk 3 is de externe omgeving in kaart gebracht. Aangetoond is dat de
internationale markt voor energie, en voor olieproducten in het bijzonder, de komende
vijftig jaar blijft groeien. Het vraagniveau zal naar verwachting in de OECD landen,
o.a. om milieupolitieke redenen en een verzadiging van de markt, stabiliseren of
wellicht op termijn zelfs iets afnemen. Dit effect zal echter ruimschoots teniet worden
gedaan door de stijgende vraag in ontwikkelingslanden. De inkomensgroei in landen
als China en India zal leiden tot een groei in de vraag naar olieproducten. Ook het
effect van nieuwe technologieen zal naar verwachting de komende vijftig jaar niet
zodanig zijn dat dit leidt tot een absolute afname van de vraag naar olie.
Op basis van de analyses in de hoofdstukken 2 en 3 wordt in hoofdstuk 4 een
SWOT analyse van de binnenlandse energiesector van Iran gemaakt, waarbij SWOT
staat voor Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities en Threats. Deze in Harvard
ontwikkelde methode wordt normaal toegepast op bedrijven; hier is de methode
echter aangepast en toegepast voor een sector. Het resultaat van de SWOT analyse is
de formulering van effectieve strategieen voor de toekomst.
De SWOT analyse van de binnenlandse energiesector heeft aangetoond dat er
drie hoofdstrategieen zijn die moeten worden uitgewerkt:
1. Het vervangen van olie door aardgas. Omdat Iran beschikt over grote
hoeveelheden goedkoop aardgas en aardgas om technische redenen veel
moeilijker kan worden geexporteerd dan olie, ligt het voor de hand het
binnenlands gebruik van olie terug te dringen via het gebruik van aardgas. Deze
strategie wordt reeds enige tijd toegepast.
2. Het ontwikkelen van een energiebesparingsbeleid. De kern van dit beleid moet
worden gevormd door het verwijderen de impliciete subsidies op energie. Echter
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een aangepast prijsbeleid alleen is onvoldoende. Dit beleid moet worden
ondersteund door additionele maatregelen ter bevordering van de
energiebesparingen
3.     Het    besluitvormingsproces    voor de binnenlandse energiesector moet worden
verbeterd. Nagenoeg alle bedrijven in de energiesector zijn eigendom van de
overheid en de overheid heeft een sterke invloed op de dagelijkse leiding ervan.
Voor een groot aantal bedrijven zou liberalisering, en eventueel privatisering,
moeten worden overwogen.
In het vervolg van het proefschrift is getracht de eerste twee strategieen te
kwantificeren, waarbij de nadruk heeft gelegen op de tweede strategie. Het verbeteren
van de efficientie en de effectiviteit van de besluitvorming, de derde strategie, is
weliswaar essentieel voor de eerste twee, maar vraagt om een ander type analyse dan
de eerste twee.
De nadruk bij de eerste twee strategieifn ligt op de tweede, omdat het
vervangen van olie door gas in de binnenlandse energievoorziening al enige tijd wordt
germplementeerd. De discussie over de tweede strategie, energiebesparing door o.a.
de invoering van een adequaat prijsbeleid, is daarentegen nog nauwelijks gevoerd.
Hiervoor zijn zowel politieke als economisch redenen. Politiek is het moeilijk te
verkopen dat de prijzen van energieproducten aanzienlijk moeten stijgen. De
jaarlijkse inflatie is rond de 20% en de loonstijgingen blijven hierbij sterk achter. De
verwachting is dat het algemeen prijspeil door een fikse verhoging van de
energieprijzen alleen nog maar zal toenemen. Echter de belangrijkste oorzaak van de
grote inflatie is de sterke stijging van de geldhoeveelheid als gevolg van de inflatoire
financiering van z'n uitgaven door de overheid.
De vraag is nu of de inflatie niet sterk kan worden teruggedrongen door de
afschaffing van de impliciete subsidies op energieproducten. Verwijdering van de
impliciete subsidies leidt tot prijsstijgingen van tussen de 400% voor benzine tot een
kleine 1850% voor stookolie. Dit zijn weliswaar forse prijsstijgingen, maar ook na
een dergelijke operatie zijn de energieprijzen in Iran nog steeds aanmerkelijk lager
dan in de meeste andere landen van de wereld. De verwachting is dat de
prijsstijgingen zullen leiden tot een aanmerkelijke verlaging van het binnenlands
energieverbruik. De prijsstijgingen zullen in eerste instantie inderdaad een grotere
inflatie tot gevolg hebben. Echter door de extra inkomsten voor de overheid uit
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enerzijds de verkopen van energie in het binnenland en anderzijds de verhoogde
inkomsten uit de extra export van olie zal de noodzaak tot inflatoire financiering
aanmerkelijk doen afnemen. Gevolg hiervan is dan weer dat, bij een goede
implementatie van de maatregelen, de inflatie op de wat langere termijn sterk zal
afnemen.
De prijsaanpassingen alleen zijn echter onvoldoende om een maximaal
rendement uit deze politiek te halen. De prijspolitiek moet worden ingebed in een
adequate regelgeving op het gebied van energieverbruik en energiebesparing. Het
effect van de prijsmaatregel kan daar aanzienlijk door worden verstrekt.
Tezamen met een efficientere overheid is de prijspolitiek ook een
noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor een succesvolle liberalisering, en mogelijk
privatisering, van onderdelen van de binnenlandse energiesector. Immers alleen bij
voldoende inkomsten uit eigen activiteiten kunnen bedrijven in de energiesector
zelfstandig opereren.
Om na te gaan of en in welke mate deze effecten zullen optreden is een model
gemaakt van het binnenlands energieverbruik in Iran. Dit model van de energiesector
is gecompleteerd met een eenvoudig macromodel om de effecten van meer olie-
inkomsten te kunnen evalueren. Dit model is te vinden in hoofdstuk 6. In dit
hoofdstuk is ook het referentie of RF scenario ontwikkeld. Dit scenario geeft de
ontwikkeling weer van de binnenlandse energiesector tot 2020 bij ongewijzigd beleid.
De belangrijkste conclusies zijn:
•   De finale vraag naar energie blijft groeien met gemiddeld 4.5% per jaar, maar
door de sterkere nadruk op aardgas neemt de finale vraag naar olie slechts toe met
2.3% per jaar. Met een gemiddelde groei van het BBP in constante prijzen van
2.4% betekent dit dat de Iraanse economie steeds energie-intensiever wordt.
•  Ook de vraag naar primaire energie blijft sterk groeien en loopt, uitgedrukt in
vaten olie, op tot 5.48 miljoen vaten per dag in 2020, waarvan 3.35 miljoen vaten
in de vorm van aardgas.
•  Door de stijgende binnenlandse vraag en omdat de productiecapaciteit van olie
verder afneemt, loopt de export van olie in het RF scenario terug van 2.52 miljoen
vaten per dag nu naar 1.33 miljoen in 2020.
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•   De impliciete subsidies op energie lopen op van USS 9.35 miljard in 2000 naar
US$ 20.6 miljard in 2020.
Het RF scenario is minder negatief dan een eenvoudige extrapolatie omdat het at
rekening houdt met enige verbeteringen. Zo is de aanname over de gemiddelde
stijging in liquiditeiten op  15%  per jaar gezet terwijl  deze  in het verleden meer dan
20% bedroeg.
In hoofdstuk 7 wordt geanalyseerd wat het effect is van het verwijderen van de
impliciete subsidies op energie, d.w. z. een aanpassing van het binnenlands prijsniveau
aan dat van de internationale vrije marktprijzen. Deze aanpassing gebeurt over een
periode van vijfjaar van 2002 tot 2007. Tegelijkertijd wordt de inflatoire financiering
van het overheidsbudget teruggebracht om  in 2007 uit te komen op 5% per jaar i.p.v.
van  15%. Dit scenario wordt aangeduid  als  het RS (remove subsidy) scenario.  Deze
politiek heeft in de periode 2001-2007 de volgende effecten:
•     De vraag naar energie neemt sterk af en groeit gemiddeld met slechts  1.2%, i.p.v.
met bijna 4.5%. De bespaarde hoeveelheid energie over de periode 2002-2006 is
equivalent aan 543.2 miljoen vaten olie, met een geschatte waarde van US$ 13
miljard.
•   De binnenlandse vraag naar olie neemt af met gemiddeld 2.4% en is in het RS
scenario in 2007 1.1 miljoen vaten per dag -tegenover 1.5 miljoen in het RF
scenario-, hetgeen gelijk is aan het niveau van 1992.
•    Het lagere binnenlandse verbruik impliceert een hogere export van olie. De export
inkomsten nemen in het RS scenario dan ook toe van US$ 21 miljard in 2001 naar
US$ 24 miljard in 2007, i.p.v. een afname zoals in het RF scenario.
•   De prijsindex van consumptie goederen stijgt in 2003 en 2004 sneller dan in het
RF scenario, maar na 2005 heeft het effect van de lagere groei in liquiditeiten de
overhand en daalt de index in het RS scenario om in 2007 uit te komen op
ongeveer het niveau van 2001. De wisselkoers vertoont een vergelijkbare
ontwikkeling.
Ook voor de periode 2007-2020 heeft de nieuwe prijspolitiek duidelijke voordelen.
•    De groei van het BBP is in het RS scenario gemiddeld 0.63% hoger dan in het RF
scenario.
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•  De gemiddelde inflatie in het RS scenario voor de periode 2007-2020 is slechts
3.8%, tegenover 14.4% in het RF scenario. De wisselkoers vertoont een
vergelijkbaar beeld.
•     De binnenlandse vraag naar olie groeit met slechts  1.5% en bedraagt 1.33 miljoen
vaten per dag in 2020 tegenover 2.02 miljoen in het RF scenario.
•  De inkomsten uit de export van olie nemen sterk toe en bedragen in 2020 US$
19.6 miljard, US$ 7 mitjard hoger dan bij het RF scenario.
•  De totale binnenlandse energiebesparingen uitgedrukt in vaten olie equivalenten
bedragen 4.2 miljard. In termen van internationale prijzen is de waarde hiervan
US$ 121.6 miljard. Dit bedrag is gelijk aan 51% van de totale olie-inkomsten in
het RF scenario.
•    De energie intensiteit neemt in het RS scenario af tot minder dan 73% van die in
het RF scenario.
In tabel 2 zijn de resultaten voor beide periodes gecombineerd en worden beide
scenario's vergeleken.
Tabel 2. Vergelijking van de twee scenario's voor de periode 2002-2020
Waarde Betere
BeschrijvingVariabel RS RF performance
BBP 2.44% 1.73% RS per jar
CPI 0.37% 14.07% RS perjaar
Reele energieprijzen 6.00% -5.54% RS perjaar
Olie-inkomsten 423.3 335.0 RS miljard US$
Wisselkoers 0.44% 13.72% RS perjaar
Energievraag 3.07% 4.23% RS perjaar
Energiebesparing 4.56              - RS miljard vaten
Energie-intensiteit 1.32% 2.87% RS per jaar
Impliciete subsidies 38.7 441.7 RS miljard US$
Omdat de prijspolitiek effectiever zal zijn indien deze is ingebed in een groter pakket
van energiebesparende maatregelen is nagegaan wat het effect van flankerende
maatregelen kan zijn. Om een inschatting te kunnen maken is gekeken naar het effect
van energiebesparingsmaatregelen in een drietal landen met een goede reputatie op
het gebied van energiebeleid, te weten het Verenigd Koninkrijk, Nederland en
Thailand. Voor deze drie landen is gekeken naar economisch haalbare
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besparingsscenario's. Daarnaast is voor Iran in kaart gebracht wat al onderzocht is als
het gaat om energiebesparing. De resultaten voor de drie landen zijn weergegeven in
de  tabel  3.
Tabel  3. Het economisch haalbaar potentieel voor energiebesparing als percentage
van de energieconsumptie in het basisjaar.
EFFEE-1CL           QC 2. P B @: 2
R. R R '0 O           20            0            0Land <99  *1 4 Besparing
UK 38.0 30.0 24.0 69.0 - -      in 2020 t.o.v. 1996
Nederland    28.5    44.0    59.9    28.2    76.0    41.0    in 2015 t.o.v. 1986 (TNO)
Nederland 35.0 64.0 65.0 45.0 73.0 49 0 in 2015 t.o.v. 1990
(ICARUS)
10.0- in 2020 t.o.v. basis scenarioNederland 1 7 0                -         -         -         -
30.0 (REDUCE)
Thailand 48.3 14.6 90.8 72.3 18.9 50.9 in 2025 t.o.v. 1998
Aan de gebruikte studies liggen meestal zeer gedetailleerde analyses van sectoren en
technologieen ten grondslag. Ze kunnen dan ook niet meer dan een indicatie vormen
voor de mogelijkheden in Iran. Verder worden de landen gekenmerkt door hoge
energieprijzen die reeds enige tijd geleden zon ingevoerd. Het Iraanse prijspeil blijft
beneden dat van de bestudeerde landen, dit heeft een negatief effect op de potentiele
besparing. Daar staat tegenover dat op het moment van de berekening van het
besparingspotentieel de bestudeerde landen reeds enige tijd een beleid op het gebied
van energiebesparing hadden ingevoerd en de snelle winsten reeds waren
verwezenlijkt, dit in tegenstelling tot Iran waar nog geen binnenlands
energiebesparingsbeleid is ingevoerd. Dit heeft een positief effect op de
mogelijkheden voor energiebesparing in Iran t.o.v. de drie onderzochte landen. Tabel
4 bevat een overzicht van de belangrijkste instrumenten die in de verschillende landen
worden ingezet en die ook voor Iran van belang zijn.
Op basis van de besparingsmogelijkheden in de bestudeerde landen en de
informatie die bekend is over Iran, gaan we ervan uit dat de totale besparing die kan
worden bereikt 32% van het finale verbruik in 2020 in het RF scenario bedraagt. Dit
komt neer op een besparing van 40% van het totale finale energieverbruik in 2002. De
extra besparingsmogelijkheden zijn toegerekend aan de diverse energiedragers op
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basis van de aandelen van de energiedragers in het finale verbruik in het RS scenario.
We noemen dit scenario van additionele besparingen het IM scenario.
De belangrijkste effecten van de additionele maatregelen zijn:
•      De finale vraag naar energie neemt af van 3.8 miljoen vaten per dag in 2020 in het
RS scenario naar 3.1 miljoen in het IM scenario.
•  De vraag naar olieproducten daalt naar 850.000 vaten per dag, het niveau van
1992.
•   De additionele besparing in termen van vaten olie equivalenten op de finale vraag
over de gehele periode  in het IM scenario t.o.v.  het RS scenario  is 1.5 miljard
vaten, en t.o.v. het RF scenario 4.6 miljard.
• De olie-inkomsten in 2020 bedragen US$ 22.4 miljard in het IM scenario
tegenover US$ 19.6 in het RS scenario en US$ 13.0 in het RF scenario.
•  Ook de groei van het BBP is in het IM scenario hoger, in 2020 zo'n 0.4% t.o.v.
het RS scenario.
Tabel 4. Overzicht van energiebesparingsmaatregelen.
Omschrijving VK Nederland Thailand
Energieagentschappen
' NR NR                        N
Nationaal energie
ja               Ja               jaefficiency programma
verplicht en verplicht enEnergiebouwvoorschriften verplicht
gecontroleerd gecertificeerd
Labels en energie verplicht en verplicht en
verplichtefficiency standaarden gecontroleerd gecontroleerd
Fiscale maatre elenvoor PT, RT PT, RTauto's
Subsidies en incentives voor Conservation
3     EC, CC ECschone en efficiente auto's projects
Belasting op brandstoffen 4         A, 0.91,0.73 A, 0.71,0.73 A, 0.13, 0.09
Energie audits5 D, C D, C, G
1.   N, R en L staan respectievelijk voor nationale, regionale en lokale agentschappen.
2.   PT en RT staan respectievelijk voor "purchase tax" and "registration tax".
3.   EC en CC staand voor respectievelijk elektrische auto en CNG auto.
4.  A geeft aan dat op alle energiedragers belasting wordt geheven; het eerste getal is
de belasting als fractie van de prijs voor benzine en het tweede getal voor diesel.
5.   D, C en G staan voor respectievelijk huizen, bedrijven en overheidsgebouwen.
Uit de uitgevoerde analyses kunnen de volgende conclusies worden getrokken. De
angst die bij veel Iraniers leeft dat een aanpassing van de binnenlandse energieprijzen
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leidt tot inflatie en een verslechterende economie is ongegrond. Op de korte termijn
zullen de prijsstijgingen voor energieproducten inderdaad leiden tot een verhoogde
inflatie. Echter, indien de prijspolitiek wordt gecombineerd met een verbeterde
geldpolitiek hebben de prijsstijgingen een blijvend positief effect op de Iraanse
economie en zullen reeds na een drietal jaren de negatieve effecten van de
prijsstijgingen teniet worden gedaan door de positieve effecten ervan. De politiek
wordt dan gekenmerkt door een hogere economische groei, een aanmerkelijk lagere
inflatie, een blijvende verbetering van de wisselkoers en een veel langere periode
waarin olie-inkomsten een bijdrage kunnen leveren aan opbouw van de economie.
Indien het nieuwe prijsbeleid wordt ingebed in een pakket van
energiebesparingsmaatregelen zoals deze ook in andere landen zijn ingevoerd kan het
positieve effect van de prijsmaatregel zelfs aanzienlijk worden versterkt.
Uiteraard zijn deze conclusies tentatief Hoe de nieuwe geldpolitiek precies
moet worden uitgevoerd is in deze studie niet onderzocht. Ook is niet nagegaan hoe
de minder draagkrachtigen voor de prijsstijgingen kunnen worden gecompenseerd.
Hiervoor zijn additionele studies nodig.
Ook is onduidelijk hoe de besluitvorming over de binnenlandse
energiepolitiek kan worden verbeterd. Liberalisering, en wellicht privatisering, van
(grote) delen van de NIOC (de National Iranian Oil Company), die nu feitelijk door
de overheid wordt bestuurd, zijn nodig om de veerkracht en winstgevendheid van de
Imanse binnenlandse energiesector te verbeteren. Hetzelfde geldt voor de
elektriciteitssector en voor raffinaderijen. Maatregelen die zonder een aangepast
prijsbeleid niet kunnen worden doorgevoerd omdat de inkomsten van de zelfstandige
onderdelen onvoldoende zullen zijn om de benodigde energie-infrastructuur te
garanderen. Ook zal de politiek zich moeten beperken tot het aangeven van de kaders
voor de energiesector i.p.v. het besturen ervan. Op at deze gebieden is nog veel
additioneel onderzoek nodig. Het is nu echter duidelijk dat een aangepaste
energiepolitiek, met als kern hogere energieprijzen, een sterke positieve bijdrage kan
leveren aan het economisch herstel van Iran.
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